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“Generally, SMEs are confronted with unique problems… constraints include insufficient working 
premises and limited access to finance. In addition, Business Development Services, namely 
services related to entrepreneurship, business training, marketing, technology development and 
information are underdeveloped and not readily available. On the other hand, SME operators 
lack information as well as appreciation for such services and can hardly afford to pay for the 
services. As a result, operators of the sector have rather low skills. Also, there is no umbrella 
association for SMEs. At the same time, the institutions and associations supporting SMEs are 
weak, fragmented and uncoordinated partly due to lack of clear guidance and policy for the 
development of the sector” 
Ministry of Industry and Trade, United Republic of Tanzania (2002)1
1  Referenced from the “small and medium enterprise development policy”. w ww.tanzania.go.tz/pdf/smepolicy.pdf
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Executive Summary
This report presents the findings of research into the main outcomes of government and donor-backed 
efforts to promote small and medium-sized energy businesses (energy SMEs) in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The research follows an outcome analysis methodology. The focus is on four countries: Ghana, Senegal, 
Tanzania and Zambia and primarily on UNEP’s AREED programme (2002-2012).
This research focuses on the ‘contributing factors’ – a deliberately broader term that incorporates the 
internal ‘success factors’ – for energy SMEs, about which much has already been written. Indeed, the 
research findings presented in this report reaffirm most of what has been concluded in previous studies, 
including Kolominskas (2003); Mehlwana (2003); Denton (2006) and Napier-Moore (2006). These studies 
identified the lack of access to affordable finance as the being the predominant, persistent, barrier to 
establishing and scaling up a commercially viable energy SME sector, emphasising the lack of strong 
policy support from governments, poor business skills capacity and the high cost of many RETs as related 
cause-and-effect barriers.
While these issues continue to characterise, to a greater or lesser extent, the energy SMEs sectors in the 
countries studied for this research, it is more relevant to revisit the main assumption behind AREED and 
other donor-backed programmes designed to promote energy SMEs. The assumption is that the solution 
to the aforementioned barriers would be overcome by a ‘demonstration effect’ whereby successful energy 
SMEs, supported by donor-backed programmes, influence the commercial financial sector to invest in 
energy SMEs, thus triggering a virtuous circle of growth and profitability. Experiences drawn from a decade 
of AREED support across four of the project countries reveal both the presence (Ghana, Senegal) and 
absence, or weak presence, of this demonstration effect (Tanzania, Zambia). This is a central question, and 
one which was not the focus of previous research, presumably because the answer was not fully apparent 
prior to 2006 when the last substantial work was conducted.
Where there is an absence, or weak presence, of a demonstration effect a number of explanatory factors 
can be identified. These include, inter alia, the lack of an entrepreneurial culture; an SME ‘dependency 
syndrome’ perpetuated by grant-based support from governments and donor agencies; persistent 
shortcomings in business skills capacity; lack of clearly defined markets; demand-side barriers to purchase 
relatively high capital-intense energy products.
Where numerous energy SMEs are in operation and thus where a valid demonstration effect can be 
identified, there is a perceived paradox that serves to undermine commercial interest in investing in energy 
SMEs. The paradox is that the donor-supported businesses that were issued with concessional and/or 
flexible loans serve to demonstrate that these businesses depend upon such concessional terms, i.e., that 
they could not survive in ‘the real world’.  While this assumption is widely regarded as self-evident by private 
investors, there are in fact other, more concrete, factors that act to undermine the demonstration effect. 
These include, inter alia, relatively high transaction costs of investing in SMEs; the inherently complicated 
nature of energy sector SMEs with longer supply chains and slower pay-back periods for capital-intensive 
technologies such as solar PV; rigid rules regarding the need to secure collateral.
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These factors can be understood as structural issues that conspire to increase the financial risk of investing 
in energy SMEs and thus are not the product of ignorance on the behalf of the banking sector. In the 
countries studied for this research, these factors are compounded by the high opportunity costs for banks 
where higher rates of return can be secured from investing in high-turnover businesses, for example those 
trading in high-volume, perishable goods. There is also a more general challenge faced by a range of 
SME entrepreneurs where such individuals and businesses are considered by banks to have an inherently 
higher risk profile, a factor which, to some extent, appears to be the product of ‘anti-SME’ discrimination, 
where investors favour larger corporate players operating under licence, often backed by strong branding, 
reputation and/or political connections.
There is evidence that government in the countries studied is now more receptive to the concept of energy 
SMEs. For example, most governments have eased the burden of red tape that traditionally surrounded 
business registration in many African countries and some governments, such as Senegal, have set up 
government departments whose sole purpose is to support SMEs. However there is a predominant 
view among stakeholders, across the countries studied, that governments are ineffective in designing 
and implementing tangible support for energy SMEs, despite politicians often providing strong rhetorical 
support. As such the establishment and success of energy SMEs more often depends on support provided 
by donor agencies or NGOs that can provide technical assistance and/or subsidised loans.
This point highlights an important status quo, and an issue that was itself one of the key rationales behind 
supporting energy SMEs in the first place, i.e., to by-pass government in efforts to supply sustainable energy 
technologies to low income consumers by supporting SMEs. However, early experience with the practical 
challenge of supporting energy SMEs led observers, including Denton (2006) and Napier-Moore (2006), to 
consider the role and importance of an ‘enabling framework’ necessary for energy SMEs to function and 
thrive. While this issue would appear to present itself as a chicken-and-egg dilemma, the research findings 
presented here from Senegal, and to a lesser extent with Ghana’s LPG market, do suggest that conducive 
economic and regulatory conditions are a prerequisite for scaling up the commercial success of energy 
SMEs. At the same time, one of the well-understood success factors for specific energy SMEs is the head 
start given to relatively mature technologies that are reliable, easy to understand and suitable for local 
distribution, thus presenting a ‘low-hanging fruit’ opportunity for SMEs. LPG and fuel efficient cook stoves 
are the obvious technologies that have proven to be most commercially viable, and indeed the failure to 
conduct in-depth market testing for energy products and services has been a major cause of commercial 
failure for otherwise well organised and motivated SMEs.
A major geographical outcome is that energy SMEs continue to mostly operate in, and supply, urban and 
peri-urban markets. As such, programmes (including AREED) that were originally intended to address 
the rural market, where traditional fuel use accounts for major social and environmental impacts, have 
largely failed. This is due to low levels of entrepreneurial capacity, higher transaction costs for supplying a 
dispersed rural market, and demand-side barriers for capital-intensive RETs. However this market focus 
is not unique to the energy sector and entrepreneurial talents and opportunities tend to dominate in urban 
areas, across all sectors. 
1This research focuses mostly on the African Rural Energy Enterprise Development (AREED) project 
countries, although it is not an evaluation of AREED. A ‘terminal evaluation’ of the AREED I programme 
was carried out by N’Guessan (2009) and similar evaluations have been done for other programmes. 
As such, the aim of this research is to go further than simply documenting the extent to which various 
projects and programmes aimed at supporting energy SMEs (the definition of which is discussed later) 
have achieved their stated objectives. Rather, the research aims to step back and ask broader questions 
of “what difference have these programmes made?” So while the research focuses primarily on the work 
of the AREED project it also takes into account other international projects and organisations operating 
in various sub-Saharan African countries, as well as domestic initiatives, to support and promote energy 
SMEs.
The question of “what difference have these programmes made” can be answered by identifying a range of 
outcomes that can be connected to individual programmes and projects. Where outcomes – and how they 
occurred – are identified as positive and constructive the findings will be subject to an in-depth analysis of 
if and how the mechanisms of change can be transferred and/or scaled up.
This study pursues a qualitative methodology based on a combination of outcome harvesting (Wilson-Grau 
and Britt, 2012) and semi-structured interviews with targeted individuals involved with these programmes 
and projects, and /or knowledgeable about energy SMEs in Africa. As such, this study provides a forward-
looking analysis, drawing out findings that are primarily of use to the individuals and organisations involved 
in the study, i.e., the project managers and those that can influence energy policy, at various levels. This 
report should also be relevant to the wider international development donor community. Nonetheless 
this research also steps back and places the projects in a wider context, providing a rigorous analysis 
appropriate to an academic audience. This context includes the shifting landscape of thought and practices 
on energy access in Africa, in particular the role and importance of energy SMEs as a viable mechanism 
for helping to close the energy access gap in Sub-Saharan Africa.
This research, conducted in Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia2, aims to answer the following 
questions:
1. To what extent have specific businesses demonstrated that energy SMEs are a viable means to 
provide scalable access to modern energy sources?
2. What are the key factors that have determined the success or failure of specific energy SMEs in the 
identified countries?
3. What are the main, persistent, barriers facing entrepreneurs when setting up, operating and 
expanding energy SMEs in the identified countries?
1. Research Background and Rationale
2 Mali, the 5th country in the AREED project, was omitted due to security concerns regarding political developments, which 
deteriorated in the second half of 2012. Efforts were however made to consult the Mali Folkecentre in July 2012, including the 
offer of payment for desk-based input, though this did not come to fruition.
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Answers to these three questions enable a summary of the main lessons that can be learned for national 
policy makers and donor agencies charged with designing programmes to promote energy SMEs in sub-
Saharan Africa. To address questions 2 and 3 it is also necessary to document and analyse the market and 
regulatory conditions, e.g., the legislative and institutional frameworks in place in each country to support 
the establishment and operation of energy SMEs. These country-specific conditions can be viewed as an 
‘enabling framework’ that can, to a greater or lesser extent, encourage the establishment of energy SMEs 
and the diffusion of sustainable technologies.
1.1	 What	is	an	outcome	analysis?
With regard to African SMEs operating in the energy sector, there has been significant experience since 
2000, justifying a study that can reflect on this experience and ask the question “what difference have various 
programmes made in promoting energy SMEs, both as a concept, and in practice?” An investigation of 
these ‘differences’ equates to the level of ‘outcomes’, as developed in Outcome Mapping methodologies, 
which are themselves based on definitions provided by the OECD (Wilson-Grau, 2008). Therefore it is 
necessary first to define ‘outcomes’, as distinct from ‘outputs’ and ‘impacts’ which are terms that are often 
used erroneously and/or interchangeably, creating confusion among development practitioners. Here, the 
most basic point is that outputs, outcomes and impacts should be seen as separate levels, whereby 
outputs are the immediate products of an organisation’s or programme’s activities, i.e., the processes, 
goods and services that it produces (OECD, 2002). These can include, for example: workshops, training 
manuals, research and assessment reports, guidelines and action plans, strategies, and technical 
assistance packages (Wilson-Grau, 2008). In other words, ‘outputs’ are within almost total control of a 
programme or project’s managers.
After the level of outputs comes ‘outcomes’, which, in the context of development assistance, the OECD 
defines as “the observable behavioural, institutional and societal changes that take place over 3 to 10 years, 
usually as the result of coordinated short-term investments in individual and organizational capacity building 
for key  development stakeholders” (OECD, 2002). In other words, this is the intermediary level of observable 
positive or negative changes in the actions of the social actors (in this case, energy SME entrepreneurs) 
that “have been influenced, directly or indirectly, partially or totally, intentionally or not, by (a programme’s) 
activities…” (Wilson-Grau, 2008). It is important to bear in mind that the programme or project in question 
can only influence these outcomes, since the individuals are the recipients or targets of the project and are 
free to interpret and react to the ‘outputs’ in any number of ways, not necessary in the intended direction of 
the programme or project’s objectives. In addition, there are many more factors (at the level of outputs) that 
influence an individual’s or an organisation’s behaviour, thus claims of cause-and-effect will logically compete 
with those of other projects and programmes. However, at the level of outcomes, the claims of any given 
programme or project can be tested through questioning the ‘change agents’, where outputs and outcomes 
are sufficiently connected to support plausible cause-effect claims. This is the outcome analysis.
Following the Outcome Mapping conception of the output-outcome-impact chain, we then move even 
further away from the sphere of influence when talking about ‘impacts’. Like outcomes, impacts can be 
judged to be positive or negative, intended or unintended, however they concern the broader (often implicit) 
objectives of a given programme or project. In the context of the development sector, these objectives 
are usually to help achieve long-term, sustainable changes that help reduce poverty and conserve natural 
resources and the environment. As such it is unreasonable to assume that any single programme or 
project can do more than only contribute, partially and indirectly, to the ‘bigger picture’ impacts. This 
weakened cause-effect link is often referred to as the ‘attribution gap’ in the development literature (GTZ, 
2004) and care has to be taken when assessing any given project or programme, where there are often 
strong incentives to close this gap in order to demonstrate ‘impacts’.
3In line with wider trends in the growth of SMEs in OECD countries, especially as engines of creativity and 
innovation, the international development donor community began to increase its focus on programmes 
to support the development of SMEs in Africa during the 1990s. This reflected a broader trend to 
diversify development aid which had traditionally focused on large-scale infrastructure investments as 
well as policies and programmes to encourage national and multinational corporations able to drive 
economic growth and create much needed employment. A review of relevant academic literature is 
provided in annex 11.4.
2.1	 Energy	sector	SMEs
Despite wide reference to the term ‘energy SME’ within the academic and grey literature of the environment 
and development community, the term has not been fully defined. What constitutes, specifically, an energy 
SME depends on the focus of the business activity. Here various studies suggest that an energy SME is 
simply a business that supplies energy-related products and services (Brew-Hammond, 2010: Karekezi, 
2002; Prasad and Dieden, 2007). However this definition creates plenty of space for interpretation of what 
is an energy product or service, and neither does it place a measure on the extent to which these business 
focus on energy, in addition to other activities. 
Energy, and specifically access to clean and modern energy technologies, has long been understood as 
a key sector worthy of targeted support due to the various co-benefits associated with the transition from 
traditional biomass fuels and kerosene lamps that have been the dominant energy sources throughout 
sub-Saharan Africa, to modern, cleaner technologies. These co-benefits include access to higher-quality 
light and heat, reduced in-door air pollution and pressure of deforestation.
Specific donor-backed programmes to support SMEs in the energy sector were developed by a few 
international agencies, NGOs and not-for-profit organisations, including E+Co a US-based clean 
technology investor set up in 1994. This was followed by UNEP’s AREED programme (2000), ESMAP 
(World Bank) and various programmes of the Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP), set up after the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002).The idea of establishing an active 
energy SME sector has been, to a large extent, an antidote to the widespread failure of post-colonial 
development aspirations, which included large-scale electrification and the provision of other, cleaner, fuels 
through major infrastructure. At the same time, local SMEs were a favoured means to deliver clean energy 
products and services based on two key assumptions: 
1. That SME entrepreneurs know and understand the needs and desires of local consumers
2. That SMEs are more able and willing than larger companies to supply rural markets where transaction 
costs are higher
2. International Donor Support for SMEs
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The challenge of defining what is an energy SME is relevant to the analysis of SME support programmes 
like AREED since the qualifying criteria was not stated. Therefore, in some cases the specific businesses 
supported by AREED did not have energy products or services as their main activity, but rather had energy 
as a major aspect, i.e., input, into their business activity and so were included on that basis.
2.1.1 The AREED project
According to the original project document, the intended outcomes of the AREED project were the 
following:
1. Enhanced capacity of entrepreneurs to start and develop energy businesses (Enterprise Development 
Services, EDS)
2. Improved capacity of local NGO Partners
3. Strong partnerships established with Financial Institutions (FI)
4. Improved capacity of government officials and agencies to formulate and implement policies 
supportive of SMEs
5. Dissemination of AREED’s experience and lessons
Source:  N’Guessan (2009) 
Of these 5 intended outcomes, the emphasis of AREED’s activities were placed on outcomes #1 and 
#3. The key idea behind the AREED model is that it would have an important effect in demonstrating that 
energy SMEs can be commercially viable. However the need to demonstrate the commercial viability of 
energy SMEs is a means to tackle what has long been understood as the #1 barrier to energy SMEs: the 
lack of access to affordable finance. This logic reveals a key assumption behind AREED, and other donor-
backed programmes,where it is supposed that banks and other financial institutions do not lend to energy 
SMEs simply because they do not know the energy sector and hence regard it as a high-risk investment, 
thus only agreeing to lend money at high interest rate and/or demands for 100% collateral. It is therefore 
important to ask whether there has been a significant ‘demonstration effect’, and if so, has it made any 
difference to the lending activities of relevant banks and financial institutions?
Previous research, monitoring and evaluation and other reports have documented the AREED project, 
with generally favourable assessments of the project’s design, implementation and results (Kolominskas, 
2003; Mehlwana, 2003; Napier-Moore, 2006; Denton, 2006; N’Guessan, 2009). Of these reports, the 
most relevant is the Terminal Evaluation (N’Guessan, 2009), which made the following recommendations:
1. The AREED model should focus more on removing financial barriers to energy SMEs
2. The AREED model should also focus on removing institutional barriers
3. A formal body at the national level (National Steering Committee) should be established to ensure 
the follow-up and involvement of local parties (both private and public)
4. Concerning the relation between local actors, there is a need for further national capacity building
55. Given the novelty of the market-based approach of the AREED model, it is important that it is 
adequately publicised in both scholarly journals and in the development community at large
Important gaps in the Terminal Evaluation (N’Guessan, 2009) concern the roles of national governments 
and financial institutions in supporting energy SMEs, whose views and opinions were not sought. The 
N’Guessan report also focused more on the West African project countries (Ghana, Mali and Senegal) and 
did not conduct its evaluation in either Zambia or Tanzania. In addition to addressing these gaps, there 
are no known studies conducted since 2006 that aim to assess the influence that various policies and 
programmes (both donor-backed and national government-led) have had in the development of energy 
SMEs in Africa.
International Donor Support for SMEs
6Desk-based preparations for this study began in June 2012. Field work in Zambia, Tanzania, Ghana and 
Senegal took place between 10 September and 5 October 2012 with 5 days work conducted in each 
country. 
3.1	 Outcome	Harvesting	by	Consensus
To help answer the research questions and to sharpen the focus of the in-country interviews, a 1-day 
workshop was held in 4 of the targeted AREED project countries where the technique of ‘Outcome 
Harvesting’ (OH) was adapted and applied. During the workshops, 4-5 specific energy SMEs (whose 
performance here is treated as ‘outcomes’) were described by the workshop participants, working in 
groups. The participants are defined here as the ‘change agents’, i.e., those that sought to affect change 
with regard to energy SMEs, which included the entrepreneurs themselves, government officials, financial 
institutions and NGOs. The second task at the workshops was for the change agents to agree upon an 
account of the plausible ‘contributions’ made by various individuals and organizations (and other, external, 
contributing factors) to the identified businesses.
According to the OH methodology, the identification of outcomes and contributions must be a participative 
process where ‘harvest users’ (the change agents) and the ‘harvester’ (in this case the UNEP Risø Centre) 
work together to understand the process of change that occurred. This principle was adhered to in this 
research, although the standard OH methodology was altered with regard to verification. Instead of working 
one-to-one with specific change agents and then seeking to verify their contributions with independent 
experts, this study opted to extract contributions through group work, thus ensuring a greater degree of 
reliability through consensus. Whereas an individual from an organization may be tempted to exaggerate 
his or her contributions (direct or direct) to a given outcome, the advantage of conducting this research in 
groups was to keep individuals ‘in check’, as a substitute for independent verification. In most cases this 
worked well and individuals displayed a high degree of recognition regarding the contributions of other, 
sometimes competing, organisations.
Outcome harvesting by consensus was chosen largely due to practical constraints faced by the researchers, 
and has some limitations. Under ‘standard’ OH, the contributions are focused on one organisation for 
the sake of understanding the activities that work well, and those that work less well (and why), as a 
tool for self-improvement. For this research the application of OH by consensus was a tool in order to 
gather key information on the outcome-contribution relationship at a broader level, moving away from a 
project or programme-specific focus, to one where everyone involved can build up a clearer picture of 
the effectiveness of energy SMEs per se, and of the relative importance of the various means available to 
promote energy SMEs.
3. Research Methodology
73.2	 Semi-structured	interviews
While the workshops aimed to obtain answers related to project outcomes, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with various ‘change agents’ in order to expand upon the issues raised in the country 
workshops. Questions were drafted based on the issues identified during the desk study, and were refined 
following the country workshops to better reflect the particular issues in each country. However, generally 
speaking, the interviews focussed more on the country-specific conditions including the ‘enabling 
frameworks’ that can, to a greater or lesser extent, encourage the establishment of energy SMEs and the 
diffusion of sustainable energy technologies. A list of the core interview questions and interviewees can 
be found in the annex 11.1. The following country chapters are ordered alphabetically, Ghana, Senegal, 
Tanzania and Zambia.
Research Methodology
84.1	 Energy	background
Ghana has relatively high levels of electrification, totalling 72% in 2011 (Ministry of Energy, 2012), compared 
to approximately 23% in 1990. Of this total, 99% of the urban population (100% in Accra) has access to 
electricity, compared to an average of 49% in rural areas (KITE, 2012). Total grid-connected electricity 
capacity totalled 2,280 MW in 2012, 52% of which came from hydro sources and 48% from thermal 
technologies. However biofuels and waste biomass sources make up 59% of Ghana’s total primary 
energy supply, with petroleum products accounting for 35% and hydro power the remaining 6% (Energy 
Commission, 2012). Rural households rely more than 96% on wood (charcoal, firewood and crop/sawmill 
residue) for cooking, while approximately 53% of urban households rely primarily on charcoal (KITE, 
2012). Ghana’s National Energy Policy (2010) places an emphasis on developing the country’s renewable 
resources, particularly small scale hydro, biomass and biofuels, and well as exploring opportunities for 
grid-connected wind power and promoting efficiency measures, with a central role expected from private 
sector investors and operators (REEEP, 2012).
In December 2011, the Renewable Energy Law (Act 832) was signed by the President with the stated 
aim of increasing the share of new renewables in the country to 10% of total grid-connected electricity 
capacity, with large-scale hydro accounting for 75%.A Renewable Energy Fund will be set up, likely to be 
financed by a mix of donor support and taxation on energy-intensive industries (including the country’s 
burgeoning oil and gas extractives sector), that would contribute to investments in new RE projects. It is 
understood that the Fund will complement a FIT that is also part of the law, in order to incentivise private 
sector investment in IPPs. However, while the Act states that the FIT shall be guaranteed for a period of 
ten years, subject to review every two years (Ahiataku-Togobo, 2012), there is, as yet, no clarity regarding 
the exact value of the initial tariff support for RETs.  
4.2	 Energy	SMEs	in	Ghana
In this section we explore the extent to which specific businesses have demonstrated that energy SMEs 
are a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in Ghana, drawing upon the 
outcomes described during the workshop, in addition to desk-based research.
4.2.1 AREED supported energy SMEs
Ghana was one of the five countries that participated in the AREED project, with in-country implementation 
led by the Kumasi Institute of Technology, Energy and Environment (KITE), based in Accra. As with the 
other country partner centres, KITE maintained principal responsibility for communicating the project and 
for co-implementing (alongside E+Co) the enterprise development services (EDS). Since 2001, KITE has 
processed 60 separate energy SMEs under the AREED programme, 15 of which were successful in 
passing through the application and EDS process, and were provided with subsidised loans to either start 
up or expand their businesses:
4. Ghana
9• AB Management: Energy Efficiency; Industrial Power Factor Correction
• Anasset: LPG Retail and Marketing Company
• Fee-Hi Ventures: LPG retail
• Gladymanuel: CFLs
• Lambark Gas: LPG Distribution
• M38: LPG Distribution
• RKA: LPG Stoves
• Trans-Legacy Ventures: LPG Stoves
• ABARA Gas: LPG Distribution
• Bansim Binara (BBE): LPG Distribution
• Power World: Energy Efficiency
• Toyola: Biomass Cookstoves
• WilkinSolar: PV Solar Home Systems& Solar Water Heaters
• Best Solar: PV Solar Home Systems & Solar Water Heaters
• NorthLite: Solar Lighting Products
As was the case in Zambia, Tanzania and Senegal, most of these energy SMEs were in fact urban-based 
businesses in Ghana, due mostly to the limited number of rural-based entrepreneurs that responded to 
the adverts for AREED support. However, as with Tanzania and Zambia, many of the urban-based energy 
businesses were aiming to supply the rural market, particularly with the manufacture of efficient cook 
stoves. Below follows a summary of some of the energy SMEs that have operated in Ghana since 2002, 
both AREED-support and non-AREED, describing both the ‘outcome’ (business activity and performance) 
and the ‘contributions’ (factors that helped in the set up and operation of specific businesses).
4.2.2 Ghana energy SMEs: outcomes and contributions
This section corresponds to research question #1, i.e., to what extent have specific businesses 
demonstrated that energy SMEs are a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources 
in sub-Saharan Africa? The following paragraphs document the specific energy SME outcomes and 
contributions in Ghana, both AREED and non-AREED supported businesses3.
Toyola 
Toyola Energy limited as set up in 2003 by two entrepreneurs Suraj Wahab and Ernest Kyei to 
manufacture and sell energy efficient charcoal cook stoves, known as the ‘Toyola Coalpot’ mostly to 
3 The information gathered represents what was available to the researchers, from various sources both primary and secondary, 
but does not claim to be exhaustive. However the authors are grateful to KITE for providing extensive information on AREED-
supported SMEs, including a summary table of their progress and status, reproduced in annex 11.12.
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Ghana’s low-income urban households. The entrepreneurs received their original training under the 
Ghana Household Energy Project in 2003, but were unable to secure financial backing from local banks 
to expand the business. In 2006 they applied for support from AREED, which resulted in the provision of 
EDS and the approval of US$ 270,000 in loans. The loan was given in tranches: the initial loan released 
to Toyola was US$70,000. The company subsequently received two more loans of US$100,000 each 
from E+Co, payable over 5 years.
This significant capital injection enabled Toyola to expand production from approximately 3,000 to 35,000 
units per year by 2010, with sales across 6 regions in Ghana and to neighbouring Benin, Togo and Nigeria. 
Toyola made and sold 154,000 efficient cook stoves between 2007 and 2011 and a survey carried out 
by the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science & Technology found that 93% of the stoves are currently in 
use, benefiting more than 500,000 people by reducing indoor air pollution and savings on charcoal. Toyola 
employs five people directly and provides work to approximately 300 self-employed artisans. The stoves 
currently in use are saving about 26,000 tonnes of charcoal each year and about 150,000 tonnes CO2e 
per year. In 2009/10 Toyola Energy Ltd., had an income of USD 550,000, 72% from stove sales and 28% 
from carbon finance.
Toyola’s business model is built upon a network of commission-based door-to-door salespeople, 
who also collect payments from households under a credit scheme which allows customers to pay in 
instalments, from the savings they make due to lower charcoal consumption. This network of salespeople 
also identified a demand in rural areas for other energy technologies, most notably solar lanterns, which 
Toyola has branched into. Other notable aspects of Toyola’s business and management model include the 
development of quality assurance and standardization systems were put in place to secure the quality and 
performance of the stoves; training programmes for artisans to ensure compliance with quality standards; 
a tracking system was put in place whereby each stove is given a serial number allowing the company to 
keep records of who assembles each stove, who sells it and who buys it; Access to Carbon Finance where 
Toyola stoves are registered for Gold Standard carbon finance, and there is regular monitoring of stoves 
in use, surveys of users, and audits of greenhouse gas savings. For these reasons, Toyola is regarded as 
one of Ghana’s energy SME success stories, with much emphasis and praise placed on the individual 
entrepreneurs as being responsible for this success. In 2010 Mr. Suraj Wahab was awarded with Africa’s 
Energy Personality of the Year prize.
Impact Energies Ghana
Impact Energies Ghana is a social enterprise set up in 2010 by Hugh Whalan (also CEO of Energy in 
Common4) which works to develop new ways of financing and distributing clean and low-carbon 
energy technologies to low-income consumers in Ghana. Impact Energies, with the help of the Energy 
in Common platform, supplies solar systems, sold through MFIs. Under this model the MFIs are sold 
the solar technologies by SMEs, working on commission. Local salespeople are then trained to sell the 
products on behalf the MFIs, which in turn provide EUF. Impact Energies refers to this integrated business 
model as a Factory-to-Village (FTV) supply chain. Impact Energies approached Lighting Africa (an IFC 
funded initiative) which provided support in terms of advertising, marketing and paying for local workshops 
to promote solar technologies. Sales of solar technologies range from US$ 25 to US$ 500, typically for 
2.5% monthly interest rates. According to Foster Yaw Adu-Dartey (Ghana Operations Coordinator) the 
quality of the products is good but consumers need to be told how to use them properly, as misuse often 
accounts for reported technical failures. 
4 “a web-based person-to-person platform which allows individuals to make green energy microloans to the poor in East and 
West Africa”
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WilkinSolar Engineering
WilkinSolar was spun out of Wilkins Engineering Limited which is involved in consulting, management 
and implementation of grid extension projects, general electrical engineering services for both commercial 
building and industries, employing approximately 600 staff. Through WilkinSolar, the company first entered 
the market for solar home systems in 1998, focusing on the sale and installation of solar PV, totalling 5,736 
installations in households and institutions in urban, peri-urban and rural communities in Ghana by 2012. 
Approximately 20% of Wilkins’ global revenues come from solar technologies.
In 2003 KITE provided EDS to the company after Mr. Omane Frimpong, the owner and CEO of Wilkins,sought 
funding from the AREED facility. Wilkins went through the entire AREED process successfully and received 
an investment of US$ 127,000 from AREED at 6% interest. In 2006 WilkinSolar set up a small assembly 
line for solar lanterns, financed through a US$ 300,000 loan from E+Co to import LEDs and other solar 
parts for local production. However from 2007/8 a glut of cheap solar products from China rendered the 
local assembly production unprofitable where solar stock purchased for 4.13 EUR per watt fell in price to 
3 EUR per watt, and so the assembly plant was closed. Nonetheless, by 2012 WilkinSolar had sold about 
10,000 solar lanterns, with an average retail price of US$ 30. Mr. Omane Frimpong is also the current (as 
of 2012)President of the Association of Ghana Solar Industries (AGSI).
AB Management
Mr. Fred Agyeman Berko, the Executive Director of AB Management responded to an advert by KITE 
offering support for clean energy services in the Daily Graphic. KITE and E+Co supported AB by providing 
EDS and seed capital from the AREED project. The company is involved in the installation of capacitors 
for power-factor correction in commercial and industrial facilities. Since 2001, AB Management has 
worked with over 166 companies in various energy efficiency measures such as PF correction, the use of 
high frequency electronic ballasts, high efficiency motors, variable speed drives, and cooling systems. A 
simulation for the 166 companies targeted shows that implementing the efficiency measures (other than 
PF correction) identified by AB has reduced power consumption by about 20% resulting in the reduction 
of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by more than 15,000 tonnes of CO2 per year. 
AB Management is the local agent for Power Economy, U.K., a supplier of energy efficiency equipment, 
which won an international tender from the Ministry of Energy of Ghana to provide power-factor capacitors 
in various companies and building in Ghana. As a means to conducting its market research and business 
plan development, AB Management consulted Dekon Engineering Services to carry out the following 
activities: a detailed audit of customer’s facility; specifying capacitor required to improve the power factor 
to 0.90 or better; calculating savings and payback period; installing capacitor at customer’s facility and 
providing maintenance for the capacitor during the payback period; monitor to ensure that savings are 
achieved; and training customer’s staff to maintain capacitors periodically.
Anasset Company Ltd.
Anasset Company Ltd., retails LPG for domestic, transport and commercial applications. The company 
recorded annual sales of between 1.87 million kg and 4.40 million kg of LPG per year over a five year 
period from 2002 to 2006. These sales translate to a displacement of between 9,340 tonnes and 22,024 
tonnes of charcoal per year, over the period. The company was established in the 1990s and, as of 2012, 
employs 60 people, operating in various towns in Ghana, aside from Accra. 
Ghana
Energy SMEs in sub-Saharan Africa: Outcomes, barriers and prospects in Ghana, Senegal, Tanzania and Zambia
12
Mr. Seth Nanemeh is the Managing Director of Anasset, who responded to an advert posted by KITE 
in the Daily Graphic in 2001, offering support for innovative clean energy businesses in Ghana. The 
entrepreneur followed the entire AREED process, from the original proposal, preliminary assessment, an 
adjusted proposal, Introduction Sheet, business plan and due diligence. KITE provided seed capital and 
EDS to Anasset from the AREED project in 2002 (US$ 38,000) and again in 2007 (US$ 225,000) which 
enabled the company to expand significantly, mainly through the establishment of a refilling station in 
Aflao near Ghana’s eastern border with Togo. In 2010 Mr. Nanemeh took out a loan with a commercial 
bank, apparently breaking the terms of a contract with E+Co who had issued a previous loan. This was an 
unpopular decision with the board, not least because terms of the loan were worse.
Fee-Hi Ventures
Free-Hi Ventures was set up by Mr. S.A. Adu in 2003 after submitting a draft business concept note 
to KITE. The company retails LPG products to households, commercial customers and automobiles at 
Ashaiman, a suburb of Accra. The company sold over 3.60 million kg of LPG from 2004 to 2009 which 
translates to a displacement of about 18,000 tonnes of charcoal. As with Anasset, Free-Hi Ventures 
completed the EDS process and was issued with a US$ 33,500 AREED loan in 2004 to finance a 
second refilling plant at Akim Oda in the Eastern Region of Ghana. However construction of the Akim-
Oda plant suffered delays due to problems with the provision of electricity to the proposed site. As 
a result, the entrepreneur decided instead to expand its plant at Ashaiman, utilising the gas storage 
holders and other equipment acquired for the Akim Oda plant. The AREED loan was serviced from the 
operation of the Ashaiman plant. In 2011, Free-Hi Ventures secured a management buy-out from Xpress 
Gas, a larger LPG retailer operating in Ghana.
Gladymanuel Trading Enterprises Limited (GTEL)
Gladymanuel Trading retails, distributes and installs energy efficient lighting systems in domestic and 
commercial facilities, selling an estimated 56,000 energy-saving light bulbs per year which translates into 
the approximately 6,000 tonnes of CO2 emission reductions.  The company was started by entrepreneur 
Mr. Emmanuel Nii Abbey, who acts as Managing Director. Mr. Abbey responded to a newspaper advert 
in the Daily Graphic in 2002 about the AREED facility to support energy SMEs start-ups. KITE, with 
technical support from E+Co, provided EDS to Mr. Abbey, helping him develop the company’s business 
plan. AREED-backed loans totalling US$ 120,000 were issued in 2002 (US$ 70,000) and 2005 (US$ 
20,000) to GTEL.
Lambark Gas 
Lambark Gas is currently one of the market leaders in LPG distribution for automobiles and for domestic 
and commercial heating purposes, in the Kumasi Metropolis. Employing 17 staff, the company sells over 
2.5 million kg of LPG each year, equivalent to 12,500 tonnes of charcoal. Ms. Mallam Abukari Amadu is 
the entrepreneur behind Lambark, who received EDS from KITE to help her refine the company’s business 
plan. AREED invested a total of US$ 359,746 in Lambark Gas between 2004 (US$ 109,746) and 2007 
(US$ 250,000). As of 2012 the company was on track to make a full loan repayment to AREED.
M38 Ventures
M38 is an LPG retail business based in western Accra,set up by Mrs. Clara Koranteng in 2003 (though 
her maiden name was Mankata and she was 38 when the business started, hence M38). Mrs. Koranteng 
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was working as a secretary when she got the idea of setting up her own LPG retail business, motivated 
by the long queues in her neighbourhood for refilling at that time. She was also encouraged by a friend 
involved in LPG retailing who advised her it was a lucrative business to get into. She first worked to 
secure all relevant permits and approval, i.e., from the EPA, fire service and construction authorities. 
She first tried to secure a bank loan but they didn’t want to lend, then she saw the AREED project 
advertised in the Daily Graphic and contacted KITE. She was later told that she was the only female 
applicant to express interest in AREED from a total of 1,441 across the 5 African countries. The EDS 
process provided by KITE helped her when it came to sourcing the two gas tanks, which were imported 
from Germany. The tanks, once delivered, had to be tested by local authorities and the Oil Marketing 
Company (OMC) trained their workers in safe re-filling. M38 was approved a US$ 59,000 start-up loan in 
2004, backed by AREED with variable interest of between 5-8%, which was paid off within 18 months. 
M38 sells approximately 0.45 million kg of LPG per year, equivalent to about 2,250 tonnes of charcoal.
The company’s refuelling station employs 4 staff and the company is now (as of 2012) planning to set up 
another LPG filling station, using its own finance. However M38 is not the only job for Mrs. Koranteng; 
she also works for Agricultural Development Bank.
M38’s refilling station in western Accra, September 2012
RKA Limited
RKA, based in Batsonaa near Accra, manufactures high quality machine-finished gas stoves and gas 
burners for the household market, which are endorsed by the Ghana Standards Board. The company 
produces an average of 2,300 stoves per month and utilises a network of wholesalers and retail stores to 
market its products. RKA has two shareholders one of whom is directly involved in the day-to-day operations 
of the company as the Managing Director, whilst the other is an investor. The Managing Director is Mr. Ali, a 
Lebanese, who has lived in Ghana for the past 23 years with his family. He spotted the opportunity to seek 
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funding to support his enterprise through AREED, advertised by KITE. Mr. Ali followed the entire AREED 
process, from the original proposal, preliminary assessment, an adjusted proposal, introduction sheet, 
business plan and due diligence. This resulted in a loan of US$ 104,080 to purchase raw materials and 
expand the company’s product line to include four-burner table top stoves, thus becoming Ghana’s first 
large importer of LPG ovens and stoves. Soon after the AREED loan was issued, RKA was contracted by 
the Government to supply LPG stoves and accessories to government agencies in all of the 120 districts 
of Ghana. Mr. Ali is well known amongst key LPG stove dealers and marketers.
Trans-Legacy Ventures
Trans-Legacy Ventures manufactures and sells LPG stoves to commercial and domestic users, with an 
average annual output of approximately 4,000 units, directly employing 3 staff and providing work indirectly 
to over 100 artisans. The company was established by Mr. Prosper Gatti, who responded to an advert 
post by KITE in Daily Graphic in 2003, offering support for innovative clean energy businesses in Ghana 
through the AREED programme. KITE, with technical support from E+Co, provided seed capital and EDS 
to Trans-Legacy, helping the company to refine its business plan. A US$ 20,000 loan was issued in 2003. 
However the company did not meet its initial growth projections and so the loan was restructured and the 
business received further technical support from the AREED team to improve its performance. According 
to KITE, the main challenge was to help improved the entrepreneur’s business and marketing skills, to 
match his technical skills.
Fuel-efficient stove production at Trans-Legacy Ventures, Ghana
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Abara Company Limited
Abara was a start-up LPG refilling plant established in the Ashanti Region of Ghana to retail LPG to 
households, commercial customers and automobiles. The company recorded annual sales of between 
0.88 million kg and 1.60 million kg during its first five years of operation. These sales equate to between 
4,400 and 8,000 tonnes of charcoal. As with most of the above-detailed businesses the entrepreneur 
behind Abara, Mr. Kofi Asante, approached the AREED facility for support through KITE, who, in partnership 
with E+Co, provided technical support, EDS and seed capital. Total AREED-backed investment in AREED 
amounted to US$ 102,990 in 2006.
4.2.3 Have Ghanaian energy SMEs demonstrated commercial viability?
In the previous section we detailed the histories of specific energy SMEs in Ghana, which helps us to 
address research question #1, i.e., to what extent have specific businesses demonstrated that energy 
SMEs are a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in sub-Saharan Africa? 
Based on the above-listed case histories, and an analysis of the literature and stakeholder interviews, the 
following issues and trends can be summarised for Ghana’s energy SME sector:
1. Most of the surveyed energy SMEs were set up with EDS and loan support from donor-backed 
programmes, as opposed to commercial sources of finance or the entrepreneurs’ own private 
sources of funding
2. More SMEs have been provided with AREED-backed EDS and loans compared with Zambia and 
Tanzania, and most of these have demonstrated commercial success
3. The most successful energy SMEs in Ghana, i.e., those experiencing higher rates of profitability and 
growth, are those operating in the LPG market
4. There is evidence of highly innovative business practices among energy SMEs, in particular the 
development of local-level sales techniques and end-user financing 
5. There is a mature market of efficient cook stoves which has attracted significant interest from local 
entrepreneurs and donor agencies
6. There is a relatively large solar PV market supplied by SMEs, especially for solar lanterns, though 
these businesses have depended more on state or donor-backed projects to help create markets, 
raise technology awareness and support EUR mechanisms
4.3	 Analysis	of	outcomes,	barriers	and	solutions
This section provides the substantive analysis of the framework conditions within which the Ghanaian 
energy SME sector operates, based on the main issues raised by workshop participants, and elaborated 
upon by individuals during follow-up interviews. Here we build upon the ‘contributions’ aspect of the 
specific energy SMEs in Ghana, i.e., to understand the key causal factors, or mechanisms, through which 
energy SMEs have experienced either success or failure, thus addressing research questions #2. 
The following analysis also addresses research question #3: what are the main, persistent, barriers facing 
entrepreneurs when setting up, operating and expanding energy SMEs in the identified countries? This 
includes a presentation of the range of ‘solutions’ proposed by national stakeholders to overcome these 
barriers, again based on the issues raised by workshop participants, and elaborated upon by individuals 
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during follow-up interviews. The overall focus of the analysis is on the specific circumstances in Ghana that 
have influenced, and continue to influence, outcomes in the country’s energy SME sector, including the 
nature of relevant barriers to market development and expansion. To structure the discussion, we use the 
similar categories of the ‘enabling framework’, as in previous chapters, adapted to best reflect the specific 
circumstances in Ghana.
4.3.1 Policy and regulatory framework
There exist numerous government-led initiatives to promote SMEs in Ghana, including the Rural Enterprises 
Programme (REP) which is an expanded version of a project that first started in 1995. The current phase, 
REP-III (2012-2020) aims to “upscale and mainstream, within public and private institutional systems, the 
district-based micro and small-scale enterprises (MSEs) support system piloted by REP-II & I to at least 
161 municipalities and districts in all the ten regions of the country…”, where “MSEs” are regarded as 
an effective means to reduce rural poverty. REP-III is funded by the African Development Bank (39.7%), 
District Assemblies (20.6%), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (16.5%), Government of 
Ghana (12.7%), Beneficiaries (6.0%) and Participating Financial Institutions (4.5%), with a total budget of 
US$ 125 million.
Another significant donor-backed government initiative to support SME entrepreneurs is the Ghana Private 
Sector Development Fund (GPSDF), financed by the Italian government and operating in partnership with 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The GPSDF supports non-farming SMEs that are 100% privately owned 
by Ghanaian entrepreneurs, with a total budget or € 33 million, starting in 2004. The second phase of 
the project (since 2007) is a majority loan component (€ 20 million) used to establish a credit facility for 
Ghanaian SMEs, with some funds set aside for grants (€ 2 million). However, as with the REP, the GPSDF 
does not have a programme dedicated to supporting energy SMEs.
There also exists the National Board for Small Scale Industries (NBSSI) which describes itself as “the apex 
governmental body for the promotion and development of the Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE) sector 
in Ghana”. Listed among its stated remit are the following:
1. To contribute to the creation of an enabling environment for the small-scale enterprises 
development
2. To contribute to the development of an enterprise culture in Ghana
3. To facilitate MSEs access to substantial and high quality Business Development Services for their 
development
4. To promote MSE sector Associations
5. To facilitate access to credit for small enterprises
Judging by these activities, the NBSSI is clearly a relevant organisation regarding efforts to promote energy 
SMEs in Ghana. However its role and importance was not mentioned by stakeholders consulted for this 
research, and when questioned about the NBSSI most had not heard of it, or regarded its role as marginal 
and/or ineffective. The reasons for this lack of visibility or apparent impact are due to NBSSI not having a 
specific expertise in the energy sector. However some local observers suggested that NBSSI’s low visibility 
is indicative of the largely dysfunctional dynamic between government agencies and the SME sector, and 
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indeed this was one of the issues explored with stakeholder for this research, in Ghana as well as the other 
countries studied. 
In order to explore these real-world dynamics, it is relevant to start with the newly-formed Ministry of 
Energy’s Business Development Support Facility (BDSF) which provides low-cost matching loans of up 
to US$ 250,000 to energy SMEs supplying grid, off-grid or mini-grid electrification. According to Mr. Seth 
Mahu of the Ministry of Energy, the application process to the BDSF is simple, however he pointed out that 
very few entrepreneurs have expressed interest and stated that the main challenge is to attract SMEs that 
can bring their own finance to the table. Arguing from a business perspective, Mr. Kofi Asante, CEO of ICR 
Engineering, commented at the research workshop that the conditions placed on matching loans tend to 
limit their attractiveness. While others commented that the BDSF facility has been poorly publicised, and 
so few entrepreneurs are aware of this facility.
The Ministry of Energy hosts a working group which meets quarterly to review state support provided 
in the energy sector, including major donors, the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) and the Energy 
Commission. Mr. Mahu claims that attendance is high and the outcomes are constructive. While the private 
sector is invited to participate in the working group, it is understood that there is a failure to communicate 
the group’s findings to government policy makers, meaning that key messages regarding energy SME 
requirements are not taken into consideration, or acted upon.
Indeed, numerous energy SME entrepreneurs claim that successive governments have done nothing or 
very little to promote energy SMEs in Ghana, with most technical and financial support being provided 
by donor-backed programmes or NGOs, including AREED. Such perceptions, common among the 
stakeholders consulted for this research, reveal a widespread lack of awareness and/or understanding 
of the technical and financial support provided to energy SMEs by government agencies in Ghana. From 
discussions noted at the Accra workshop organised for this research, there appears to be a dynamic 
similar to that observed in Zambia whereby government officials are ‘passive’, i.e., waiting for businesses 
to contact them regarding specific support, and, on the other hand, entrepreneurs tend not to actively 
look for assistance from the state. Broadly speaking, the reasons for the apparent lack of contact made 
on behalf of energy SME entrepreneurs can be divided into two groups: where entrepreneurs are willing 
to look for support from the government, but they simply do not know about what is available to them, or 
where to look for it; and where entrepreneurs are aware of government support but disregard it as a ‘non-
starter’, either because of perceived bureaucracy and/or an inherent lack of faith in government.
Frank Atta-Owusu, employed by Samsung in Ghana (as of 2012), was previously the AREED project 
manager at KITE and thus was able to provide some valuable insights into the experience of energy SMEs 
in Ghana. On the topic of Government and policy support, Atta-Owusu echoed the arguments of other 
stakeholders when he claimed that there was practically no official support for SMEs in Ghana, until the 
World Bank funded Ghana Energy Development and Access Project (GEDAP) was launched in 2007, into 
which AREED was able to contribute in terms of strategies to supply rural areas.
With regard to the efficacy of government policies to support energy SMEs, Mr. Omane Frimpong, CEO of 
Wilkins Engineering, argued that party politics is largely to blame for the lack of coherent and consistent 
policy, whereby if the government says that area X will receive solar power then the opposition party will 
promise them grid electricity. It is widely regarded in Ghana that such politicking undermines the value 
of legitimate energy planning and perpetuations false promises, to the detriment of the target region or 
community.
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In November 2011, just prior to the passing of the Renewable Energy Law, the Association of Ghana 
Solar Industries (AGSI) issued an ‘information memorandum’ entitled “promoting solar energy application 
as a viable alternative power in Ghana” which focused on arguing for a tax waiver for ‘imported solar 
energy systems and accessories’, in order to reach the government’s target of supplying 10% of grid-
supplied electricity from non-hydro RE sources. It is surprising, given the number private actors operating 
in Ghana’s solar market, and the relative maturity of this market, that such tax benefits have not already 
been issued for individual parts (tax benefits have always been available for completed solar units). To date 
(late 2012) this proposal is being considered by the government, though as with other countries studied 
for this research the challenge is to define a list of RE technologies and associated equipment (such as 
inverters) that is fair and not open to abuses by traders who would avoid tax but use the equipment for 
other, i.e., non RET, uses.
The capital vs. fuel costs equation among consumers in Ghana, which has been identified as a key 
economic barrier in other AREED project countries, especially for solar technologies, was not discussed 
as a major issue among stakeholders consulted for this research. Indeed it was repeatedly claimed that 
it is easy to convince consumers of the benefits of solar light, on quality terms alone. Rather, the main 
challenge is to convince consumers that the high quality products – which are more expensive – are worth 
paying for as there are many poor-quality solar products that look the same but don’t last as long. In 
Ghana there are many SMEs competing in the solar energy market, importing and selling seemingly similar 
products of widely differing quality and prices. For this reason, the issue of standardisation is actively 
debated among energy SME stakeholders, and awareness over the importance of product approval 
standardisation processes, appears high. Here, the Ghana Standards Authority should have a key role to 
play. Among the remit of the agency are listed the following activities:
• National Standards development and dissemination;
• Testing Services
• Inspection Activities
• Product certification scheme
• Promoting Quality Management Systems in Industry
• Advise the Ministry of Trade and Industry, on standards and related issues
In reality, the task of lobbying for product standardisation and quality control is conducted by interested 
parties and organisations, for example the Association of Ghana Solar Industries. On this issue, Mr. Omane 
Frimpong stated that it was difficult to push the issue of standardisation, arguing that “AGSI was set up 
with the primary motivation of setting industry standards in the solar market... but the lack of applied quality 
standards is still a problem in Ghana”. The IFC’s Lighting Africa programme (2009-2012 in Ghana), which 
aimed, inter alia,to support commercially viable energy SMEs, was also focused on quality control and 
product standardisation. Lighting Africa worked with local laboratories and lamp manufacturers in China, 
India and Germany to improve products for the Ghanaian market, while pushing for ‘truth in advertising’ 
especially in the solar lanterns market. Here, the IFC’s country manager Albert Eliason stated that the 
most successful examples of product improvements came from businesses that contacted Lighting Africa 
before developing their products, as a self-interested means to expand market share. Eliason’s point was 
to emphasise that product standardisation in the retail energy sector is being driven by businesses, not 
government agencies.
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SME entrepreneurs interviewed for this research, including Boniface Taylor (Technical Director, Windfield 
Engineering), Omane Frimpong (CEO, Wilkins Engineering) and William Aye-Addo (Managing Director, 
Syscom Energy Ltd.), argued that the public procurement process favours bigger players, and although 
there is no explicit discrimination, the MoEN argues that the capacity of SMEs must be improved so 
they can compete to secure high-profile contracts. This ‘barrier’ is one that is mentioned in the other 
AREED countries studied for this research, and is highlighted as a key frustration to many energy SME 
entrepreneurs who see public contracts as an important means to expand operations, gain experience 
and build up contacts for operating in other regions of the country.
In the solar PV market, the prospect of FIT support has the potential to kick-start major investments that 
would enable to Government to reach its 10% target of RE generation by 2020. WilkinSolar is among 
those hoping to invest in large-scale, grid connected PV, with plans for a 5 MW plant in northern Ghana. 
However Mr. Frimpong considers the cost of the FIT as too great to place on consumers and believes it 
would be politically impossible to support more than 20 MW of FIT-supported solar in Ghana. If so, this 
would rule out the 155 MW Nzema Project announced in December 2012: a US$ 400 million foreign 
investment in the country’s Western Region that would increase Ghana electricity generation capacity by 
6%. Nonetheless, there are other means to support FITs, including a period of committed donor-support 
that would make the Ghanaian FIT politically viable in the short to medium term.
SMEs investing in LPG technology have been a notable success in Ghana, with numerous reported cases 
where there wasn’t enough capacity to meet demand. The main barriers to further LPG market development 
in Ghana have been market-based, especially bottlenecks with the wholesale transport and distribution of 
gas. As with the other countries studied for this research, the stakeholders consulted in Ghana generally 
agreed that it is now easier and quicker to register an SME, as the process has been reformed since 2000. 
Registration is still centralised, but the process in more reliable than it used to be. At the same time, tighter 
government regulations are also creating new barriers for entrepreneurs. Clara Koranteng, owner of M38, 
explained that “…for LPG it’s harder now than 10 years ago due to bureaucratic implementation of health 
and safety regulations, especially when setting up an LPG business... the fire service and the Environmental 
Protection Authority (EPA) all need to approve operations, not just applications.” However it is important 
to balance this view with one that focuses on the interests of health, safety and the environment for a 
technology which is potentially more dangerous and damaging that most RETs.
When asked about the role of government in supporting energy SMEs, Albert Eliason, Country Manager 
for the IFC/Lighting Africa programme, argued that past experience, with many governments, had taught 
him to question their effectiveness, stating that “…it’s all about talk, talk and talk and nothing ever gets 
done. So for me the point is to always cut out [the government] and get on with what needs to be done…
because we are always told about the ‘policy framework’, the ‘institutional regime’ etc., but nothing ever 
gets done.” He added his view that politicians think only in the short term and lack vision, producing 
plenty of good policy documents, but that the government, ultimately, has no plans and/or systems in 
place to implement them, so nothing happens. This ‘anti-government’ perspective is one that is shared 
by the architects of other organisations and programmes that have sought to promote energy SMEs, 
including E+Co and the AREED project which, at the outset, chose to deal directly with entrepreneurs and 
not concern itself with the working to influence a country’s ‘enabling framework’. This is a key point and 
something that we will return to in chapter 8.
However the Government of Ghana does support energy SMEs through various policies and state-funded 
investments and that end up contracting local SMEs. For example, the Government has policy to replace 
all kerosene lamps with either solar lamps or grid-connections. To this end the KERO-Fund was launched 
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in 2012 to finance this transition, using local SME manufacturers and distributors. This will also lead to 
significant fiscal savings for the Government as it currently subsidises the national kerosene market by 
a total of US$ 20 million per year, thus offsetting the cost of the transition to more sustainable energy 
technologies.
4.3.2 Nationally available financing
When it comes to the central issue of finance, the workshop discussions and interviews centred on the 
question of ‘what has changed’, using the year 2000 as a temporal reference point. The general opinion 
was that banks in Ghana are more aware about environmental and social sustainability criteria now, with 
some banks, including the regional ECOBank, conducting environmental due diligence on all their loan 
approvals. However, while there is more awareness now regarding energy SMEs due to the number of 
such businesses operating in the country, the sector is still perceived to be relatively risky, which in turn 
continues to restrict commercial lending.
Even for ECOBank, which is widely viewed as the country’s leading bank in terms of lending to ‘green 
enterprises’, collateral is still very important and for more complex business (including most energy 
SMEs) that depend upon a longer supply chain, experience lower levels of business turnover and rates 
of return. For these businesses it is unheard of for commercial loans to be issued for less than 26% 
annual interest. Such rates render the majority of energy SMEs financially unviable, even for some LPG 
businesses that have witnessed higher rates of profitability and growth. Mark Ofori Kwafo from ECOBank 
Ghana commented during the workshop that there are “not enough” commercially viable small energy 
businesses in Ghana to create a demonstration effect for banks to see that this is a sector worth investing 
in, adding that their small size inhibits their commercial viability. However when compared to Tanzania and 
Zambia, there are numerous successful energy SMEs operating in Ghana, and so this argument appears 
to be an excuse that masks more structural objections that banks have with energy SMEs. Indeed the 
perceived lack of sufficient energy SME underlines the reality that commercial banks everywhere tend to 
overlook investments in smaller businesses that cannot harness economies of scale and, for the banks, 
imply relatively high transaction costs. From a business perspective Mrs. Clara Koranteng (M38) argued 
that banks in Ghana simply don’t want to lend to SMEs unless they have already made money and 
demonstrated commercial success, which refers directly to the development ‘catch-22’ that AREED and 
other programmed aimed to overcome.
ECOBank claims that it is willing to finance an SME that has won an important contract, without existing 
financial strength. For them (and presumably other banks) problems occur when SMEs apply for loans 
without any contracts lined up, thus exposing the bank to significant financial risk. This is the non-negotiable 
bottom line that dictates all investment decisions, even for banks such as ECOBank that want to be seen 
as investing in socially and environmentally sustainable small enterprises. In order to confront this reality, 
all energy SME programmes and projects (including AREED) have emphasised the importance of capacity 
building activities, making sure that entrepreneurs are fully informed about their markets in order to justify 
and negotiate commercial loans. Mr. Albert Eliason of Lighting Africa pointed out that many SMEs don’t 
keep basic records on sales and transactions, and that this is a problem for the banks when they need 
to assess a business’ past performance, profitability and outlook. Furthermore, Eliason argued that most 
of the SME entrepreneurs that he has worked with under the Lighting Africa project don’t want to listen 
to the free business advice that they are given, stating that “only two of the SMEs took advantage of that 
offer…the reason is that they know what they ought to do, but either they don’t feel it’s important or that 
somebody will just give them the money and get off their backs, and I think that’s the mentality.” As such, 
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Eliason claims that many of the entrepreneurs involved with Lighting Africa complain that the programme 
has not benefited them, because it hasn’t provided them with cheap finance.
E+Co have been operating in Ghana since 2001 and the company maintains its position as the main 
lender dedicated solely to the energy SME sector. At the research workshop E+Co’s country manager 
for Ghana, Mr. Albert O. Boateng, echoed many of the issues raised by Eliason and challenged other 
participants to consider whether they would risk investing their own money on a business venture that did 
not present a clear and well-developed and realistic business plan. Regarding the performance of E+Co’s 
Ghana portfolio, Boateng confirmed that the company has invested in 13 separate energy SMEs, some of 
which were looking for capital to expand operations. Of these businesses, approximately 50% were LPG 
traders, 30-40% cook stoves and 10-20% solar home systems. However, E+Co’s approach of managing 
its funds from the US meant that only a limited local capacity with regard to energy SME lending was 
built up through the AREED project. Following the relative success of AREED, E+Co moved to secure the 
custom of the larger players in the energy SME market, where risks and transaction costs are lower, and 
profits generally higher.
Indeed, Frank Atta-Owusu recalled that many of the businesses that approached AREED were applying 
for far more than the average US$ 50-100,000 loans that were issued. This indicates that the programme 
was either misinformed about the appropriate scale of financial support needed for energy SMEs in Ghana, 
or reflects inflated and/or unrealistic ambitions on behalf of entrepreneurs. However there was clear 
agreement among those interviewed that when it came to the funding available for the guarantee funds 
under the AREED II facility (2007-2012) these were, at US$ 50,000, too small to attract serious interest 
from the financial sector in energy SMEs.
Regarding the prospect of cooperation between banks in order to share the financial risk of lending to 
SMEs, Mr. Albert Eliason of Lighting Africa stated that “…no, this would only happen for very big deals like 
oil… and even if you [as a donor agency] have made funds available to the bank and say ‘invest this’, they 
won’t do that and will put in place very stringent mechanisms for the intended beneficiaries, and not just 
for energy. There are too many projects where guarantee funds have been made available to the banks 
and the beneficiaries have been unable to access it because, as the banks will tell you, they are not free 
funds, and they have to be paid back…and they have to account for the funds, so when you look at it from 
their point of view it [the stringent lending practices] makes sense”. Eliason added that “there is a certain 
dependency mentality within SMEs, to the extent that when they even have access to these funds they 
think it’s free money.”
Given the reality of the commercial banking sector’s hesitancy in lending to energy SMEs, combined with 
the low level of ‘preparedness’ on behalf of SMEs, the most significant change in lending practices to 
support the energy SME market has come from the microfinance sector, especially with the issuance of 
end-user finance (EUF). While this is seen as an effective means to stimulate demand for RETs, especially 
off-grid solar PV systems, the micro-finance banks that issue such loans are charging upwards of 30% 
annual interest, which calls into question who the main beneficiaries of this arrangement are.
4.3.3 Business Models and Institutional frameworks
Given Ghana’s relatively high rates of grid-connected electrification (>60%) it is unclear why the IFC 
selected Ghana as one of the pilot Lighting Africa countries, as compared to Kenya (the other pilot 
country) where electrification totals 22%. However Albert Eliason claims that at least 13% of the Ghanaian 
population will not be supplied with a grid connection before 2020, opening up a significant market for 
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off-grid technologies, though much smaller than in many other SSA countries. Despite the large number of 
SMEs operating in the market for solar PV technologies (including SHSs and solar lamps), it has witnessed 
less growth, when compared to efficient cook stoves and LPG. This is widely attributed to a decline in 
the levels of willingness to pay for SHSs, even in some rural areas, due to government’s relative success 
in providing grid-supplied electricity. However demand for SHSs for back-up purposes, as opposed to 
primary energy, remains strong due to frequent power outages from the grid. A specific challenge for many 
solar businesses in Ghana is that their business plans are undermined by inconsistent investments in grid 
electrification, i.e., certain areas are prioritised ahead of official plans. Nonetheless the Ministry of Energy 
has mapped its electrification plans and so it’s possible to know which areas are unlikely to get electrified 
in the next 10 years, for example, thus identifying the natural domain of SMEs to supply off-grid solutions.
Eliason argued that in order to achieve a significant role for SMEs in the diffusion of clean, modern, 
energy technologies it is necessary to involve a large corporate player to provide a mature network and 
platform on which the SMEs can retail their goods. He pointed out that this model would require a complex 
business management system in place to support SMEs, to make sure they are fully stocked and remaining 
profitable. In turn this would increase the SME’s credibility with the banks, thus stimulating a virtuous circle 
of growth for energy SMEs. However this model remains untested and, though technically possible, it 
comes up against a variety of organisational challenges such as how to convince a big corporate player 
to work with smaller local businesses and how to equip the SMEs with relevant skills. Eliason provided an 
example from the Lighting Africa work, where they tried to convince GOIL (Ghana Oil: a major oil and gas 
company with a large network of refilling station) to distribute the solar lamps but they weren’t interested, 
due to bad past experience with installations of poor-quality solar technologies. This issue highlights the 
importance of technology reputations, which is a particular concern for large corporations. 
Regarding other energy technologies, the manufacture and marketing of efficient cook stoves has been 
more successful in Ghana than in either Zambia or Tanzania, as measured by the number of profitable 
SMEs operating in this market. In part, demand for these cook stoves has been driven by a lack of supply 
from LPG traders in more remote areas, revealing a higher level of willingness to pay for clean, modern, 
energy as compared to Zambia and Tanzania. However, as in the market for solar PV projects, there have 
been challenges regarding a lack of quality control and standardisation over what constitutes an efficient 
stove. In the LPG sector, the market has been largely unregulated and some less scrupulous traders have 
been reported cheating their consumers, mainly by not fully filling gas bottles, though this is understood to 
have not affected demand. Ghana currently imports all its natural gas but local production is likely to supply 
the market by 2014, where most LPG demand growth is expected to come from the transport sector.
Compared to either Zambia or Tanzania, there are more, and better organised, RET industry trade 
associations. Nonetheless, many stakeholders argued that more needs to be done to organise and 
represent clean and renewable energy technology businesses, especially when it comes to the task of 
lobbying Government for favourable reforms to taxation and policy support. Here, the Solar Industry Trade 
Association is regarded by many as a good start, but that there is a need for a nationwide umbrella 
association of renewable energy businesses. Beyond rhetorical support, however, there is no concrete 
evidence that this idea is being developed. 
4.3.4 Human capacity
Drawing upon his experience with the AREED programme, Frank Atta-Owusu emphasised the importance 
of the skills and motivation of individual entrepreneurs in determining the success of specific energy SMEs. 
Citing the experience of Toyola, he claimed that “the technology is as good as the entrepreneur”, adding 
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that in this case the entrepreneur had a clear idea of what he wanted to do, and was willing to take risks. 
In this sense Atta-Owusu was clear that entrepreneurs must be “hands on” and always actively involved 
in pushing the market for their products in order for the SME to succeed, thus revealing, as in the other 
countries studied, the importance of basic human capacity as a key ‘success factor’. While this is a rather 
obvious point, it is worth noting since the AREED selection process differed between countries where, in 
the case of Ghana, KITE focused its efforts on assessing the experience, skills and motivation of individual 
entrepreneurs in addition to the energy market or technology they wanted to pursue. As such, KITE was 
not only keen to support entrepreneurs that expressed a genuine interest in sticking with the energy sector 
in the longer term, but also considered the background and qualifications of the individuals, with a view to 
ensuring the development of strong business and administration skills. By comparison, various AREED-
supported business in Zambia and Tanzania (many of which ultimately failed) appeared to be selected 
based on the quality or originality of the business idea, more than the individual behind it.
Boniface Taylor, Technical Director of Windfield Engineering, explained that Ghana has significant wind 
resources that could be commercially developed. To this end his company installed 6 x 60 metre wind 
speed testing masts in under the GEDAP project. Measurements have indicated up to 6.2 m/s average 
wind speeds in some areas of Ghana, though technical factors regarding grid connections present 
the most significant barrier. Taylor also stressed the importance of addressing the issue of technology 
standards and performance, as previous discussed. However he highlighted a human dimension behind 
this otherwise technical challenge, arguing that “the need for standards is very important because we have 
had some problems, some complaints, about renewable energy technologies…but many of the problems 
are technical, where proper load studies have not been conducted and so the right size of equipment is 
not used, and people don’t know how to use or maintain the technologies…” In order words, the proper 
application of RETs is essential and damage to their reputation often results from poor installation decisions 
and maintenance, both of which refer to essentially managerial issues.  
4.3.5 Social and cultural factors
During the research in Ghana, various stakeholders repeated the idea that SMEs are permanently pleading 
for financial support from the government, grants and subsidised loans, leading to a dependency syndrome 
as previously explained by Eliason from Lighting Africa. The true extent to which this attitude dominates 
the SME sector is unknown, however it was not obviously apparent among the entrepreneurs that were 
interviewed. A vocal exception was Mr. Frimpong from Wilkins Engineering who was willing to share his 
advice to other energy sector entrepreneurs, stating first and foremost that “money is not the issue”, 
and that it’s not necessary to have contacts in Government to secure contracts, contrary to want other 
entrepreneurs commonly claim (however it should be noted that  Frimpong used to work at the Ministry 
of Energy). Instead, he argued for the need for more commitment on behalf of the entrepreneurs, stating 
that he himself was “determined not to fail” and that being able to overcome failure is one of the keys to 
entrepreneurial success, along with perseverance. Furthermore he claimed that “Africa is poor because 
we lack vision” which is the kind of sound bite that could easily be misconstrued or taken out of context, 
and indeed for this research its value provides little analytical insight itself, though his comment is notable 
for the strength of the assertion.
In common with many energy SME entrepreneurs interviewed in the other countries, most of the Ghanaian 
entrepreneurs explained that they avoid borrowing from commercial banks, instead opting to self-finance 
their business through savings and/or from informal borrowing from family and friends. Once such 
businesses are established and require working capital to finance specific project, these entrepreneurs 
often prefer to operate on trust, using a mix of self-finance and client-finance. Boniface Taylor claimed that 
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he has never even considered going to a bank, due to the high interest that they charge, and explained that 
“it depends on the project, but in most cases I pre-finance [the work] with the little I have. But if it is huge 
and will demand more than what I have, then I come to an agreement with the client who pays a certain 
percentage and then we take the rest of the money after completion. It has to do with trust…but I personally 
always prefer to pre-finance if I can…”Insights such as these highlight the bottom-line reality of the cost of 
commercial financing in sub-Saharan Africa, and how this reality in turn shapes entrepreneurial attitudes, 
preferences and business strategies. In the case of Windfield Engineering, Taylor explained that his aim was 
to expand the business, especially into the solar water heater market, though not by borrowing from the 
banks. However, the financing and operating model described by Taylor, while internally rational, limits SMEs 
to operating on a contract-to-contract basis, thus restricting the scope for expanding their businesses.
4.3.6 Summary of workshop discussion on barriers in Ghana
The below-listed issues are a summary of the main ideas and arguments expressed by the local stakeholders 
that attended the one-day workshop in Accra.
Demand-side	issues Supply-side	issues
1 SMEs lack capacity to develop business plans and keep basic 
records on sales, cash flow etc. This is both a problem for banks 
and also government funds (BDSF) to support SMEs.
2 Few entrepreneurs in private sector know about the matching fund 
facility, so lack of communication is a barrier to progress
3 Idea that SMEs are permanently pleading for support, subsidised 
loans etc., leading to a dependency syndrome
4 The public procurement process favours bigger players, although 
there is no explicit discrimination. MinOE argues that capacity of 
SMEs must improved so they can compete.
5 ECOBank is willing to finance an SME that has won a contract, 
without financial strength. The problem is when SMEs apply for 
loans without any contracts lined up. SMEs should be fully informed 
about their markets in order to justify and negotiate loans.
4.3.7 Solutions
A wide-ranging debate over the relevant barriers and solutions was conducted at the Accra workshop (see 
annex 11.1.3 for a list of participants). Through open discussion on what actions could/would serve to 
benefit the Ghanaian energy SMEs sector, the following needs were agreed upon:
1. Clear policy goals established through a transparent stakeholder engagement process, thus 
minimising political risk, especially with regard to the continuity of the national electrification planning. 
The same should be done for cook stoves and LPG and CNG for the transport sector. 
2. Government to define clearly where energy SMEs can and should operate, based on informed 
planning, in order to improve market stability for investors
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3. Legislation and regulations to ensure quality control for energy products, including solar products, 
to be defined and pushed for by trade associations. Also to introduce a clear system of product 
certification and standardisation. 
4. National renewable energy resource assessments at the local level to inform project appraisals and 
financial risk assessments
5. Back high-profile RET projects (for example solar lighting for public space) that demonstrate their 
effectiveness to achieve public buy-in
6. Targeted government support to create warehouses for sustainable energy technologies that can 
supply local businesses
7. Improved communication of government actions and taxation for product imports, with tax breaks 
for quality-approved products (see point #3)
4.4	 Conclusions
As compared to Zambia and Tanzania, the concept and reality of ‘energy SMEs’ is observed to have made 
a more lasting impact and presence in Ghana. In particular, individual businesses supported by AREED 
have demonstrated commercial success in the LPG and cook stoves market, to the point that some banks 
are now actively seeking to invest in these businesses, for example Toyola (stoves) and Anasset (LPG). 
However the majority of these successes are concentrated in the LPG market, which was a technology 
‘ripe’ for development in Ghana at the time that AREED first operated, i.e., there was both significant 
demand at the household level, and wholesale supplies available for distribution. The government of 
Ghana also encouraged LPG, although regulations have, since 2007, become tougher on SMEs seeking 
to start LPG operations, in particular with securing safety and environmental licensing.
Other energy sector programmes supported by the Ministry of Energy are now pursuing the enterprise-
led approach, including Lighting Africa and GEDAP. As such, the explicit efforts made by KITE to engage 
the government in AREED, were key to raising the profile of the enterprise model approach into the policy 
community where it has had a lasting effect, at least in the ideational realm where the concept of ‘energy 
SMEs’ is now widely endorsed.
Ghana
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Senegal is a Sahelian country located in western Africa. The population is estimated to be about 12.8 million 
(2011), with more than 58% living in rural areas. The population is unevenly spread across the territory 
with a strong concentration in the western part of the country and more than half of the urban population 
(54%) lives in the capital city of Dakar. High rural poverty and limited access to rural infrastructure and basic 
services has fuelled migration to urban areas.
Senegal is poor in natural resources. The economy is dominated by a few strategic sectors including 
fisheries and services, especially tourism. However, due to its geographic location and history as a strong 
trading centre, the country has an important industrial sector compared to the other countries in the 
region, including investments from multinational companies, though mainly French capital (UNDP, 2010; 
IRENA, 2012). In 2011, Senegal’s GDP was US$ 14.29 billion with a 2.6% rate of growth. The country’s 
informal sector accounts for approximately 60% of GDP (World Bank, 2012).
5.1	 Energy	background
The energy sector in Senegal is facing significant challenges, including an extreme dependence on 
imported oil products. All fossil fuels are imported, including oil products used in the transport sector and 
for electricity generation, making Senegal very vulnerable to increases in the global price of oil products. 
In recent years, Senegal has experienced a deterioration in the finances of the national electric company 
(SENELEC), largely as a result of oil price increases. These issues have been exacerbated since 2008 
and have precipitated a deep crisis in Senegal’s energy sector that impairs broader economic and social 
development due to significant load shedding (World Bank, 2012).
In order to solve the country’s energy crisis, the government of ex-President Abdoulaye Wade (2000-2012) 
adopted in 2011 the “Plan Takkal”, an energy emergency plan covering the 2011-2014 period, which 
includes short-term emergency measures and medium term investments. In 2012, the new President 
Macky Sall made reform of the energy sector and the development of new energy policies one of his 
political priorities, focusing on the need to adopt an optimal energy mix, in order to reduce supply costs 
over the medium and long term through a policy of diversification—natural gas, hydropower, and renewable 
energies—as well as through regional integration.
The Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) of Senegal in 2009 was 157.9 Petajoules (PJ) of which renewable 
energy accounted for 54.8 %. Biomass accounts for 54% of the country’s energy supply and oil products 
for 40%. A mix of coal, hydro, natural gas and solar are the other energy sources that make up the 
remainder 6%. Electricity generation totalled 2,858 GWh in 2009 of which renewables, including hydro, 
accounted for 10.2% (IRENA, 2012). The use of traditional fuels –wood and charcoal – is putting great 
pressure on forests and contributing to a degradation of the environment. However Senegal has significant 
potential to develop new energy sources, including solar PV and concentrated solar technologies, as well 
as solid biomass, wind, hydro and liquid biofuels.
5. Senegal
27
In 2009, 77% of households in urban areas had access to electricity, whereas in rural areas only 16% of 
households had access to modern energy services (REEGLE, 2012). Access to electricity is principally 
through SENELEC’s grid. The rate of electrification is increasing both via new connections to grid and 
through small, off-grid systems. SENELEC is a majority state-owned company that is responsible for the 
production, transmission, distribution and sale of electricity through the national grid. In recent years, 
the national authorities have adopted legislation aimed at liberalising the sector by promoting private 
investments in generation capacity. However the high cost of electricity means that it is not possible to 
finance new connections through increased consumer tariffs, thus presenting a barrier to attracting private 
investment. Furthermore the scarcity of capital available to the State means that investment relies heavily 
on foreign donors (IRENA, 2012).
The Ministry of Energy has overall responsibility for the energy sector in Senegal. This Ministry has a division 
for renewable energies that is responsible for the management of the renewable energy programs such 
as the national biomass programme. Other key institutions working to harness the country’s renewable 
energy resources are ASER (the Senegalese Agency for Rural Electrification) whose role is to promote the 
use of renewable energy and to bring technical and financial support to electrification initiatives in rural 
areas; and CERER (the Study Centre on Renewable Energy) which is a university institute dedicated to 
research into renewable energy in Senegal.
Since 2000 the energy policy focus of the national authorities has been on the contribution that the sector 
can make to increase well-being and eradicate poverty by providing basic ‘social’ services while taking into 
account environmental issues. To this end, the government adopted a National Strategy for the Development 
of Renewable Energies for Poverty Alleviation in 2003. This strategy aims to integrate renewable energies 
into other development policies, with the specific target of a minimum 15% renewable-based electricity 
production by 2025. In addition to this target, the government adopted the Renewable Energy Law in 
2010 that includes a 0% corporate income tax break (normally 30%) for investors in renewable energy and 
on VAT (normally 7%) for renewable energy products and services (REEGLE, 2012).
5.2	 Energy	SMEs	in	Senegal
Senegal’s informal sector accounts for about 60% of its GDP and SMEs account for approximately 90% 
of the value of business conducted in the country. As such, the government is aware of the importance 
of the private sector as a driver of development, and has taken measures to encourage informal SMEs to 
formalise their activities, starting with business registration. 
The institutional framework for SMEs has been designed and implemented by the Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Crafts (Ministère du Commerce, de l’Industrie,  et de l’Artisanat), which contains a department 
dedicated to supporting Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). The role of this department includes the 
development of actions and policies to promote the creation of SMEs. Another key organisation is the 
Agency for the Development and Support of SMEs (Agence de Développement et d’Encadrement des 
PME, ADEPME), which is an autonomous administrative body but acts as a technical arm of the ministry. 
The role of ADEPME is to assist SMEs and to advise entrepreneurs wishing to start an SMEs in terms of 
procedures, opportunities, market analysis and good management.
The policy framework related to SMEs is built mainly upon the Law of SMEs Orientation (Loi d’Orientation 
des PMEs) adopted in 2008, which evolved from being an SME Charter, first adopted in 2003. The law 
commits public authorities to the task of promoting and developing the SME sector, the immediate business 
environment, and the strategic positioning of SMEs in the national and international economic spheres. 
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The law defines SMEs, mandates the development of supporting measures for formalised SMEs, and sets 
out the benefits that SMEs can receive from the state, as well as the obligations that they have to respect. 
In 2010 the government issued the Sectoral Policy for SMEs, which constitutes the strategic framework for 
the implementation of all the actions and measures for the development and promotion of SMEs.
In the following section we explore the extent to which specific businesses have demonstrated that energy 
SMEs are a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in Senegal, drawing upon 
the outcomes described during the workshop, in addition to desk-based research.
5.2.1 AREED supported energy SMEs
Senegal was one of the five countries that participated in the AREED project. The Energy Programme of 
ENDA, an international NGO based in Dakar, was the in-country organisation responsible for communicating 
the project and for co-implementing (alongside E+Co) the enterprise development service (EDS). Under 
the leadership of Mr. Secou Sarr, Director of the Programme “Energy, Environment and Development”, 
ENDA has many years of experience with conducting energy-related research and project implementation 
in Senegal.
Since the beginning of the project in 2000, 15 businesses have received financial and technical support 
in Senegal. Below are listed some of the SMEs that went through the EDS process under AREED in the 
country, and were issued with loans to either start up or expand their businesses:  
• GIE Foyers Améliorés (GIE FA) – Dakar and other locations : fuel-efficient cook stove manufacture
• Montagrisol – Louga : manufacture of solar grinding mills
• Prosoleil – Saint-Louis : manufacture of solar water heater 
• Vent et Eau pour la Vie (VEV) – Thiès: installation and maintenance of wind-powered water pumps 
• Africaine de Maintenance et d’Equipement (AME) – Dakar: installation and maintenance of  solar 
water heaters 
• Energie R – Dakar:  electronics for solar PV manufacture
• APROCER: ceramics for the manufacture of efficient cook stoves
As was the case with all of the AREED countries, most of the energy SMEs in Senegal were in fact urban-
based businesses mostly due to the limited number of rural-based entrepreneurs that responded to the 
adverts for AREED support. However many of the urban-based energy businesses were aiming to supply 
the rural areas, including Montagrisol, VEV and APROCER. 
5.2.2 Senegal energy SMEs: description of outcomes and contributions
Below follows a summary of energy SMEs that have operated in Senegal since 2002, both AREED-
supported and non-AREED, describing both the ‘outcome’ (business activity and performance) and the 
‘contributions’ (factors that helped in the set up and operation of specific businesses)5. 
5 The information gathered represents what was available to the researchers, from various sources both primary and secondary, 
but does not claim to be exhaustive.
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COSER (Compagnie Sahélienne en Energies Renouvelables): provider of equipments for rural 
electrification (solar, wind, biogas)
COSER is an engineering consultancy that provides technical support for the design of renewable-powered 
(mostly solar, wind and biogas) rural electrification projects (both off and on grid), as well as sourcing finance 
for project implementation. In addition to its project-based work, COSER also supplies electrification 
equipment to a variety of clients in rural areas. The business started in 2002 and was spearheaded by 
Mr. Abdoulaye Ba, an energy engineer specialised in renewable technologies. The business was a self-
financed and started with the purchase of fifty 50 watt solar home systems imported from Germany. 
Mr. Ba first identified potential rural clients in Senegal through his own research in the Matam region 
where his grandfather was from, and where he knew there were people with money to spend (largely 
thanks to remittances sent by relatives living abroad). He started the business by providing a one-month 
trial period for solar home systems and if consumers wanted to continue using it, they must pay a 30% 
down-payment to keep it. The company employed a local contact to collect repayments from the local 
consumers. In 2010, COSER became a limited liability company (Ltd.) and as of 2012 the business has 
its African office based in Dakar and a European branch, based in Berlin.  The company is mostly run 
by two fixed employees but operates through a network of technicians who are based in the villages. 
The business mostly seeks opportunities through various government, NGOs and foreign donor-backed 
project for rural electrification.
La Maison Solaire: installation and maintenance of solar home systems 
La Maison Solaire was self-financed by the entrepreneur and set up in July 2011, based on a previous 
company called Sana Chips which commercialized solar systems in Dakar. The business started by 
identifying a need for solar energy in rural areas. La Maison Solaire employs 6 staff and focuses on the 
installation and maintenance of solar home systems in rural areas. Due to the challenge in reaching remote 
rural areas, the company waits to install a few systems at the same time to lower transport costs. They sell 
the solar home systems through end-user financing provided by microfinance institutions, backed up by the 
AREED II funds. SENFINANCE, a foundation set up through Swiss donor support and now operating as a 
private financial lender, holds the AREED guarantee fund. SENFINANCE lends to microfinance institutions 
at 8% interest and 12% is charged to consumers.
La Maison Solaire conducts its own studies into village demand for solar home systems and the “association 
of village chiefs” provides a vetting of local householders, providing informal (i.e., not legally responsible) 
advice to La Maison Solaire as to who are likely to be reliable borrowers. Local chiefs thus act as gatekeepers 
and provide a level of risk mitigation to the company. For example, La Maison Solaire has installed 400 
solar home systems in 13 villages in the Fatick region which is approximately 140 km from Dakar, and in 
the rural community of Mbellacadiao. In this case, the company has an agreement with ENDA (responsible 
for AREED in Senegal) to lend to the LE SINE, a local microfinance institution which in turn lends to the 
households to purchase the systems. La Maison Solaire purchases the solar home systems and makes a 
profit through economies of scale, where the system is sold to consumers for a fixed price, paid for by the 
microfinance institutions who charge consumers a monthly repayment rate. According to the manager of 
the company, this business model would be impossible without the guarantee funds from AREED.
SIFF (Sangomar Ice Fabrics and Fisheries): ice manufacturing for transporting refrigerated foods
SIFF, based on the town of Joal, was set by Mr. Lamine Ndour in 2010 with the aim of supplying ice to 
the fishing industry, manufactured through the use of clean energy sources. SIFF’s ice factory uses a solar 
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PV system and a wind turbine as a backup to diesel-powered generation. The SIFF factory does not use 
any electricity from the power grid. The factory’s daily production capacity is about 30 tonnes of ice per 
day and employs ten full-time staff. SIFF received EDS and a US$ 38,888 loan from the regional Solidarity 
Bank (BRS), backed by guarantee funds from AREED. In addition the company benefits from an import tax 
waiver and was exempted from paying VAT for the first 3 years of operation.
Kayer: photovoltaic solar home systems installation and maintenance
Kayer was formerly a pilot project created by the Meckhé Peasants Union, seeking to promote the use of 
renewable energy as a mean to power rural development. The company, created in 2006 and based at 
Ngaye Mékhé, focuses on the installation and maintenance of photovoltaic equipment and systems. Kayer 
received technical and financial support from different organizations including SIDI (International Solidarity 
for  Development and  Investment), a company specialised in the financial and technical support of 
microfinance institutions. The company works in partnership with microfinance institutions with the aim of 
providing customers with adapted microcredits to finance their equipment. Since 2006 Kayer has installed 
more than 200 individual solar systems and 15 multifunctional solar platforms.
SAEB (Société Africaine d’Exploitation de Biocarburants): production, transformation, and 
marketing of agriculture products for biofuels production.
SAEB was the brainchild Mr. Daniel Vidal, a bio engineer, who had the idea of developing a company in 
the renewable energy sector while creating employment and providing access to electricity in rural areas. 
SAEB was set up in 2009 by three partners and is based in Dakar. In the beginning the company was 
self-financed and parts of its activities were made on a volunteer basis. The objective of the company is 
to produce, commercialize, import and export biofuels. In order to implement the first experimental activity 
of improved production techniques of jatropha (Jatropha curcas), SAEB received 200 hectares of land 
from the local authority in Mbane Commune. In addition, the company purchased unfarmed lands on 
which to experiment different production techniques. By doing so, they were able to develop within three 
years a reliable system to produce seeds and oil from jatropha with the aim fuelling motors of small private 
production units in rural communities (balers, multifunctional platforms, mini generators).
Today SAEB has its own plantations but also collaborates with local producers in Senegal as well as in 
Mali and Guinea. The sale of seeds and oil started in 2010 in a market characterized by a strong external 
demand (outside of Senegal). The company is using artisanal balers to harvest the jatropha seeds and 
although the quality of the products would be higher with industrial balers, the capital investment needed to 
acquire such equipment is beyond the company’s reach. SAEB has received some support from national 
institutions such as MBERRS (the Ministry of Biofuels, Renewable Energies and Scientific Research) mainly 
to promote the company’s activities in national and international events or medias. The company also 
collaborates with the Institute for Agronomic Research in Senegal which operates with oversight from 
the Ministry of Agriculture to conduct research into seed technology. The company has also entered into 
commercial negotiations with many foreign companies and has submitted a financing request under the 
AREED II facility.
ABS Group (Afric Building Services Group): manufacture of biodigesters 
ABS Group was set up in late 2011 with the aim of manufacturing domestic biogas digester; however as 
of 2012 the company was not fully operational. . The company has been self-financed until now and is 
the first in Senegal to be certified by the National Programme of Domestic Biogas for the manufacture of 
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biodigesters. As well as manufacturing biodigesters to fit household needs, ABS Group also provides the 
hydraulic installation for the technology and supplies free maintenance for one year. The biogas is produced 
primarily from cow dung but peanuts shells can also be used, and is used for cooking and lighting. For 
this reason the company is mainly operating in the pastoral areas of Senegal, where appropriate organic 
matter is more freely available. ABS group has received support from the National Programme of Domestic 
Biogas for training their staff on biogas production and have collaborated with the ANCAR (the National 
Agency for Rural and Agriculture Advice) and ANEV (the National Agency of Eco-Villages) to manufacture 
biodigesters in different rural areas. Given that the price of biogas digesters is often too high for local rural 
customers, the ABS Group works with farmers’ organizations to try to involve microfinance institutions to 
develop affordable end-user finance mechanisms. 
5.2.3 Have Senegalese energy SMEs demonstrated commercial viability?
The previous section detailed the history of specific energy SMEs in Senegal, which enables us to address 
research question #1, i.e., to what extent have specific businesses demonstrated that energy SMEs are a 
viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in sub-Saharan Africa? Based on the 
above-listed case histories, the following issues and trends can be observed in Senegal, some of which 
point to factors related to the ‘enabling framework’ which is explored in the subsequent analysis:
1. There is an overall good performance of energy SMEs in Senegal with many commercial 
successes
2. Energy SMEs are more often than not self-funded businesses
3. Energy SMEs are mostly dependent on market niches and face demand-side barriers to business 
scale-up
4. The demand for new technologies in rural areas is low due to a) a lack of knowledge of technologies 
on the part of households, b) a lack of  financial resources to purchase the technologies
5. Microfinance institutions are key stakeholders in providing capital to rural businesses and households 
to purchase modern energy technologies
6. Where energy SMEs have failed, poor market research and marketing is often to blame
5.3	 Analysis	of	outcomes,	barriers	and	solutions
In this subsection we provide our substantive analysis of the Senegalese energy SME sector, based on 
the main issues raised by workshop participants, and elaborated upon by individuals during follow-up 
interviews. Here we first build upon the ‘contributions’ aspect of the specific energy SMEs in Senegal, 
i.e., to understand the key causal factors, or mechanisms, through which energy SMEs have experienced 
either success or failure, thus addressing research questions #2. We then address research question #3: 
what are the main, persistent, barriers facing entrepreneurs when setting up, operating and expanding 
energy SMEs in the identified countries? The analysis of the range of ‘solutions’ proposed by national 
stakeholders to overcome these barriers, is again based on the issues raised by workshop participants, 
and elaborated upon by individuals during follow-up interviews.
The overall focus of the analysis is on the specific circumstances in Senegal that have influenced, and 
continue to influence, outcomes (specific businesses) in the country’s energy SME sector, including the 
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nature of relevant barriers to market development and expansion. As such is it useful to divide the issues 
raised by stakeholders into the elements of an ‘enabling environment’ that all countries have, to a greater 
or less extent favourable to the growth of energy SMEs. 
5.3.1 Policy and regulatory framework
In recent years, the government of Senegal has shown a strong commitment to developing its renewable 
energy resources, legislating the framework law on renewable energy at the end of 20106. Furthermore, 
renewable energy is widely viewed as an important means to enable rural development and poverty 
reduction. The government is also aware of the role of SMEs for human development and the contribution 
that they make to the economy, as evidenced by the adoption of a legal framework to promote the 
development of the private sector including SMEs, specifically the 2008 Law of SME Orientation (Loi 
d’Orientation des PMEs) and the 2010 Sectoral Policy of SMEs, as previously discussed.
However there is no specific reference to energy SMEs in the government’s legal and regulatory frameworks, 
and indeed various barriers that directly hinder the development of energy SMEs can be identified in 
Senegal. For example, the government spends billions of CFA francs (West African Francs) subsidising the 
generation and distribution of electricity in Senegal. In 2012, because of high production costs and the rise 
of oil prices on the international market, the government allocated total subsidies of up to 120 billion CFA 
francs (approximately US$ 248 million) to the state-owned SENELEC utility, with the aim of keeping the 
price of electricity at a level within the purchasing power of Senegalese households. In this context, while 
electricity prices are higher in Senegal than they are in the other countries studies in this report (see annex 
11.13), the large public subsidies provided to SENELEC undermine the competitive advantage of energy 
SMEs providing both grid and off-grid RET systems.
It should be noted that Senegal relies strongly on fossil fuels in particular in its transport sector and for 
electricity generation, 100% of which are imported. In 2009, the cost of importing fossil fuels totalled 
approximately US$ 1.1 billion, accounting for 23.2 % of all imports, thus heavily weighing down the 
country’s balance of trade (IRENA, 2012). The need to reduce such high energy import bills is the main 
driver behind the government’s policy to develop a diversity of domestic energy sources, including the 
uptake of various RETs, many of which are well suited to be supplied by SMEs.
The only case of subsidies provided to support modern energy other than fossil fuel in Senegal is for liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG). For more than three decades, Senegal has had a policy of subsidising LPG supplies, 
with the aim of reducing demand for traditional fuels and their impact on deforestation. From the 1970s the 
Senegalese government started to subsidize LPG first through exemptions of customs duties on cooking 
equipment designed to operate on LPG. By the end of the 1980s, the government began to subsidize 
the LPG fuel itself. Both 2.7 kg and 6 kg bottles were subsidised until 2008. Ms. Aliou Lô from LMDB gas 
(Lobbou Mame Diarra Bousso), an LPG distribution company, explains that although poor households 
struggle to afford the upfront cost of purchasing an LPG cylinder and cooker, the subsidies helped grow the 
market and, consequently, there has been an observed reduction in deforestation in many areas. Indeed the 
market grown significantly and LPG technology is now the main cooking fuel for most urban and peri-urban 
households. The Senegalese experience with subsidising LPG demonstrates that switching to modern 
forms of energy can occur when effective and stable government policies are applied over medium to long 
term. However at the end of the 1990s, the LPG subsidy program was not considered sustainable due to 
the weight of subsidies cost on country’s GDP. Based on the recommendation of International Monetary 
6 Loi n° 2010-21 du 20 décembre 2010 portant loi d’orientation sur les énergies renouvelables
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Fund (IMF), the Government committed to removing the subsidies, over time. In 2009 the Government 
reported that these subsidies had been totally removed (IISD, 2010; AFREA, 2011). 
The lack of financial incentives was mentioned by various stakeholders as a barrier to the development 
of energy SMEs in Senegal and to the diffusion of renewable energy technologies in general. In the case 
of the electricity sector, there is for example no feed-in tariff support available to support renewable 
energy technologies. There is evidence of confusion regarding the rules on legitimate tax exemptions for 
energy SMEs, and so this is an area of government policy that requires clarity. In the case of SIFF, the ice 
manufacture, Mr. Ndour explained that the company benefited from a tax exemption on the importation of 
non-solar equipment and was exempted from VAT for the first 3 years from the beginning of the operation. 
However, in the case of Kayer, for example, the company does not benefit from either VAT exemption or 
tax exemption on imported solar PV equipment, which is the businesses main expenditure. In the early 
1990s, the government of Senegal introduced tax and VAT exemptions for solar technologies, however 
this decision was abolished in 1999 after the common external tariff came into force within the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union which strove to harmonize fiscal policies between countries. According 
to Mr. Kassé from FESELEC if the authorities adopt incentive measures, these technologies – renewable 
technologies such as solar– will most likely develop. This is observation is rather obvious and indeed the 
greater need appears to be, first and foremost, clarity regarding which markets and technologies are, in 
fact, exempted from various taxes since this basic question promoted contradictory answers.
Another challenge faced by energy SMEs mentioned by the stakeholders interviewed, is the problem of 
competition from foreign companies. This issue was usually associated with low quality control on imported 
equipment. Mr. Kassé from FESELEC explained that nowadays any company can apply to a call for tender 
issued by the government, with no process of quality control. This allows large international companies 
Solar panel production at the SPEC plant, Dakar, October 2012
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to subcontract poorly trained, low-cost local companies. The lack of quality control on equipment was 
also mentioned by Mr. Mamadou Saliou Sow of SPEC7, a Senegalese company manufacturing solar PV 
panels in Dakar. He argued that the national market is full of cheap and low quality equipment produced 
by national companies or imported by foreign companies. Although there is a Standards Association in 
Senegal and some norms have been established for example for solar energy, Mr. Kassé explains that 
there is a lack of logistical capacity to check the quality of the equipment installed and that there is a real 
problem of knowledge on behalf of customers about what constitutes good quality service. As with the 
other countries studies for this research, there is a clear need for Government to develop and adopt clear 
norms and standards on RET equipment, and to implement a programme of systematic inspection and 
quality assurance. 
5.3.2 Nationally available finance
One of the main objectives of the AREED project was to demonstrate that energy SMEs can be economically 
viable so that local banks will see it as a safe sector, worth investing in. However in most cases this 
demonstration effect has not occurred and the banks in Senegal remain reluctant to lend to energy SMEs, 
charging relatively high interest rates when they do lend. From the perspective of the banks and other 
potential investors in energy SMEs, there are often high opportunity costs, whereby far higher and more 
secure rates of return can be achieved by investing in well-established businesses, revealing a broad trend 
across all the research countries.
There was wide agreement among stakeholders that it is difficult to access start-up capital in Senegal, 
where banks are very demanding with regard to documentation and collateral. For example, in the case 
of SPEC, a photovoltaic solar panels manufacture, collateral requested by the bank to start the company 
were up to 200% of the value of the loan. These included the provision of real estate and other personal 
assets from the company owners.  Mr. Mamadou Saliou Sow, the director general of SPEC confirms: 
“Receiving support from the banks is still very difficult because banks do not like start-ups. As SPEC 
was the first photovoltaic solar panels manufacture in Senegal, it was a new experience for the banks, 
for whom the solar energy sector is new”. The administrative process of requesting a bank loan is also, 
generally, very slow in Senegal. In the case of SPEC, it took one year to complete the request and receive 
the money. Mr. Sow states that “the – administrative - process is very slow. Six months can pass to finally 
receive a NO”. 
Interest rates are also relatively high in Senegal as compared to OECD countries, even on loans issued to 
expand SMEs that have a positive track record and performance. According to Mr. Issa Diop, in charge 
of partnership at BRS, the Regional Bank of Solidarity (Banque Régionale de Solidarité), which has been 
involved in the AREED project, “the bank lends money at a 12-13% interest rate. In the case of the 
partnership with ENDA – within the AREED project - the rate was about 10-11%”. At such rates of interest 
a business has to grow relatively fast and secure a clear profit margin with which to pay off the principle 
debt, otherwise there is a risk that the company’s finances become consumed by interest payments. 
Another barrier referred to by stakeholders regarding the banking sector is the generally short loan-
repayment periods, which tend not to benefit energy SMEs where the businesses cycle can be months or 
years, compared to the short turnover periods experienced by other businesses, especially those trading 
in high-volume, perishable goods. The banks’ reluctance to provide extended loan periods acts as a major 
barrier for the renewable energy sector in particular as the return on investment is generally longer than for 
7 SPEC: Sustainable Power Electric Company http://www.solar.sn/
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other companies. Mr. Diop from BRS mentioned that “the bank tries to adapt the repayment period  to the 
project but in general never goes beyond the medium term”. 
In addition to these structural challenges inherent to the energy sector, which increase risk premiums 
and discourage banks from lending, there is still strong evidence in Senegal that the banks remain quite 
ignorant of the small business energy sector, and this contributes to the banks’ insistence on collateral. On 
this point, Mr. Diop from BRS stated that “energy SMEs is a new sector for the financial institutions… with 
a huge risk regarding the support of the SMEs”. As such, BRS’s experience with AREED remains unique in 
Senegal. However Mr. Diop recognizes that the energy SME sector has grown quickly in Senegal and that 
there is a strong demand for sector in this sector, stating, however, that “trust needs to be established” 
between the financial institutions and the SMEs before lending can occur on a larger scale. Regarding 
financial risk, Mr. Diop explained that “the SME must be able to meet the needs of the population. The 
problem is the purchasing power of the customer and the lack of cover behind it. The SME is exposed and 
thus the bank is exposed”. However the lack of familiarity of the banks with this sector is probably not the 
main cause of high interest rates and the short term lending periods, and the problems appear to be more 
structural. In this sense, Mr. Sow from SPEC mentioned that “the banks act in the short term and do not 
lend on a longer term basis because they do not have the funds to do so”.  
Despite (or perhaps because of) the structural challenges facing the energy SME sector, the government 
in Senegal encourages the banks to support private initiatives in the energy sector. Mr. Diop from BRS 
explained that “the sector of energy SMEs is starting to interest the banks, who are responding to the 
government’s policies”. However he went on to clarify that “the bank – BRS – is not an expert in this 
sector”. Mr. Diop also considers that “many of the entrepreneurs working in this sector are not experts 
either” and so “support to banks, but also to SMEs, is necessary to develop relevant knowledge and 
experience in this field”. 
In this context, Mr. Louis Seck, ex-Minister of Renewable Energies in Senegal, explained that, although the 
AREED facility has raised awareness, the “Government still lacks a lot of awareness about energy SMEs in 
particular. This is the key challenge”. In this sense, the need to raise awareness to all the stakeholders of 
the State was mentioned by most of the people interviewed, and furthermore that this lack of awareness 
translated into low levels of local financing provided to energy SMEs. 
According to Mr. Kassé, president of FESELEC, the micro finance sector has grown rapidly in the last 
few years in Senegal, as a response to the low levels of interest from the larger commercial banks to lend 
to SMEs, generally. Mr. Sow from SPEC explained that although the conditions offered by the banks for 
a standard business loan are more attractive than the conditions made by the microfinance institutions, 
the microfinance institutions are more flexible and better adapted to the conditions of the rural world. 
Mr. Ndiaye from SENFINANCE, a private financial lender working with microfinance institutions to finance 
SMEs markets, explained that “micro finance institutions occupy a market which is not covered by traditional 
banks. These banks still consider this market as risky and not profitable enough. The banks do not work 
with rural micro finance institutions either”. As of 2012 there are only a few micro finances institutions 
(from many hundreds operating in the country) that work with traditional banks, but these institutions are 
relatively big and are the only ones considered as solvent by the banks. In this context, SENFINANCE 
together with bilateral and multilateral cooperation are the main sources of finance for rural micro finance 
institutions. It is interesting to note that although the energy SME sector is new for SENFINANCE, 
Mr. Ndiaye considers that this market constitutes a significant commercial opportunity that should be 
taken advantage of. With regard to the risk related to limited customer purchasing power, he states that 
“based on my experience, the payback by the customer is not a problem”.
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5.3.3 Institutional framework
Aware of the importance of the private sector as a driver of development, the government has taken 
measures to encourage the development of SMEs in Senegal. Similarly, conscious of the contribution 
that the energy sector can make to increase well-being and eradicate poverty, and the importance of 
promoting the use of renewable energies as a national security factor to decrease the reliance on fossil 
fuel importation, the government has made the development of renewable energies one of its priorities. 
However, SMEs in general are still hindered by many institutional difficulties which act as a brake on their 
development and evolution. 
It is worth mentioning that in Senegal, the Senegalese and foreign companies working in the electricity 
sector are brought together in the Federation of Enterprises in the Electricity sector (Fédération des 
entreprises du Sénégal dans l´électricité – FESELEC). FESELEC groups engineering, distributors and 
installation companies. Mr. Mor Kassé, the president of FESELEC, states that the difficulties related to the 
national environment define FESELEC’s mandate, and that the organisation aims to give more power to its 
members regarding the objective fixed by the government, namely to provide enough energy with a better 
quality and lower cost; and ensure electricity services access to the populations and decrease the energy 
price volatilities. Given this remit, FESELEC is unique in Senegal, and there are no other organisations 
that group energy SMEs together. Furthermore, contact between SMEs addressing the same kind of 
technology is very limited in Senegal where companies tend to operate in isolation from each other, to the 
detriment of the sector as a whole.
However there are many institutions dedicated to the development of SMEs in Senegal, in general. The 
country has a ministry, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Crafts, which includes the department of Small 
and Medium Enterprises addressing specifically the issue of SMEs. ADEPME also plays a key role by 
providing advice to SMEs in terms of management, strategies and market analysis.  However, while these 
institutions consider energy SMEs as just a subset of SMEs, they are usually unfamiliar with the specifics 
of the energy market, its structural dynamics and the relevance of other government policies. Therefore 
the services provided by these institutions do not always match the special features and needs of energy 
SMEs. In addition there is a clear lack of knowledge by entrepreneurs on the services provided by the 
institutions, and so potentially useful contact and collaboration often goes unrealised. Furthermore, there 
are no structures in place to promote a dialogue between the institutions bringing the services and the 
entrepreneurs of SMEs. Consequently there is no flow of communication between parties and it is difficult to 
convey information and expectations from one side to the other side. Government representatives expect 
the entrepreneurs to approach them with the aim of clarifying their expectations, while the entrepreneurs 
expect the government to take active decisions and leadership to support the development of SMEs. 
According to Mr. Louis Seck, ex-Minister of Renewable Energies, “the State put the general framework in 
place; then it is the responsibility of the private sector to approach the State”.
There are also a number of institutions and national programmes dedicated to the development of 
renewable energy, notably CERER (Centre for Studies and Research into Renewable Energy) at the 
University of Dakar and the National Program on Biogas (Programme National de Biogaz du Senegal) 
started in 2010. There are many examples of positive collaboration between SMEs and these institutions 
and programmes or with other scientific institutions. For example the technical staff of the ABS Group 
have been trained by the National Program on Biogas and SAEB developed a partnership with the Institute 
for Agronomic Research in Senegal to conduct trials on Jatropha seeds. However these institutions and 
programs usually provide technical support and do not address either the policy or regulatory frameworks, 
or the management aspects of SMEs.
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More broadly-focused agencies such as ASER (Senegalese Agency for Rural Electrification) and CRSE 
(The Committee for Regulation of the Electricity Sector) address renewable energy as a central part of 
their remit. Mr. Ousmane Fall Sarr, head of the Studies and Information System Unit at ASER, considers 
that energy SMEs have a key role to play in the national programme of rural electrification and that this 
programme must facilitate the emergence of SMEs compared to larger companies. In this sense ASER 
encourages the participation of energy SMEs in the awarding and management of the grid concessions. 
However Mr. Fall Sarr explained that there is a general lack of technical capacity on behalf of SMEs 
entrepreneurs. On this issue, FESELEC confirms that the State encourages local entrepreneurs to become 
concessionaires and that there is a preference for the Senegalese companies within the call for tenders. 
ASER also promotes the participation of energy SMEs through local development initiatives, namely the 
Rural Electrification Local Initiative (ERIL). However in these cases FESELEC points out that ASER launches 
projects and looks for implementing entities to execute the projects. In this context “SMEs are only service 
providers for ASER”.
It is therefore clear that the institutional context in terms of SMEs and Energy is well developed in Senegal. 
However the problem is at the level of communication and synergies between these institutions, whereby 
there are entities working to promote SMEs but that they are not familiar with the energy or renewable 
energy sector, and on the other side there are entities addressing the technical aspects of the energy or 
renewable energy issues but are not familiar with the business challenges facing SMEs development. 
In this sense, there is a need to promote an inter-sector dialogue to bridge the information and support 
gap. Most stakeholders interviewed for this research identified the Ministry of Energy as responsible for 
initiating this dialog and in promoting the development of energy SMEs more generally. There is also a need 
to develop the communication between research centres and government ministries, to feed technical 
knowledge in to evidence-driven policy making.
5.3.4 Human capacity and knowledge
In the case of Senegal, as in other AREED countries, it appears that the energy SME sector has attracted a 
number of technology ‘enthusiasts’. Most of them have a scientific background (engineers or bio-engineers) 
and have often completed part of their academic studies (Master, PhD) outside of Senegal.  Usually these 
entrepreneurs are driven mainly by their interest to develop a specific technology, as opposed to being 
primarily motivated to make money. In this sense, one can consider that the strategy for the development 
of their SMEs lack a certain business approach or aspect of financial motivation. These entrepreneurs may 
be able to identify a market opportunity and have relevant ideas on how to supply this market, yet lack 
strong business management skills.
In this context, it is worth mentioning that there are many international, donor-backed, programmes in 
Senegal which aim to strengthen the managerial capacities of SME entrepreneurs specifically involved 
in the energy sector. One example is the Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) which supports small 
energy businesses to grow in developing countries in order to expand energy access. In Senegal GVEP 
organizes training on business planning for energy entrepreneurs. PERACOD8 (Programme to promote 
rural electrification and a sustainable supply of domestic fuel), a German-Senegalese programme, also 
provides support services to small energy enterprises through EDS, similar to that provided by AREED.
An issue frequently raised by entrepreneurs consulted for this research as a barrier to the development of 
energy SMEs in Senegal is the lack of a qualified and skilled work force. Specifically, there is a lack of qualified 
8 PERACOD - www.giz.de/themen/en/13591.htm
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and/or skilled people to operate the new technologies or to ensure their instalment and maintenance. This 
issue acts as a barrier that hinders the diffusion of the technologies and thus the expansion of the SMEs. 
As such Mr. Fall Sarr from ASER states that there is a lack of technical skills in Senegal and mentioned the 
need to develop programmes to train technical experts on new technologies, and to develop a partnership 
with the ministry in charge of education to include vocational training on renewable technologies such as 
solar and wind. In concrete terms, one policy option is to develop a technical curriculum in high schools 
and universities about RETs and to raise awareness among young students about issues of sustainable 
energy and natural resource management.
5.3.5 Social and cultural factors
The main social or cultural issue raised by stakeholders consulted for this research with regard to 
energy SMEs in Senegal was the need to convince household consumers of the benefits of new energy 
technologies. The most important issue referred to is thus on the demand side. This factor can most easily 
be observed with regard to the high capital cost of renewable energy technologies vs. fossil fuel costs. It 
is an open question as to whether this is in fact a “true” cultural barrier, rather than a financial barrier that 
hinders consumers to invest in short or medium terms to purchase these technologies. However the need 
to further inform the population on the benefits of renewable energy technologies was an issue widely 
mentioned by stakeholders. 
It is also worth mentioning that, contrary to findings from Zambia, Tanzania and (to a lesser extent) Ghana, 
the lack of ‘entrepreneurialism’, i.e., the apparent lack of a strong, dynamic business culture where ideas 
and plans are not effectively and efficiently converted into reality, was not identified as a barrier to the 
development of SMEs in Senegal.
5.4	 Conclusions
Senegal has recorded a diversity of commercially successful energy SMEs, although the most notable 
growth has been witnessed in the LPG, cook stoves and off-grid solar PV markets. At the framework-level, 
it is clear that many of the economic, policy and institutional prerequisites for energy SME success were 
already in place in Senegal when AREED began to operate, apart from access to commercial finance. 
These prerequisites include relatively high electricity prices (due to the country’s dependence on imported 
primary energy resources); a relative scarcity of biomass fuel (especially in urban and peri-urban areas); 
government subsidies for LPG; and an entrepreneurial culture. 
Given this context, the provision of concessional finance through the AREED programme was well received 
and enabled numerous entrepreneurs to set up profitable businesses. However the majority of energy 
SMEs operating in Senegal are, in fact, self-funded. Unlike Ghana where the concept of ‘energy SMEs’ 
was new, but took hold largely due to the AREED project, Senegal has a stronger SME sector in general 
and many energy SMEs were already operating in the country. Therefore the EDS element of concessional 
financing made a relatively smaller contribution to the outcomes documented in this chapter. In Senegal 
a more mature microfinance sector is playing a more significant role (as compared to the other countries 
studies in this research) in providing loans to rural businesses and households to purchase modern energy 
technologies, which in turn is helping to drive the energy SME sector.
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6.1	 Energy	background
As with many of its neighbouring countries Tanzania has low levels of electrification totalling 13.9% in 2009 
(IEA, 2011), where 39% of the urban population is estimated to have access to electricity compared to 2% 
in rural areas (CDKN, 2012). 58.5% of grid-supplied electricity is generated from hydro resources, 41.5% 
from thermal generation. However biomass energy, including all renewable and waste sources, makes up 
87.7% of total primary energy supply in Tanzania, with petroleum products (8%), Natural gas (2.8%) and 
hydro-electric energy accounting for the remainder (REEEP, 2012). In both low-income rural and urban 
areas households and small businesses rely on biomass fuel for more than 95% of their cooking and 
heating energy needs, mostly in the form of wood fuel and charcoal (REEEP, 2012).
Tanzania has a National Energy Policy dating from 2003, which places and emphasis on developing the 
country’s renewable energy sources and well as more efficient use of existing biomass. The main targets 
of the policy include:
• Developing domestic energy sources
• Promoting economic energy pricing
• Attracting private sector participation in the energy market
• Improving energy efficiency and energy reliability
In addition, the Rural Energy Act of 2005 established the Rural Energy Board, Fund and Agency responsible 
for promotion of improved access to modern energy in rural areas (REEEP, 2012).
6.2	 Energy	SMEs	in	Tanzania
In this section we explore the extent to which specific businesses have demonstrated that energy SMEs 
are a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in Tanzania, drawing upon the 
outcomes described during the workshop, in addition to desk-based research.
6.2.1 AREED supported energy SMEs
Tanzania was one of the five countries that participated in the AREED project. Since its inception, the 
project was facilitated by the Tanzania Traditional Energy Development and Environment (TaTEDO). Based 
in Dar es Salaam, TaTEDO was the in-country organisation responsible for communicating the project 
and for co-implementing (alongside E+Co) the enterprise development service (EDS). TaTEDO is a social 
enterprise specialising in research, development and the commercialisation of environmentally improved 
energy technologies, including efficient cook stoves, biogas, solar PV, biogas, sustainable and green 
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charcoal production, micro hydro power generation as well as wind. Mr. Estomih Sawe is the director of 
TaTEDO and a well-known advocate of energy SMEs in Tanzania.
The task of documenting the AREED-supported energy SMEs is Tanzania was somewhat hampered by 
a loss of computer data due to a theft at the TaTEDO offices. However, by reconstructing information 
from various sources, it is understood that the following businesses went through the EDS process under 
AREED in Tanzania, and were issued with loans to either start up or expand their businesses:
• BETL: Fuel substitution with biomass
• ENSOL Ltd.: solar PV distribution and installation
• Mona-Mwanza Electrical and Electronics: solar PV distributor
• RESCO Ltd.: solar PV retail and distribution
• Sustainable Energy and Environment Company (SEECO): efficient cook stoves
• Zara Solar: solar PV distributor
Most of these energy SMEs were in fact urban-based businesses mostly due to the limited number of 
rural-based entrepreneurs that responded to the adverts for AREED support. However, as was the case in 
Zambia, many of the urban-based energy businesses were also aiming to supply the rural market. Below 
follows a summary of some of the energy SMEs that have operated in Tanzania since 2002, both AREED-
support and non-AREED, describing both the ‘outcome’ (business activity and performance) and the 
‘contributions’ (factors that helped in the set up and operation of specific businesses).
6.2.2 Tanzanian energy SMEs: outcomes and contributions
This section corresponds to research question #1, i.e., to what extent have specific businesses 
demonstrated that energy SMEs are a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources 
in sub-Saharan Africa? The following paragraphs document the specific energy SME outcomes and 
contributions in Tanzania9.
Sustainable Energy and Environment Company (SEECO)
SEECO sells improved energy-saving products such as charcoal stoves, charcoal ovens, wood fuel stoves, 
biogas, solar cookers, solar photovoltaic systems, solar lanterns and liquid petroleum gas (LPG). However 
the majority of their business concerns the manufacture and retail of efficient cook stoves, with premises 
on the outskirts of Dar es Salaam. SEECO was set up in 2001 by TaTEDO, primarily to develop efficient 
cook stoves, from the design stage to manufacture and commercialisation. The company sought to tap 
into the high demand for improved cook stoves, which has grown rapidly since the late 1990s. SEECO 
claims that more than 2 million households are already using efficient cook stoves in Tanzania, produced 
by a number of different, mainly small-scale, manufacturers many of whom are using low-quality materials 
and production processes. While this is an optimistic figure that cannot be verified, it is true that there has 
been significant investment by donor-backed programmes into the local manufacture and dissemination 
of efficient cook stoves in Tanzania.
9 The information gathered represents what was available to the researchers, from various sources both primary and secondary, 
but does not claim to be exhaustive.
41
SEECO is currently producing 500-800 stoves per month, of various sizes for both domestic and institutional 
use. The company sells about 60% of its products to Dar es Salaam markets with the remaining 40% is 
sold to inland rural regions and neighbouring countries. About 50% of SEECO’s sales are done through 
agents who sell the products to end-users and stove retailers while the other 50% constitutes direct sales 
to end-users from selling points and market places. Filbert Shoo, Manager of SEECO, confirmed in 2012 
that the company employees an average of 21 staff and that an average of 20 stoves can be made per 
person, per day. The stoves vary in design and size but retail for an average of US$ 7-8 each, while SEECO 
also manufactures approximately 7 charcoal stove ovens per month which retail for US$ 150 each.
SEECO was given a US$ 120,000 loan by AREED in 2002, 100% managed by E+Co, having developed 
an ambitious business plan. However the company couldn’t meet its demand projections and so decided 
to return US$ 60,000 to E+Co, the remainder of the loan was paid back by 2009. E+Co provided a US$ 
170,000 loan in 2011 to expand the business. SEECO aims to mechanise its production processes, 
cutting metal with machines for smooth finish, plus expand output. They are (as of late 2012) planning to 
secure commercial financing from Twiga Bank though hasn’t officially requested a loan. 
SEECO operates as an independent company, though is majority owned by TaTEDO and is overseen by 
a board of directors. Given that TaTEDO shared the responsibility (with E+Co) for identifying and vetting 
entrepreneurial applicants to the AREED facility, as well as approving the business loans, this level of 
involvement with SEECO would appear to present a conflict of interest, though this was not recognised as 
an issue during the 2012 field research.
SEECO’s production of clay linings for efficient cook stoves, Dar es Salaam, September 2012
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Renewable Energy Services Company (RESCO)
RESCO is based in Dar es Salaam and imports solar equipment, designs and installs solar and battery 
backup systems throughout Tanzania. RESCO’s clients are either private individuals, public institutions 
(through state tendering processes) or other businesses looking to purchase solar equipment. RESCO 
was registered in 2001, before the AREED facility was set up. However AREED provided EDS, mainly 
delivered by E+Co, though from RESCO’s point of view communication was difficult with AREED and 
progress was slow. For example, RESCO’s founder Mr. Mzumbe Mussa claims that financial support was 
supposed to come from AREED within 4 weeks of the business plan being completed, but that the finance 
didn’t come until 2005, 3 years later. In the end, US$ 63,000 was provided to RESCO by AREED, fixed at 
7% for 3 years with a grace period of 6 months (i.e., no interest for first 6 months). As with most AREED 
loans RESCO could make its loan repayments quarterly, not monthly. 
Mr. Mussa claims that it would have been have possible to secure a commercial loan for the solar business 
in 2002, but only at much higher interest rates, backed up by more than 100% collateral. In fact the 
company tried to secure a loan from the CBRD bank, though it fell through due to tough conditions. Prior 
to securing the AREED loan, RESCO used to rely on one or two equipment suppliers who would provide 
their equipment on a 30-day credit cycle, creating high-risk chain of dependency that limited business 
expansion. As such, the AREED loan enabled RESCO to cut out the local middle men, giving the company 
more freedom to work with different suppliers. In 2010 RESCO secured a US$ 120,000 loan for business 
expansion from E+Co at 11.5%, with no grace period, which the company plans to repay in full during 
2013. Since 2002 RESCO has grown from 2 to 5 employees, in addition to employing technicians on a 
contract basis. 
In 2008 AfriCARE contracted RESCO to supply solar systems to about 40 rural sites and generally RESCO 
see a growing demand for solar home systems (SHS) in Tanzania, mainly from private houses and public 
institutions in rural off-grid areas. SHSs are often being used in rural areas to charge mobile phones, 
for example charging 20 phones at a time for US$ 30 cents per charge. RESCO also builds and sells 
electricity back-up systems (batteries + 240 volt inverters) for the urban market where power cuts have 
become more frequent. However RESCO sees the majority of its business growth in business-to-business 
trading, selling equipment to other solar developers. RESCO also has good relations with the REA which 
has contracted the company, through a public tendering process, to supply solar systems. 
CLAPHIJO dried foods
CLAPHIJO was established in 2002, initially as a small kitchen-based enterprise, by Mama Clara. The 
company sources, dries and markets fruits and vegetables and secures its supplies from within a 30 km 
radius of Dar es Salaam, where farmers sell direct to CLAPHIJO direct instead of selling in the market. 
Mama Clara is from Tabora (a dry central region in Tanzania) and was already drying vegetables, so she had 
the idea of selling dried produce to Dar es Salaam market. According to Mama Clara, the initial inspiration 
for setting up the business came after she attended a course on solar drying techniques, organised by 
the Tanzanian state-operated Small Industry Development Organisation (SIDO). The business was 
initially self-financed and the first investment was in solar driers, processing mainly paw-paw fruit, mango 
and bananas. 
In 2005 CLAPHIJO was approached by the College of Engineering Technology at the University of Dar to 
design an improved solar drier and signed a 4 year MoU to this end. At the same time CLAPHIJO secured 
contracts to supply solar-dried fruits to the Shirjee chain of supermarkets, as well as selling dried vegetables 
direct to customers in government offices. The company also supplied the larger South African owned 
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SHOPRITE supermarket chain for a few months but was forced to pull out as they were unable to meet 
demand. In 2009 the company won the Business Plan Competition organised by the Tanzanian Private 
Sector Foundation, receiving 50 million Tsh (US$ 35,000). They used this prize money to invest in electric 
oven dyers, which is particularly useful on the coast where higher humidity inhibits the efficacy of solar 
dryers. In 2010 the company collaborated with the SME Competitive Facility (SCF) funded by the Danish 
aid agency Danida, securing an 80 million Tsh (US$ 50,000) grant to build productive and human capacity 
within the company, materials and advertising. The company hired a marketing consultant who came up 
with the brand “Mama’s Favours”, with the aim of scaling up supplies to larger commercial outlets.
Alternative Energy Tanzania Ltd. (AET)
AET was set up in 2008 by Oscar Lema, who was previously responsible for managing the AREED facility 
at TaTEDO. The company is based 40 km outside of Dar es Salaam and is focussed on commercialising 
a variety of clean energy technologies throughout Tanzania, including solar lighting, efficient biomass cook 
stoves, fuel briquetting and LPG. The business was initially self-financed with US$ 6,000 of personal 
savings and was inspired by Mr. Lema’s experience of working with AREED. In 2010 AET implemented a 
12 month project to sustainable energy access to education and health social service sector institutions 
in rural Tanzania, with a total budget of € 117,000. Of this total, an €87,000 grant was provided by the 
Energy and Environment Partnership for Eastern and Southern Africa (EEP), financed by the UK, Finland 
and Austria and managed by the Development Bank of South Africa. An additional €21,000 €grant was 
secured from the Canadian foundation Energy for Everyone and the balance of €9,000 €was provided by 
AET. For the EEP grant, AET competed with 356 other applicants for 24 grants, 3 of which were given to 
Tanzanian SMEs. The project funds were used to purchase and install solar PV systems for 7 rural primary 
schools and 31 staff houses and 3 health clinics (refrigeration), and to finance capacity building for local 
maintenance of the systems. Lema claims the project has also raised awareness among local government 
to build-in energy requirements when developing their rural planning. 2 orphanages with 31 children were 
also supplied with LPG as part of the same project. 
AET is focusing its short-term business plans on expanding the LPG distribution, through Oryx which 
the main LPG distributor in Tanzania. Lema points out that LPG is a growth market in Tanzania and Oryx 
is heavy marketing its technology, focusing on the benefits of LPG gas over cook stoves, including the 
argument that it is cheaper than using charcoal stoves. For example, a 15 kg LPG bottle last an average 
family approximately 45 days and costs 54,000 Tsh (US$ 33). By comparison the same family would 
consume 2 bags of charcoal which sell for 30,000 Tsh each (US$ 8). LPG gas burners cost between US$ 
45-70, compared to US$ 8-10 for a charcoal stove.
Although AET grew between 2008 and 2012, the company is now in need of capital to expand and has 
applied to E+Co for a US$ 120,000 loan, but the application has been delayed and Lema maintains that 
the terms of the E+Co loan are not favourable. Lema has also approached the Diamond Bank for the 
expansion of LPG business, as well as exploring opportunities with other small banks that are willing to 
take risks. Lema claims he has problems securing a commercial loans has his house is not registered and 
so he can’t use it as collateral and maintains that in general the demands placed on SMEs by banks are 
very stringent.
ENVOTEC Services Ltd.
ENVOTEC manufactures efficient cook stoves and ovens, for both domestic and institutional use. The 
company was established by Mr. Mwambijein 1998 as a self-financed sole trader, building just 1-2 stoves 
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per year, mostly for institutions such as schools and hospitals. In the late 1990s ENVOTEC planned 
to access the household stoves markets but faced challenges of marketing an affordable stove, plus 
competition from many other SMEs. Since 2000 Mr. Mwambije has expanded and secured grants and 
technical support from GTZ and the Rural Energy Agency (REA), and production has increased rapidly 
since 2007 and now employs 10 staff as of 2012, having achieved 25% growth in turnover in 2011. 
ENVOTEC secured a US$ 13,000 grant from the government’s Private Sector Fund in 2006.
The company now mostly builds and sells ‘rocket stoves’ for households and larger fuel efficient stoves 
and ovens for institutional use, which provide fuel savings of up to 60-80%, having made and sold 700-800 
institutional stoves since 1998. The company also makes clay-lined stoves, using local materials which retail 
for 20,000 Tsh (US$ 13) compared to the metal stoves which sell for 80,000 Tsh (US$ 52). Nonetheless 
ENVOTEC does use finished steel products which it normally sources from China, at a relatively high cost. 
The company has plans to expand and has already procured a 7 acre plot in Bagamoyo (north of Dar es 
Salaam) to house an expanded production facility.
However, according to Mr. Mwambije, the company’s main, ongoing, barrier to expansion is that of 
securing affordable capital, in addition to the local bank’s requirement for more than 100% collateral. In 
2012 Mr. Mwambije had applied to REA for a grant of US$ 120,000 to expand the business, specifically 
to purchase equipment that will enable ENVOTEC to make “smooth-looking” products that compare with 
the imported goods, as opposed to the tin-bashed look of traditional stoves. However Mr. Mwambije 
was not confident that they would invest in his business as he sees the REA as more willing to invest 
in public awareness campaigns to use efficient cookstoves, rather than in local production capacity 
per se.
6.2.3 Have Tanzanian energy SMEs demonstrated commercial viability?
The previous section detailed the history of specific energy SMEs in Tanzania, which enables us to address 
research question #1, i.e., to what extent have specific businesses demonstrated that energy SMEs are 
a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in sub-Saharan Africa? Based on 
the above-listed case histories, and an analysis of the literature and stakeholder interviews, the following 
issues and trends can be observed in Tanzania:
1. There is a mature market of efficient cook stoves which has attracted significant interest from local 
entrepreneurs and donor agencies
2. There is a relatively strong solar PV market, though most demand comes from state or donor-
backed projects, rather than private customers
3. Most of the surveyed energy SMEs were set up using the entrepreneurs’ own private sources of 
funding
4. AREED and other programmes mostly supported already existing energy SMEs
5. Energy SMEs demonstrate a high dependence on subsidized loans and/grants in order to expand 
and commercial success
6. Relatively strong government support for energy SMEs, especially in the solar PV market for rural 
electrification
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6.3	 Analysis	of	outcomes,	barriers	and	solutions
This section provides the substantive analysis of the Tanzanian energy SME sector, based on the main 
issues raised by workshop participants, and elaborated upon by individuals during follow-up interviews. 
It first builds upon the ‘contributions’ aspect of the specific energy SMEs in Tanzania, i.e., to understand 
the key causal factors, or mechanisms, through which energy SMEs have experienced either success 
or failure, thus addressing research questions #2. Here, we also address research question #3: what 
are the main, persistent, barriers facing entrepreneurs when setting up, operating and expanding energy 
SMEs in the identified countries? In answering this question, we include an analysis of the range of 
‘solutions’ proposed by national stakeholders to overcome these barriers, again based on the issues 
raised by workshop participants, and elaborated upon by individuals during follow-up interviews. The 
overall focus of the analysis is on the specific circumstances in Tanzania that have influenced, and continue 
to influence, outcomes in the country’s energy SME sector, including the nature of relevant barriers to 
market development and expansion.
6.3.1 Policy and regulatory framework
The focus here is on ‘second order’ economic settings such as taxation, subsidies and import tariffs over 
which governments have greater, if not total, control and which can have a significant direct or indirect 
impact on the private sector.
The Tanzanian government has plenty of sustainable energy targets, strategies and policies, including a 
Biomass Strategy aimed at promoting the efficient use of biomass for cooking, which feeds into the “East 
African Energy Strategy” which aims for 15% total use of clean stoves technology by 2015. Tanzania is 
also party to East African Sustainable Energy for All, a lobbying activity in partnership with Practical Action. 
There is further, concrete, evidence of active government support for energy SMEs in Tanzania, mainly 
through the work of SIDO and the REA, which complements a whole host of donor-backed programmes 
and projects that provide both financial and technical support to specific energy SMEs, especially those 
aiming to harness renewable energy for rural electrification.
For example, the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) created a framework for Small Power Projects 
(SPP) to allow for, and encourage, the commercial development of SPPs using renewable sources to 
supply the national grid or local mini-grids, with a generation capacity of 100-10,000 kW. The framework 
builds upon the 2008 Electricity Act and aims to reduce the time and cost of negotiating such projects, 
in recognition of the huge potential that distributed, smaller-scale generation technologies offer the lower-
cost and more immediate solution to increasing rural electrification. 
The MEM also oversaw the Solar photovoltaic (PV) Clusters Project in Tanzania which aimed to reduce 
market barriers to solar PV as a means to increase rural electrification rates. The project was financed 
by the World Bank and sought to standardise high-quality systems, introduce bulk purchases to reduce 
costs, set up credit-financing and subsidies as means to accelerate PV penetration in Tanzania. The 
Tanzanian solar PV market grew rapidly from 100 kWp in 2005 to 1.5 MWp in 2009, though the levels of 
installed capacity remain a fraction of what is needed to make significant increases in rural electrification 
rates (Camco, 2012). Under current rules, owners of solar systems receive a subsidy from the REA of 
US$ 2 per kW/peak installed capacity, although most observers agree that this is not enough to stimulate 
stronger demand.
Criticism was levelled at the government from various stakeholders interviewed for this research, primarily 
for its overall priority to push for grid-connected solutions to rural electrification over other lower-tech 
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energy technologies, including the efficient use of biomass energy. TANESCO, the state-owned electricity 
utility, is supposed to operate on commercial lines with many IPPs operating and demanding capacity 
payments. However market-based reforms have been slow and so as yet few small IPPs have been set 
up. Mr. Sawe of TaTEDO is critical of the government’s focus on the grid-based approach to providing 
energy access and claims that energy SMEs have not received the support they should from the state as 
the government in Tanzania is “…more focussed on large-scale grid electrification… less than 5% of the 
government’s energy budget is used to support the development and uptake of poor man’s energy…”, 
i.e., to promote the use of efficient, clean, biomass-burning energy technologies. 
Similar observations were voiced by Mr. Mwambije of ENVOTEC, who added that the MEM is doing 
nothing in Tanzania to support local production of efficient stoves and that there is equally little interest 
or support from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, where both Ministries claim they have no 
budget to affect change. However it is understood that in 2009 the government took steps to limit the 
supply of charcoal by placing quotas on producers, which has increased the average price from US$ 5 to 
30 per 50 kg bag. In turn this is driving demand for fuel efficient stoves.
Addressing a related point, Mr. Mussa of RESCO argued that the Procurement Act of 2004 needs to 
be reformed in favour of SMEs, as current rules place inflexible demands on a businesses’ ability to 
demonstration financial stability. Arguing that these rules serve to benefit larger businesses, Mussa also 
stated that “there is no government support for the private sector… they want somebody who is already 
financially capable and has the management capacities, only then will they give you a job. That’s what 
they want. But in terms of supporting enterprises, well that’s not something that has been done by the 
government.”
Furthermore, it was pointed out that the government’s procurement rules of many donor-backed projects do 
not favour local suppliers, and often more expensive products are imported as a result of inflexible rules. In 
order to qualify for public tenders, local businesses need to be registered with the Contractors Registration 
Board, which is more difficult for SMEs as there are tough requirements regarding technical capacity. To 
be registered with the board you have to have a Full Technicians Certificates (FTC), so often SMEs are 
forced to invite individuals with an FTC in order to qualify for the bid. In exchange these individuals are 
normally given company shares. The only alternative is for SMEs to employ the professionals with the FTC, 
and work with them, in partnership, though the scale of contracts often makes this option commercially 
unrewarding.
Mr, Mwakahesya, Director General of the REA, stated that the REA has been involved with SMEs since 
it was set up in 2008, including the provision of targeted subsidies for consumers of decentralised RETs, 
supplied by SMEs, and through the financing of mini-grids and energy for productive use. The REA provides 
matching grants and also lends money to SMEs for up to 15 years, including a 5 year grace period, issued 
through local banks such as the Community Rural Development Bank (CRDB). However the challenge, 
according to Mr. Mwakahesya is for SMEs to come up with their own equity. The REA provides its loan 
support to SMEs of up to 70% of project costs, issued through local banks. The REA lends to banks at 
6% and the banks lend to SMEs at around 12%. The REA also awards cash prizes, mainly for lighting 
schools and clinics in rural areas. In 2012, Alternative Energy Tanzania, RESCO and TaTEDO were among 
15 winners of US$ 100,000 given to each SME to develop specific rural electrification projects, based 
on a detailed proposal. Mr. Mwakahesya claims that since the REA began work, rural electrification has 
increased from 2 to 6.6%.However Oscar Lema of Alternative Energy Tanzania maintained that progress 
with rural electrification has been to slow and the REA needs to work closer with local governments and 
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argues for the development of private-public partnerships (PPPs) as a means to finance and implement 
widespread, systematic electrification.
As is the case in Zambia, the Tanzanian government has removed import taxes and VAT on solar equipment 
in 2005. Mussa from RESCO claims that this occurred thanks to coordinated lobbying by a solar energy 
programme funded by the UNDP, which managed to convince a ministerial committee, which in turn 
influenced parliament to legislate a tax break. However there was some cheating in the system whereby 
car dealers tried to import car batteries and claim they are solar batteries in order to avoid taxation. The 
problem was exacerbated by the tax authorities’ technical ignorance and so solar companies have often 
had to argue and defend their claims, adding bureaucratic delays. Nonetheless, the stakeholders consulted 
for this research maintained that it’s now easier to set up a business in Tanzania, following reforms made to 
the registration procedures, also in 2005, so that SMEs no longer have to secure their licence to operate 
every year. Business registration now only takes approximately 30 days now and businesses are charged 
a fixed, one-time fee, of TSh 20,000 (US$ 12). The government also reformed corporation tax, which used 
to be pre-determined, but now it’s based on revenues and paid quarterly.  
Aside from these streamlined processes and tax benefits for clean energy businesses, there were minimal 
references made by interviewees to any significant actions taken by government to support energy SMEs, 
including the issue of how to access affordable finance. Indeed Mr. Imanuel Muro, an Investment Officer at 
E+Co, claimed that the government’s repeated political promises to provide widespread access to modern 
energy sources has, itself, created a barrier to stable and systematic energy planning.
6.3.2 Nationally available financing
As is the case with the other AREED countries studied in this research, the difficulty in accessing affordable 
finance was referred to as the most significant, structural, barrier to setting up and/or expanding energy 
SMEs in Tanzania. A fundamental barrier to financial liberalisation in Tanzania is that the National Bank, 
following the Banking and Financing Acts of 1991 and 2001, demands that Tanzanian banks secure no 
less than 125% collateral, when lending to households and smaller local businesses.
According to Mr. Ndunguru, Head of Investment-Banking at Bancorp Limited, energy SMEs are still not well 
known in Tanzania, though there is “more awareness” now by both banks and consumers. Mr. Ndunguru 
added that Tanzanian banks are weary of lending to businesses that don’t have a strong history or track 
record, although any attractive, well-developed, business plan would likely receive interest from commercial 
lenders as “they want to do business”. Indeed Mr. Ndunguru claims that the situation is changing now in 
Tanzania, and especially in the energy sector now that TANESCO no longer has a monopoly on power 
production (the law changed in 2010). As such, he claims there is greater interest among SMEs to act as 
IPPs, supplying electricity in mainly rural areas. Twiga Bank’s involvement with the energy sector started 
when it was approached by TaTEDO to manage the guarantee fund supplied under AREED II, mainly 
to provide end-user financing for cook stoves. However, according to Mr. Ndunguru, the bank plans to 
specialise in lending to energy SMEs, to tap into what he believes is a growing market. 
Although Twiga bank is state-owned, they are obliged to follow the rules on issuing only collateral-backed 
loans and added that the government collateral fund (mentioned by REA) is very bureaucratic and difficult 
for SMEs to access. In addition the borrower must pay a fee to access the government’s collateral fund and 
so Mr. Ndunguru believes that demands for collateral do in fact present a significant barrier to accessing 
finance in Tanzania. However he claimed that repayment levels have improved in TNZ and are now “quite 
good”, and that the risk of black listing is a strong incentive for businesses to repay their loans, adding that 
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Twiga has a 90% recovery rate in its business loans to SMEs. When assessing loan risk, Twiga is primarily 
concerned about the security of the supply chain, i.e., from where business get their materials. On the 
demand-side, Mr. Aluti Myenza, from the Institute of Management and Entrepreneurship Development 
(IMED), explained that formal savings rates are low in Tanzania, partly due to popular lack of trust in 
organisations and banks.
Mr. Sawe from TaTEDO highlighted the fact that most ‘traditional energy’ businesses (i.e., efficient use of 
cook stoves) operate within the informal sector, arguing that banks and MFIs simply don’t want to lend to 
these businesses. On the other hand, Mr. Imanuel Muro, an investment officer at E+Co’s Tanzania office, 
argued that access to financing is not, in fact, a problem in Tanzania. Instead, Muro maintains that the 
main problem is a lack of detailed understanding among entrepreneurs of their business plans, which they 
present to banks and other potential funders. As such, Muro argues that banks simply won’t risk their 
portfolios on weak or incomplete business plans.
The issue of informal business operations relates to another structural challenge, on the demand-side, whereby 
there are limited financing options available to families and other small businesses that want to purchase 
energy systems that have a relatively high capital cost, such as solar PV. In Tanzania there is a small number 
of Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) and Savings and Credit Cooperative Societies (SACCOS) that are willing 
to provide loans for such investments, however such financing is usually only available to state employees 
and teachers, and so most private PV systems are bought with cash, from private savings. This financial 
barrier to demand-side growth was the target of the AREED-II facility (2007-2012) which sought to provide 
loan guarantee funds to national lenders, with the idea that they would lend to otherwise ‘risky’ customers 
and/or as lower rates of interest. Other initiatives, including the government’s solar clusters programme, 
provide 20% subsides on PV systems to farmers through the REA, with customers asked to provide another 
20% as down payment and the remainder 60% is provided to the cluster as a loan through the local StanBik 
Bank. Mr. Mussa from RESCO sees E+Co as an expensive source of sector financing, however he stated 
that its US$ loans are still cheaper than loans through local banks issued in Tanzanian Shillings.
Another financial barrier identified during this research has to do with access to capital for financing 
local manufacturing of energy products in Tanzania. Mr. Mwambije, director of ENVOTEC services Ltd., 
elaborated on the difficulties of competing with goods imported from China and India, which he claims 
are subsidised. Furthermore, Mwambije claims that neither the government nor the donor agencies are 
interested in supporting local manufacturing capacity, but rather are more focused on the least-cost, 
commercial, means to supply efficient cook stoves to the market, which often means suppliers are forced 
to import their products, undermining local producers.  Indeed Mr. Mwambije claims that he turned down a 
loan offer from E+Co Tanzania, partly because they encouraged him to import lower-cost Chinese goods. 
This narrow focus on an SME’s bottom line, promoted both by EDS programmes, donor and government 
policies, reveals a myopic emphasis on profit as the greatest force for good, as opposed to strategic, 
coordinated, investment in local human and manufacturing production capacity which would have far 
more valuable development implications for Tanzania, if they led to commercial success. The government’s 
and donor’s prioritisation of internal rates of return on SME investment would appear to miss important 
opportunities, especially in cases where local resources and skills are available for the manufacture of low-
tech products, such as cook stoves.
In addition to insisting on collateral, most banks and MFIs operating in Tanzania tend not to recognise or 
value the past commercial performance of energy SME when assessing loan applications. However the 
situation has changed since 2007, partly due to the growth of the MFI sector, and even corporate banks 
are lending more to SMEs, increasing the level of competition in local financial markets. There is also 
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evidence of banks demonstrating more flexibility when lending to energy SMEs, such as the Diamond Trust 
bank which now performs due diligence on loan applicants, as opposed to rigid demands for collateral. On 
the government side, there is little obligation placed on the financial sector to lend to SMEs, hence small 
businesses have traditionally been forced to borrow money from family, friends or MFIs at higher rates. 
TaTEDO is managing a revolving fund called Sustainable Energy and Finance Access (SEFA) which has 
been registered as a private enterprise and includes manufacturing as one of its target sectors, although 
as of 2012 it had yet to invest in specific energy SMEs.
6.3.3 Institutional frameworks
In Tanzania there is more organisation between energy SMEs than is the case in Zambia, where companies 
meet to discuss issues of common interest through the Tanzania Renewable Energy Association (TAREA) 
(previously known as TASEA - Tanzania Solar Energy Association), which in turn has formal connections 
with the REA. The REA has significant resources to finance grid and off-grid access to electricity, as well as 
the promotion of efficient cooking fuels and stoves. TAREA is the main organisation that brings together and 
represents the renewable energy sector in Tanzania, acting as both a trade association and government 
lobby group. One of TAREA’s main objectives is to “promote the local manufacture of Renewable Energy 
products and enterprise development in the Renewable Energy sector”, thus recognising a central role for 
SMEs. Matthew Matimbwi from TAREA highlighted the importance of energy SMEs in Tanzania, stating 
that “due to the low rate of access to modern energy technologies, especially rural areas, SMEs work to 
disseminate technologies. There are a lot of rural areas that need energy service but lack supply chain. 
SMEs are the tools to disseminate the energy services in the rural areas. A study that was concluded in 
Nov, 2011 by the Rural Energy Agency shows how SMEs have contributed the increase of access to the 
electricity in the rural Tanzania from 2% to 6%.”
In answer to the question of how, and to what extent, have various energy SME programmes influenced 
national energy policies to incorporate support for SMEs in Tanzania, Matimbwi cited the example of the 
Rural Energy Foundation, managed by the MEM to promoting energy entrepreneurship, with the backing of 
the Embark Foundation (Columbia University), Bidnetwork (Small of Business-University of Dar es Salaam) 
and the Support for Entrepreneurship and Enterprise Development (SEED) which mentors entrepreneurs, 
specifically in how to set up and operate rural energy businesses, mainly the distribution of solar PV and 
improved cook stoves. In 2012, 50 entrepreneurs received training, and the end of which they each receive 
seed financing of US$ 10,000. This model, a combination of EDS and subsidised loans, closely reflects 
the AREED model set up in 2001 by UNEP. Matimbwi states that capacity building for energy SMEs in 
Tanzania has been conducted by a wide range of foreign NGOs and donor organisations, including SIDA, 
UNDP, The World Bank, SNV (Netherlands), GIZ and GVEP.
Related to the topic of RET sector-specific associations there exists, aside from TAREA, a “clean cook 
stoves and fuel alliance of Tanzania” forum which involves key stakeholders to discuss the necessary steps 
for promoting these technologies. However this alliance is not a trade association per se, and although 
they’re pushing for fuel efficient use of charcoal and technologies to replace charcoal, their impact is 
understood to have been marginal, to date. Some observers argue that such broad stakeholder forums, 
often the outcome of NGO programmes, are useful for communicating ideas and arguments but tend not 
to produce a clearly-defined institutional ‘check-list’, to the commercial benefit of energy SMEs. Indeed, in 
cases where NGOs themselves attempt to set up energy SMEs, either private profit-making or community 
owned enterprises, results have been variable. On this issue Oscar Lema, Managing Director of Alternative 
Energy Tanzania stated, unambiguously, that “NGOs are unable to manage businesses”.
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During the stakeholder workshop organised for this research, the problem of ‘club proliferation’ was 
raised, whereby too many energy and development related committees, groups and associations are 
operating in Tanzania which duplicate efforts and waste limited resources, taking attention away from 
business activities. This is a curious contrast to the situation in Zambia where strong communication 
and coordination between energy SMEs was lacking. However stakeholders from the finance sector in 
Tanzania, including Mr. Ndunguru of Twiga Bank, generally agree on the need for a knowledge-sharing 
platform for the energy finance community in Africa.
In addition to the non-market institutions that serve to help or hinder the development and commercial 
success of energy SMEs in Tanzania, there are some structural, market, challenges facing the energy SME 
sector in Tanzania that can be broadly related to the ‘institutional framework’. Mr. Mussa from RESCO 
stated that these challenges include the cost of marketing, with the cost of media advertising, as well 
as face-to-face promotional work, greatly diminishing profits. Mussa also maintains that commercial 
success in the solar PV market is dependent upon having a strong rural distribution network, which is time 
consuming and expensive to build up.
6.3.4 Human capacity
Mr. Mwakahesya of the REA argued that there is not enough technical know-how in the Tanzania banking 
sector to enable them to assess renewable energy projects, and that this is a significant barrier to lowering 
bank’s risk premiums. The REA’s technical assistance to SMEs is provided by contracting local consultants 
and their support programmes are advertised in newspapers, to which they receive hundreds of applicants 
every year, indeed more than they can support, according to Mr. Mwakahesya. Similar shortcomings with 
regard to human capacity we raised by stakeholders at both the national workshop, and in follow-up 
interviews.
In the market for efficient cook stoves, Mr. Sawe (TaTEDO) suggested that there is strong demand for 
efficient stoves in Tanzania, but that there is a “human capacity gap” relating to generally weak business 
skills, especially for marketing and packaging products, with appropriate pricing. However he argued that 
key technical barriers have been reduced over the last decade where there is now more technical human 
capacity within Tanzania to install, repair and maintain more complex RETs, such as solar home systems 
and mini wind power. Sawe maintains that this technical capacity has been built largely by the market 
itself, with the help of the technical organisations like TaTEDO and the University of Dar es Salaam and 
some specific donor-backed energy projects that have been designed to specifically build technical local 
capacity to maintain installations.
TaTEDO is promoting mini-grid technology and has a goal of setting up 25 systems by end of 2012. The 
business and operational model varies depending on the place, but the principle behind each project is 
that they must operate along commercial lines, whether private or community-owned. TaTEDO works 
with the REA to identify the best potential locations for installing mini-grids, i.e., to understand the areas 
where grid electrification is unlikely to reach in the medium term. These mini-grids will be based on a Multi-
Function Platform (MFP), fuelled by Jatropha oil, to connect 500-600 households. According to Mr. Sawe, 
the success of such platforms is determined more by effective management as opposed to hardware of 
the technology. As such, TaTEDO is focused on building local capacity to operate and manage the MFPs, 
though it faces resource challenges.
Mr. Aluti Myenza is a Trainer and Consultant IMED, based in Dar es Salaam. IMED was established in 
2009 by Dr. Olomi who was previously the head of the Entrepreneurship Centre at the University of Dar es 
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Salaam. As of 2012 IMED has a staff of 8 which work with SMEs to provide capacity building and business 
skills training, as well as conducting consultancy and research. Myenza sees a big challenge in Tanzania 
with regard to the human capacity of SMEs, and offered this explanation based on what are, to his mind, 
cultural barriers: “In Tanzania it’s really hard to do business because of [a lack of] awareness. You see, we 
don’t like to learn, we don’t like to have the right skills for whatever we are doing. We want a quick reward, 
a short-cut. So we don’t want to invest in personnel or anything that would take us a long time, so most 
of the entrepreneurs, the SMEs, they don’t want to lose ownership and so aren’t open to training from 
external experts, even though they [the entrepreneurs] don’t have business skills”.
One of the key agencies that influence the business environment in Tanzania is the Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation (TPSF). The TPSF was established in 1998 as an NGO (company limited by guarantee) and is 
owned by the main private sector trade associations, as well as some large corporate individual members 
and the Tanzanian Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. They have 211 members, of which 40 
are corporate members. According to Gabriel Landa, a Funds Manager at TPSF, the job of the organisation 
is to lobby the government on reforms favourable to the private sector, i.e., to influence policy. To this end, 
the TPSF hosts the Tanzania National Business Council which facilitates dialogue between the private 
sector and government and in the energy sector they are lobbying for further liberalisation of TANESCO. 
However the TPSF doesn’t have direct day-to-day contact with SMEs and Landa maintains that there 
are few energy SMEs operating in Tanzania, which collectively have a marginal impact on energy access 
at a national level. For example, less than 10 energy SMEs were listed from a total of 400 applicants to 
the Business Development Gateway Competition organised by TPSF. The TPSF also runs the Cluster 
Competitions Programme (CCP) which is designed to increase the competitiveness of SMEs in Tanzania, 
although from a final list of 18 SMEs only one business could be defined as operating in the energy sector. 
The CCP has funds available to finance SMEs through grants, including to a food processing company 
called Serengeti Freshto finance the uptake of charcoal refrigeration technology in Arusha. However, 
Landa was keen to point out that grant money “is not sustainable” and that TPSF has plans to use its 
resources to finance a revolving fund where money is loaned up to US$ 15,000 to SMEs at subsidised rates 
(approx 5%) and repayments are ploughed back into other projects.   
As a separate form of ‘moral hazard’, Landa highlighted the risk that grants, as opposed to loans, for 
business can be counter-productive, stating that “we see grants as a kind of distortion... I can give you 
examples of businesses that have received grants 3 or 4 times, yet they don’t grow. With one grant he 
[the entrepreneur] buys a car. With another grant he builds a nice house. Then when he is asked how his 
business has developed, he points to the car and the house! But this didn’t come from the business, it came 
from the grants.” Similar ideas and arguments expressed by non-business stakeholders in Tanzania reveal 
the emergence of a strong ‘anti-aid’ discourse in Tanzania, which focuses on the need for entrepreneurs 
and project managers in receipt of donor-backed support to see such support as a means to and end, 
rather than and end in itself. As such this issue could be regarded as either a question of ‘human capacity’ 
or one of the social and cultural factors, which are explored in the next section.
6.3.5 Social and cultural factors
As previously detailed, it is axiomatic among many Tanzanian stakeholders that the demand for collateral 
from banks is made more complicated for entrepreneurs that don’t have formal land titles or documents 
that prove ownership of assets. However Mr. Mwakahesya of the REA stated that “…in fact, the bank of 
Tanzania has facilities to provide collateral to renewables, so companies can borrow money here… the 
problem is that they [the entrepreneurs] want free money!” 
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When questioned on what may account for the apparent lack of entrepreneurial culture in Tanzania, Myenza 
from IMED pointed to the importance of the country’s legacy of collectivist economic development model 
known as ‘Ujamaa’, a brand of African socialism conceptualised and promoted by Tanzania’s first president 
Julius Nyerere (1964-1985). Indeed many observers argue that there is a hangover of Ujamaa where a 
culture of entrepreneurialism was largely absent and bank loans were perceived as ‘free money’ and so re-
payments were notoriously bad. Myenza argues that a popular socialist mentality continues to discriminate 
against business in Tanzania and compared country to Kenya, which according to him, is ahead in this 
regard. Nonetheless, Myenza recognises that the Tanzanian government is creating an increasingly pro-
business environment he believes that much of this is due to pressure from donors, and the conditions 
placed on donor support. With regard to education and the next generation of potential entrepreneurs, 
Myenza argues that there is a lack of ‘soft skills’ among SMEs in Tanzania and that university graduates 
are mostly looking for fixed employment, not thinking about setting up their own business or thinking as 
entrepreneurs. 
On the demand-side, Mussa from RESCO argued that rural businesses tend not to think about, or 
value, the longer-term benefits of solar systems in relation to the fuel costs of diesel generators, i.e., 
that they’re looking for fast returns on investment. The difficulty that energy SMEs face in convincing 
potential consumers to see the medium to longer-term benefits of investing in efficient stoves and RETs 
is not unique to Tanzania. Indeed there is a dynamic common to all the AREED countries where low and 
precarious income levels tend to skew household purchasing decisions in favour of low-cost capital goods 
at the expense of longer-term benefits through fuel-saving. 
On the topic of the public procurement process in Tanzania, Landa of the TPSF argued that there is too 
much paperwork involved which puts off smaller SMEs whose administrative capacities are constrained. 
In addition, the government normally advertises its tenders only in newspapers and in government 
offices, thus restricting exposure to the benefit of a smaller group of entrepreneurs, mostly based in Dar 
es Salaam. Landa also elaborated on the “vicious circle” that affects SMEs in Tanzania whereby public 
contracts issued through the competitive tending process are only open to businesses that are formally 
registered, with a track record, stating that “I think the government doesn’t realise that the private sector 
is very important, that they don’t understand that it is business that drives the economy”. On developing 
local manufacturing capacity, Landa of TPSF argued that the government is able to support this sector, 
stating that “…the government is the one that can engineer this thing… even if they don’t want to put on 
some import restrictions, they can lay the foundations in the country to attract people to make business 
here…”. When asked why he thought the SME sector isn’t growing strongly in Tanzania, he pointed to 
the government’s “…you know, it is very easy to transform the economy of this country… that the energy 
SMEs aren’t growing in Tanzania, it’s because of the lack of political will power.” This line of argument, 
whereby observers place an emphasis on the role and responsibility of government to ‘affect change’ was 
prevalent among the stakeholders consulted for this research. Such argumentation is symptomatic of the 
deferral of responsibility, which was also strongly observed in Zambia, and can aptly be considered one of 
the main socio-cultural tendencies among energy SME stakeholders.
6.3.6 Summary of workshop discussion on barriers in Tanzania
The below-listed issues are a summary of the main ideas and arguments expressed by the local stakeholders 
that attended the one-day workshop in Lusaka.
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Demand-side	issues Supply-side	issues
1 Efficient cook stoves are widespread in 
Dar as charcoal prices are relatively high. 
Approx 30,000 stoves are sold per month in 
Tanzania. The cheapest ones sell for 3,500 
shillings to 15,000 shillings (US$ 2-10).
The difficulty in securing access to affordable 
financing is the #1 barrier to energy SMEs
2 Charcoal production is growing in Tanzania, 
1.2 million tonnes of charcoal being 
consumed per year. 300 hectares are being 
lost due to charcoal per day in TNZ
There has been limited ‘trickle down’ of various 
international initiatives to push clean/modern 
energy technologies
3 There is a disconnect between the small 
and large scale energy technologies and 
businesses
There is a disconnect between the small and large 
scale energy technologies and businesses
4 LPG only supplies 5% of the market in TNZ 
due to high prices and accessibility barriers
Entrepreneurs are unaware of energy business 
opportunities in TNZ, due to lacking of knowledge
5 The government’s procurement rules of 
many donor-backed projects do not favour 
local suppliers, and often more expensive 
products are imported.
The situation with regard to energy SMEs has 
changed in TNZ since 2000, however policy 
remains broadly the same with
6 The REA is not dedicated to involving 
SMEs in its mainstream strategy for rural 
electrification
98% of the REA budget is given to TENESCO 
to finance electricity grid extensions, overlooking 
lower-cost opportunity to provide clean/sustainable 
energy through other, lower-tech options
7 Weak and/or minimal government support for 
SMEs: very difficult to convince them that SMEs 
are a worthwhile model that justifies their support
8 The Ministry of energy is responsible for energy 
demand and the Ministry of forestry responsible 
for charcoal production. However government 
rejects charcoal and wood as modern energy and 
so doesn’t confront the issues. They’re in denial 
about the reality of charcoal use in TNZ and so 
don’t engage with modern/efficient technology, 
thus revealing a reality gap in TNZ.
9 AREED II model (to provide smaller loans to 
consumers to drive demand for sustainable energy 
products) has had limited success in TNZ, mainly 
due to a hesitant financial sector
10 Cheap, low-quality energy technologies (esp. 
solar) are being imported to TNZ which prohibits 
a level playing field
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6.3.7 Solutions
A wide-ranging debate over the relevant barriers and solutions was conducted at the Dar es Salaam 
workshop (see annex 11.1.2 for a list of participants). Through open discussion on what actions could/
would serve to benefit the Tanzanian energy SMEs sector, the following needs were agreed upon:
1. To reform the Banking and Finance Act of 1991 to create terms and conditions that are favourable 
to SMEs and allow more flexibility of banks to lend to SMEs, taking into account the importance of 
business track records and not such strict demands for collateral and/or high interest rates. This job 
should be led by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, with an important role for the TPSF and the Dar 
es Salaam University Entrepreneurship Centre, acting as a lobby group. 
2. The REA should encourage the private sector in the provision of energy to rural energy sector, 
however the REA needs to reform the subsidises it provides to SMEs so they can sell their systems 
directly to customers, and not only through public tendering which is limited in scope.
3. Businesses need to keep records of their transactions and conduct in a formalised manner, as much 
as possible, including greater documentation of resources and asset ownership that would improve 
the chances of securing finance. The introduction of nation ID cards should improve formalisation 
and improve access to financing
4. ‘After care training’ (follow-up on training) should be provided by the training organisations, through 
use of role models and highlighting successes. 
5. Government should establish local level representation for SMEs, down from the central government 
level. There is no representation at the local level to engage with SMEs, especially in the energy 
sector (apart from electricity, i.e., TANESCO). 
6. To streamline and harmonise SME associations activities and goals
7. To appoint a dedicated desk officer for supporting SMEs in the different ministries
6.4	 Conclusions
The energy SME sector in Tanzania shares some of the characteristics of the Zambian sector, though there 
are more examples of commercially viable businesses, some of which have been detailed in this chapter. 
To a large extent, this reflects the fact that the Tanzanian economy and population is approximately 3 times 
larger than Zambia’s, but also because there are other donor-backed programmes that specifically seek 
to promote energy SMEs, including GVEP’s Developing Energy Enterprises Project (DEEP) project (2008-
2013). In addition there is more policy support from the state, in particular for the solar PV market and other 
off-grid RETs for electricity generation, which is benefiting from some liberalisation in the IPP rules, plus 
targeted support and investment from the Rural Energy Agency, set up in 2008. 
These are all relevant contributing factors at the level of the enabling framework. However in terms of 
understanding what are the main contributing factors at the business level, the evidence gathered for 
this research suggests that successful energy SMEs have mostly been financed by the personal savings 
of entrepreneurs or by non-commercial, AREED-type, concessional loans and donor-backed grants. As 
such, there is little evidence among the businesses studied of commercial bank lending, i.e., there lacks 
evidence of a significant demonstration effect and access to affordable finance remains the single most 
important barrier to scaling up the energy SME sector. Consequently ‘energy entrepreneurs’ in Tanzania 
remain largely dependent on their own savings to either establish or expand their businesses, or on 
government and donor-backed programmes for both EDS and financial support.
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7.1	 Energy	background
Zambia, as with many of its neighbouring countries, has low levels of electrification, totalling 18.8% in 
2009 (IEA, 2011) where 44% of the urban population is estimated to have access to electricity, compared 
to 3% in rural areas (e8-GEF-UNDESA, 2010). 96% of grid-supplied electricity generation is from hydro 
sources, however total primary energy supply in Zambia is 80.9% biomass, 11.3% hydro-electric and 
7.6% oil-based products (REEEP, 2012). In both low-income rural and urban areas households and small 
businesses rely 95% on biomass fuel for cooking and heating, mostly in the form of firewood in rural areas 
and 75% charcoal in urban areas (REEEP, 2012). The heavy reliance on charcoal has led to widespread 
environmental destruction of forests surrounding the capital city Lusaka. 
The Zambian government approved a revised national energy policy in 2008, which places an emphasis 
on developing new hydro-electric resources. The country’s sixth National Development Plan 2011-2015 
(NDP) provides specific goals for the energy sector, including increasing generation capacity by 1,000 MW 
compared to 2010 levels and expanding rural and national electrification to 15% and 40% respectively 
(REEEP, 2012). Other specific goals of the sixth NDP include:
• Implementing a cost-effective electricity tariff regime,
• Establishing an open and non-discriminatory electricity transmission regime
• Introducing and appropriate cost-effective renewable energy feed-in tariff (FIT)
• Promoting the use of biogas for cooking, lighting and electricity generation
• Increasing biofuel substitution for fossil fuels to 10%
• Developing a Biomass Energy Strategy, to improve the sustainability and effectiveness of biomass 
supply
Source: REEEP (2012)
7.2	 Energy	SMEs	in	Zambia
In this section we explore the extent to which specific businesses have demonstrated that energy SMEs 
are a viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in Zambia, drawing upon the 
outcomes described during the workshop, in addition to desk-based research.
7.2.1 AREED supported energy SMEs
Zambia was one of the five countries that participated in the AREED project. The Centre for Energy, 
Environment & Engineering Zambia (CEEEZ), based in Lusaka, was the in-country organisation responsible 
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for communicating the project and for co-implementing (alongside E+Co) the enterprise development 
service (EDS). Under the leadership of Professor Francis Yamba, CEEEZ has more than 10 years of 
experience with conducting energy-related research and project implementation in Zambia.
Below are listed the SMEs that went through the EDS process under AREED in Zambia, and were issued 
with loans to either start up or expand their businesses:
• KBPS Ltd. – Kitwe: Charcoal production from sawmill waste
• RASMA Engineering – Lusaka: Efficient cook stove manufacture
• Chavuma Waterfalls Ventures Limited (CWVL) – Lusaka: Energy efficiency
• Ubwato Enterprises – Lusaka: Efficient cook stove manufacture
• TSADC – Lusaka/Mazabuka: Solar bakeries
• RCI – Zambezi: Oil manufacturing from Jatropha
• Sylva Food Solution Limited – Lusaka: Use of solar driers for fruit and vegetables 
As was the case with all of the AREED countries, most of the energy SMEs in Zambia were in fact urban-
based businesses mostly due to the limited number of rural-based entrepreneurs that responded to the 
adverts for AREED support. However many of the urban-based energy businesses were aiming to supply 
the rural market, for example the manufacture of efficient cook stoves. According to E+Co (Eibs-Singer, 
2004), a total of 21 investments were made through the AREED facility across the five countries in the first 
phase of the project. Of this figure, five of the investments had been written off. Of these five, four were in 
Zambia: KBPS; RASMA; Chavuma and Ubwato.
7.2.2 Zambian energy SMEs: description of outcomes and contributions
Below follows a summary of energy SMEs that have operated in Zambia since 2002, both AREED-
supported and non-AREED, describing both the ‘outcome’ (business activity and performance) and the 
‘contributions’ (factors that helped in the set up and operation of specific businesses)10. 
KBPS Ltd.: Charcoal production from sawmill waste (Kitwe)
KBPS was based in the Copperbelt region and aimed to produce charcoal from forest waste (specifically, 
off-cuts from a Eucalyptus plantation) using efficient kilns and employed 10 women in the production 
and distribution of charcoal. The operation was initially successful, securing large contracts with local 
businesses. However the business folded within a year when the entrepreneur decided to stop the charcoal 
production and instead used the truck that was bought with the AREED loan for other purposes. The truck 
was then written off in an accident and then the AREED loan was likewise written off, with some cost 
recovery made through the sale of the damaged truck.
10 The information gathered represents what was available to the researchers, from various sources both primary and secondary, 
but does not claim to be exhaustive.
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Charcoal production from forest off-cuts, using the ‘half-orange’ kiln, Copperbelt, Zambia
RASMA Engineering: Efficient cook stove manufacture (Lusaka)
The business was spearheaded by Mr. Rashid Phiri and focused on the manufacture and sale of efficient 
charcoal stoves, based on his own research and development which started in 1985. Seeking to expand 
RASMA’s efficient cookstove production, Mr. Phiri applied for EDS and loan support from the AREED 
project, and was finally granted a loan of US$ 18,000 in 2002. Mr. Phiri claims that he did not receive any 
support from the government or universities for his business; however he has given his stove designs to 
universities to test their energy efficiency, receiving feedback that has helped improve the designs. He also 
claims to have drawn inspiration for his designs by observing market traders using his stoves which he gave 
free of charge just to get feedback on the stove’s real-world fuel demand and user friendliness. However 
the business could not meet its sales projections, due to the high and rising cost of stoves affected by the 
increase in the price of imported steel, combined with poor market research. AREED reclaimed and sold 
the truck that was bought using the AREED loan, then wrote off the rest of the loan.
RASMA is still active (as of 2012) in the research, design and manufacture of energy efficient stoves and 
ovens. Although RASMA has made and sold more than 3,000 stoves since 2002, the business is now 
mostly bespoke, manufacturing biomass stoves for commercial applications such as cooking in markets 
and ovens for baking and vegetable drying. The business is now operating at a lower-level of capacity 
and turnover than was planned when RASMA secured its AREED loan. Income now earned is partly used 
to invest in R&D, including stoves and ovens fuelled by sawdust which Mr. Phiri sees as a technology 
with huge potential to compete with charcoal, given the significant stores of sawdust waste available in 
Zambia.
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Mr. Phiri set up RASMA on his own and is strongly motivated by environmental concerns, principally the 
rapid destruction of Zambia’s forest for conversion into charcoal. Indeed, when discussing the potential 
of sawdust briquetting technology he claimed it could help “fight the war against deforestation”, and that 
sawdust briquettes could sell for half the price of charcoal.
Mr. Rashid Phiri of RASMA Engineering at his workshop in Lusaka, September 2012
Chavuma Waterfalls Ventures Limited (CWVL): Energy efficiency (Lusaka)
CWVL received EDS and loan support from AREED and aimed to establish a sales network in Zambia for 
the supply and installation of Powerboss devices that conserve electrical energy in motors. CWVL acquired 
the sole dealership for the supply of Powerboss from Somar International and successfully supplied and 
installed Powerboss devices at the Intercontinental Hotel, National Milling and Nkana water and sewerage 
company. However the business encountered challenges when the health of the sole entrepreneur, 
Dr. Bob Sakahilu, began to decline until the business had to be closed down less than two years after the 
AREED loan was issued.
Ubwato Enterprises (Lusaka)
This business involved the manufacture and sale of efficient cook stove using a clay liner, based on the 
Kenyan ‘ceramic jiko’ design. However the business failed in 2004 after one of the partners abandoned the 
operation. As with RASMA, the rising price of imported steel (which is defined as a ‘finished product’) for the 
manufacture of cook stoves during 2003-2008 also eroded the profit margin for these stoves in Zambia.
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Dread & Works Enterprise (Lusaka)
This business is owned by Lazarous Chewe, the other partner in the aforementioned Ubwato Enterprises 
and a previous ‘student’ of Mr. Phiri at RASMA engineering. The business focuses on the design and 
manufacture of efficient cook stoves of the ‘jiko’ style, plus larger ‘rocket stoves’ for schools and hospital 
kitchens. At one point Mr. Chewe was negotiating with the South African supermarket chain ‘Shoprite’ to 
market his stoves, and came close to brokering a deal but ultimately it fell through, partly due to challenges 
in packaging the stoves. Financial support, in the form of a grant, was provided by the ProBEC programme 
(GIZ) and the business now manufactures stoves on-demand, with some orders being placed through 
the HEDON website which is supported by various international NGOs and businesses, including GVEP, 
Practical Action, The Shell Foundation and Engineers Without Borders.
TSADC: Solar bakeries (Lusaka/Mazabuka)
The core activity of this business was to bake bread using solar bakeries acquired from TTT Inc holding 
group, a company based in Arizona, USA. While initially promising, the technology did not function well in 
Zambia due to higher levels of cloud cover, compounded by the fact that the ovens could not be adapted, 
for technical reasons, to operate on natural gas. The solar ovens were subsequently reclaimed by the 
manufacturers due to non-payment and the loan was refunded to AREED.
RCI: Oil manufacturing from Jatropha (Zambezi)
The project was started by Mr. Henry Ngimbu from the Zambezi district in North-western Zambia. The 
core business plan, supported by AREED, was to process biodiesel from Jatropha to be used in engines, 
especially for milling. However the business did not take off, due mainly to a lack of clear biofuel pricing in 
Zambia and the Jatropha crops were eventually cut down. 
Sylva Food Solutions: solar dryers (Lusaka)
Sylva food solutions were established in 1986, selling vegetables to the urban market. However fresh 
vegetables have a short shelf-life and production is seasonal. In addition, some products were arriving to 
the market damaged and so for these reasons the company decided to invest in food drying technology 
to ensure stable production and delivery of foodstuffs from local, small-scale, farmers to the urban market. 
Solar dryers are a table-high raised surface where fruit and vegetables are placed and covered with a 
plastic sheet to trap heat which speeds up the drying process, and protects food from dust and other 
pollutants (see annex 11.10).
Seeking to incorporate and develop solar drying technology, Sylva foods applied for support from AREED 
and were eventually awarded a loan of US$ 126,500 to invest in the development, manufacture and sale 
of solar dryers to its network of famer suppliers. Sylva has made and sold approximately 1000 solar dryers 
sold since 2005 and have trained more than 9,500 farmers from all 10 provinces. The company employed 
engineers from the University of Zambia to come up with an optimal dryer design. The loan was paid back 
and the company continues to expand, adopting food processing technologies, packaging and exporting 
beyond Africa.
Subsequent to the AREED loan Sylva secured, with the help of the Ministry of Agriculture, a loan of US$ 
600,000 from the World Bank to expand the business’ operations, managed by the private NGO AfriCARE. 
At the same time technical support was provided through DfID’s (the UK’s development department) 
Business Innovation Facility to conduct a market analysis through consultants that were placed in-house at 
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Sylva. IDE (International Development Enterprises, an American NGO operating in Zambia) also contributed 
to Sylva’s successful expansion by helping them to identify the type of materials that were needed to set up 
the business and also supported a market linkages study, i.e., putting farmers in touch with the company. 
Training from IDE was provided for free. 
Copperbelt Forestry Company (CFC): production of sawdust briquettes 
In 2003 CFC approached the National Technology Business Centre (NTBC), a government agency that 
provides advice on appropriate technology use, sustainability assessments, business and market analyses. 
CFC enquired about the feasibility of developing sawdust briquetting technology. While there exist significant, 
low-cost, sawdust resources in Zambia, the CFC suffer initial setbacks due to a combination of poor 
marketing and management. Nevertheless, the company remains active (as of 2012) and has collaborated 
with a Swedish organisation Emerging Cooking Solutions to develop sawdust pelleting technology. CFC 
did not receive any EDS or loan support from AREED.
Solar Tech Ltd.
Solar Tech Ltd. grew from a family business focusing mainly on solar drying technology, and, to a lesser 
extent, supplies the solar PV market in Zambia. As of 2012 the company is operational and exhibits its 
products at trade fairs where interest is strong but the follow-up demand is weak, mainly due to the high 
capital cost vs. payback times, especially for solar PV technology. The company’s main PV customers are 
NGOs that normally finance their investments through grants and so do not operate on commercial lines. 
To date Solar Tech Ltd. has not received any substantial external assistance or commercial loans.
CLEF Energy
CLEF Energy was set up by Chilumba Ngosa who spent many years living in the UK and was one of the 
Zambian nationals encouraged to return home by ex-President Banda11. Mr. Banda pushed for expat 
Zambians to invest their financial and human capital in the country, offering them a 7-year 0% tax break, 
profit repatriation plus other incentives to invest in Zambia. As of 2012, CLEF is looking into various 
energy technologies and market opportunities, including the production of bioethanol from municipal solid 
waste for mixing with transport petroleum fuels, and grid-connected power generation from solar PV and 
wind. While Mr. Ngosa sees commercial potential for developing these energy sources, he is clear about 
the need for concerted support from government to help develop these markets. At the time this study 
was conducted CLEF was waiting for an official response from the government regarding proposals to 
implement a ‘feed-in tariff’ for grid-connected renewable energy technologies.
Muhanya Solar
Muhanya Solar was established by Mr. Geoffrey Kaila, initially motivated by his hobby interest in solar PV 
technology, ‘tinkering’ with solar panels. The business mainly focuses on supplying solar home systems 
(both PV water heating) to rural, off-grid areas and has installed 100-200 systems to date, including 
17 projects completed through the public tendering process. The business is mostly self-financed from 
savings and, as yet, has not borrowed any money from financial institutions though Mr. Kaila tried to 
get financing from AREED but claims that AREED didn’t support PV, although this was not the case. 
Other financial help has come from friends, lending money informally. The main business model is to put 
consumers in touch with micro finance institutions to borrow the money necessary to purchase the solar 
11 Rupiah Bwezani Banda was the President of Zambia from 2008 to 2011
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water heaters or PV systems. Most of the technology is imported as finished products, and the job of 
Muhanya is to assemble, install and service the systems.
7.2.3 Have Zambian energy SMEs demonstrated commercial viability?
The previous section detailed the history of specific energy SMEs in Zambia, which enables us to address 
research question #1, i.e., to what extent have specific businesses demonstrated that energy SMEs are a 
viable means to provide scalable access to modern energy sources in sub-Saharan Africa? Based on the 
above-listed case histories (which are a mix of AREED and non-AREED), and an analysis of the literature 
and stakeholder interviews, the following issues and trends can be observed in Zambia:
1. Overall poor performance of energy SMEs in Zambia with more commercial failures than 
successes
2. Poor market research and marketing is a major cause of business failure
3. Self-funded business have demonstrated more success than those that secured external loans, 
including subsidised loans
4. Energy SMEs are, more often than not, overly dependent on market niches and face barriers to 
business scale-up through limited demand
5. Evident lack of government support for energy SMEs, revealing extensive scope for policy to create 
financial and non-financial incentives and benefits and incentives
7.3	 Analysis	of	outcomes,	barriers	and	solutions
This section provides the substantive analysis of the Zambian energy SME sector, based on the main 
issues raised by workshop participants, and elaborated upon by individuals during follow-up interviews. 
Here we build upon the ‘contributions’ aspect of the specific energy SMEs in Zambia, i.e., to understand 
the key causal factors, or mechanisms, through which energy SMEs have experienced either success or 
failure, thus addressing research questions #2. We also address research question #3: what are the main, 
persistent, barriers facing entrepreneurs when setting up, operating and expanding energy SMEs in the 
identified countries? This includes an analysis of the range of ‘solutions’ proposed by national stakeholders 
to overcome these barriers, again based on the issues raised by workshop participants, and elaborated 
upon by individuals during follow-up interviews.
The overall focus of the analysis is on the specific circumstances in Zambia that have influenced, and 
continue to influence, outcomes (specific businesses) in the country’s energy SME sector, including the 
nature of relevant barriers to market development and expansion. As such it is useful to divide the issues 
raised by stakeholders into the elements of an ‘enabling environment’ that all countries have, to a greater 
or less extent favourable to the growth of energy SMEs. The following five categories are adapted from 
Nygaard et al. (201212), and best reflect the issues identified in Zambia:
• Government intervention and national macroeconomic conditions
• Nationally available financing
12 See annex 10.10 for a table on “Enabling frameworks for technology transfer Source” from Boldt, J., Nygaard, J., Hansen, 
U.E., Trærup, S. (2012) Overcoming Barriers to the Transfer and Diffusion of Climate Technologies. UNEP Risø Centre, 
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• Human and institutional capacity
• Research institutions and technological capacity
• Social and cultural factors
7.3.1 Government intervention and national macroeconomic conditions
The wider economic ‘settings’ of a given country are of fundamental importance to any business, large or 
small, attempting to or already operating there. The impact of interest base rates, inflation and growth levels 
are the main factors that influence the business climate. However governments, especially those of smaller 
and less developed economies (thus covering most of sub-Saharan Africa) often have little influence over 
these primary factors. Therefore the focus here is on ‘second order’ settings such as taxation, subsidies 
and import tariffs over which governments have greater, if not total, control and which can have a significant 
direct or indirect impact on the private sector.
Import tariffs on various products have had significant impacts, both positive and negative, for many 
Zambian energy SMEs. For example production costs for RASMA’s improved cook stoves rose sharply 
along with the cost of imported steel, on which tax is paid in Zambia as it is considered a ‘finished product’. 
Over a period of just two years the cost of steel had forced RASMA to more than double the price of its 
stoves to approx US$20 each, beyond the purchasing capacity of average Zambian consumers. Around 
the same time in 2008 the government introduced a tax waiver on solar PV technologies, all of which are 
imported. This provided, at a stroke, significant cost savings for companies such as Muhanya Solar, CLEF 
and Solar Tech Ltd. by reducing import tax from 15% to 0%. 
Geoffrey Kaila of Muhanya Energy argued that local electricity market conditions in Zambia present a 
large economic barrier to the uptake of solar PV, stating that “…it is easier now to run an energy SME in 
Zambia… we have tax breaks for importing solar products, which includes PV panels, inverters, batteries 
and bulbs, and the price of panels has come down a lot. But the price of electricity in Zambia is too low 
and so consumers need to be subsidised in order to grow the solar [PV] market from the bottom up.” 
However solar PV and grid electricity don’t compete in the same market and so this argument and so 
this, in reality, is not a valid barrier to the PV market although it was heard from various actors in the solar 
market. Arguments can be made in favour of cross-subsidising from the grid to off-grid systems in order to 
create a ‘level playing field’, though this is not a viable option for Zambia’s indebted ZESCO utility.
In addition, because of heavy subsidies that cause ZESCO to be a loss-making utility,the company is 
caught in a classic public-services dilemma whereby its low tariffs are politically difficult to increase. 
Further, without some degree of market reform the electricity sector remains dependent upon government 
subsidises to finance investments, which are currently swallowed up by the cost of maintaining what is 
an ageing infrastructure. As of early 2013 Zambia has experienced a generation shortfall of approximately 
70 MW, in a grid system that contains just 1,750 MW, 90% of which is hydro capacity (Bloomberg, 
2013). Market reforms, including electricity tariff increases and/or the introduction of feed-in tariffs (FIT) 
targeting at RET generation would help close the generation gap and generate revenues for investing in 
grid expansion. This was one of the issues elaborated by Chilumba Ngosa of CLEF Energy who expressed 
his frustration with a government committee to discuss the FIT proposal, where progress is similarly slow 
and ineffective, stating that “there is too much talking and nothing is done!” Ngosa also explained that 
he has struggled to sign an MoU with the city council of Lusaka regarding a proposal to utilise municipal 
solid waste as a fuel source, with progress being blocked at every stage in the bureaucratic chain. Partly 
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for these reasons Ngosa argues for the need to decentralise some government responsibilities in Zambia 
since he sees central government as ineffective.
More generally, SMEs are currently taxed the same as large corporations in Zambia (6%) and there is a 
debate about whether SMEs should be given a tax exemption. However few stakeholders believe that 
such a reduction would make a significant impact in helping to overcome other, more fundamental, energy 
market barriers including electricity tariffs.
There was a general consensus at the Lusaka workshop that it is now (as of 2012) easier to set up and 
operate an SME in Zambia than it was 10 years earlier. This change was attributed to reforms initiated 
by the Banda government (2008-2011), which reflects the official importance the government places 
on SMEs as a driver of economic growth and employment. However there was also strong agreement 
among workshop participants that the drafting and implementation of energy policy is disorganised and 
convoluted in Zambia, and that this acts as a significant brake on the growth of energy SMEs which are 
in need of clarity on strategic priorities, market opportunities, incentives, targets and relevant standards 
for energy products and services. Indeed, among the stakeholders consulted for this research there was 
a dominant tendency to defer all leadership, decision making and problem-solving obligations to ‘the 
Government’. In the world of energy SMEs this reference to government would imply a key role played by 
the Department of Energy, within the Ministry of Energy and Water Development.
However it is clear, by its own admission, that the Department of Energy (DoE) has had very little interaction 
with energy SMEs beyond the market for efficient cook stoves. According to Charles Mulenga, Assistant 
Director at the DoE, the DoE contributes to energy policy making in Zambia and works with NGOs in the 
production and dissemination of cook stoves. It also conducts information campaigns, mostly billboards 
and flyers. Although Mulenga stated that he saw ‘potential’ for the widespread provision of solar PV lighting 
and charging in rural areas, through SMEs, the DoE has done little to facilitate the development of this 
sector. A notable exception is that the DoE supported, with funding from the Swedish development agency 
(SIDA), the establishment of Solar Energy Supply Companies (ESCOs) in the Eastern Province. When 
pressed on the boundaries of the DoE remit to support energy SMEs, Mulenga clarified that the DoE “…is 
not responsible for providing support to energy SMEs”, and that it would be a responsibility of the Ministry 
of Commerce. Such deferrals of responsibility, within government, reflect the degree to which there lacks 
a widely understood, coherent policy and strategy to support energy SMEs in Zambia, given that many of 
the energy SME entrepreneurs approach the DoE when seeking support from the government.
Indeed Zambia’s 2008 energy policy doesn’t make specific reference to SMEs, and so there is currently 
no official statement on the role and importance of energy SMEs to achieving the government’s wider 
targets of increased consumer access to sources of clean, modern energy. Mulenga stated that the DoE 
is “thinking about” supporting the LPG industry in Zambia, though no more information was provided on 
the topic. Mr. Tambatamba, director of the National Technology Business Centre (NTBC) stated that the 
government of Zambia is “pro business” and is trying to promote SMEs through workshops but that there 
is a constant need for mentoring small businesses in Zambia. 
7.3.2 Nationally available financing
One of the main objectives of the AREED project was to demonstrate that energy SMEs can be economically 
viable so that local banks will see it as a safe sector, worth investing in. However, due to the low success 
rate of energy SMEs, this demonstration effect has not occurred in Zambia. Consequently the banks in 
Zambia remain mostly unwilling to lend to energy SMEs, charging relatively high interest rates when they do 
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lend. From the perspective of the banks and other potential investors in energy SMEs, there are often high 
opportunity costs, whereby far higher and more secure rates of return can be achieved by investing in well-
established businesses like the importing of foodstuffs that provide a low-risk, fast return on investment.
There is wide agreement among stakeholders that it is difficult to access start-up capital in Zambia, where 
banks are very demanding with regard to documentation and collateral. Even when collateral is provided, 
Zambian banks are not willing to leverage their loans beyond the value of the collateral, meaning that asset-
poor entrepreneurs are unable to secure capital beyond a limited range. Furthermore, interest rates are 
relatively high in Zambia as compared to OECD countries (though comparable with other AREED countries), 
even on loans issued to established SMEs with a positive track record and performance. There is no 
universal agreement as to the reasons why banks lend at higher rates to SMEs in general in Zambia (of up 
to 6% per month), though various stakeholders, including Mulambwa Imasiku, the director of the TDAU, 
suggested that trust was a major issue, stating that “SMEs are considered a risky type of business where 
you may lend to them today and tomorrow they have disappeared”. In the energy sector, the nature of the 
business cycles put investors off, where more complicated supply chains, prices and slower pay-back 
periods for capital-intensive technologies such as solar PV all conspire to increase the financial risks.
At the DoE, Mr. Mulenga emphasised the need for innovative financing for energy SMEs in Zambia, a widely 
held position. What ‘innovate financing’ could mean in reality goes undefined (other than being a euphemism 
for cheap money) but suffice to say that it refers to mechanisms that are fundamentally different from those 
that exist in practice. However, repeated reference to the term ‘innovative finance’ masks a more concrete, 
real-world, dilemma whereby commercial banks in Zambia (and indeed in most other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa) are themselves unable to borrow money at low interest rates from international markets. As 
such, no amount of financial ‘innovation’ will allow for the provision of loans for SMEs at single-digit rates 
and relaxed demands for collateral that would be considered affordable and viable to help finance business 
start up and/or expansion. Nonetheless, some relevant ideas were discussed at the Lusaka workshop, 
including the possibility of creating a sector-specific investment fund contributed to by various banks and 
channelled through business associations that vet specific businesses (i.e., their members), providing a 
degree of assurance for banks. Such sector-specific financial risk sharing has taken place in South Africa 
where banks were encouraged, through strong leadership from the state, to lend to the country’s nascent 
solar water heater (SWH) industry; first to manufacturers and then to customers to support the demand 
side, mainly by agreeing to finance SWH systems as part of mortgage lending. Chilumba Ngosa of CLEF 
Energy argues that the financial sector needs support from the government, like the AREED mechanism 
but on a larger scale. To this end, Ngosa wrote to the Minister of Finance arguing that “the government 
should come up with a policy [to earmark funds for investing in energy SMEs] which they should share with 
the banks, and which in some cases they should guarantee, funded by green taxes”.
Added to the fact that there have been few business success stories in Zambia of entrepreneurs receiving 
soft loans from donor-backed programmes, various stakeholders also expressed the risk of ‘moral 
hazard’13 in the use of guarantee funds to stimulate commercial lending to energy SMEs. While guarantee 
funds aim to demonstrate to banks that energy SMEs are a worthwhile and low-risk venture that will yield 
results, they often have the opposite effect by increasing the chance of non-repayment as borrowers 
know that their loans are ‘covered’. This issue was put to Bernard Lusale, Financial Services Programme 
Coordinator, at the Micro Bankers Trust (MBT) who acknowledged that this was a possible risk, though 
13 “Moral hazard describes behaviour when agents do not bear the full cost of their actions and are thus more likely to take such 
actions” (OECD, 2001). In other words, moral hazard refers to the tendency of actors to be more willing to take a risk when 
they know that the potential costs will be paid, at least in part, by other actors or agencies.
65
argued that it is a less significant factor when compared to the low levels of loan enquires on behalf of 
Zambian entrepreneurs, across all sectors.
As a separate issue, Lusale claims that SMEs are not approaching Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) 
to borrow money due simply to a lack of awareness and information on the part of the entrepreneurs. 
Nonetheless MBT have a larger SME portfolio than 5 years ago, and see this as a growing sector of the 
Zambian economy. 
In terms of how they view the energy sector, Lusale stated that the MBT are “enthusiastic” about the 
energy sector, indeed that they are happy to finance any project that appears to be commercially viable. 
The MBT provides loans of up to 50 million kwacha (US$ 10,000), all of which are secured through 
collateral, divided into private or community loans, and typically lend at 60% interest per year. However, 
in defence of such high interest rates, Mr. Lusale explained that the MBT borrows from the Development 
Bank of Zambia at 12% per year, which is the lowest, subsidised, rate available to them. According to 
Lusale, all banks in Zambia prefer to lend to formalised tax-paying employees as they have a stable income 
and their repayments are automatically deducted from salaries. When asked about their lending criteria, 
Lusale clarified that MBT considers mostly legal and financial security and that they don’t screen their 
lending to SMEs against any sustainability criteria.
7.3.3 Human and institutional capacity
Primary research reveals that there are plenty of ideas and numerous activities going on to develop 
and diffuse new energy technologies in Zambia. However there is an apparent lack of awareness and 
coordination between the individuals and organisations within the energy SME sector, where similar efforts 
are duplicated and/or operate in isolation from each other, to the detriment of the sector as a whole. Of 
the five AREED countries, the energy SMEs sector is least developed in Zambia where just a handful 
of small businesses are operating, without any meaningful coordination or representation. For example 
the sawdust fuel technology and SME ‘incubator’ idea, which the NTBC already operates but which the 
stakeholders present at the research workshop were unaware of. Similarly, there are no renewable energy 
trade associations in Zambia, apart from biofuels, and there is minimal contact between small businesses 
and the DoE, while the Rural Electrification Authority (REA) is mostly focussed on grid-based work. The 
apparent lack of coordination in government to support energy SMEs can, to a large extent, be explained 
by shortcomings in human and institutional capacity.
The main issues raised at the Lusaka workshop, and during subsequent interviews, concerned the lack of 
coordinated or centralised marketing for specific energy technologies; a generalised lack of information for 
entrepreneurs regarding the energy sector; the need for SME incubators; follow-up support for energy SMEs 
to improve chances of commercial success. In response to a discussion of these issues, the workshop 
participants agreed that a high-level energy ‘taskforce’, with strong political leadership at the highest 
levels, should be set up in Zambia to identify the organisational gaps in the energy SME sector. As well as 
galvanising support for a clear energy SME national agenda, such a taskforce should conduct a market 
mapping of who should be doing what, in order to streamline current activities. Participants also agreed 
that government-sponsored courses for entrepreneurs on management skills, book-keeping and business 
planning would help fill an important capacity gap. However such open discussions can quickly descend 
into a ‘wish list’ of capacity needs, where it is all too easy to state that “it’s the government’s responsibility” 
to provide these services when, in reality, the government itself may lack the necessary human capacity 
and organisational capacities! This dynamic brings to light a deeper, intractable, development dilemma the 
implications of which are far wider than just the energy sector.
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In the case of Zambia it appears that the energy SMEs sector has attracted a number of technology 
‘enthusiasts’, that lack training in business skills and/or are not primarily motivated to make money. 
Mr. Phiri of RASMA Engineering is a good example of this and, by his own admission, is not motivated 
by making money and indeed he laughed when recalling that others do not consider him to be a 
businessman. Furthermore he was happy to know that his stove design is now being copied and sold 
in Namibia where consumers are willing to pay a higher price, though he will not receive any income or 
royalties.
At the DoE, Mulenga stated that there is a lack of awareness regarding business opportunities in the 
energy sectors, stating that “we see SMEs as important in providing access to modern energy... [however] 
we need to find ways to formalise the production of efficient cook stoves”, citing the fact that ‘mbaulas’ 
(traditional, less efficient, cheap stoves) are still too common in Zambia. Such generalised statements from 
individuals that occupy positions of expertise reflect the level of the debate regarding Zambia’s energy 
SMEs. However, Mulenga stated that the DoE would welcome the formation of trade associations on 
the basis that “it’s easier [to work with trade associations] than working with individual businesses, who 
sometimes contact the DoE to lobby for their own, narrow, interests”. 
Thus far there is only one energy SME association, the Biofuels Association of Zambia. This association 
has presented the DoE with suggestions as to what is needed in Zambia to make the biofuel market take 
off and they are currently “assessing the proposals and working out what is viable”. The DoE claims that 
it wants to set a price for biofuels but that the producers in Zambia are not being transparent about their 
production costs, and so a deadlock has occurred on that issue. Citing its activities to promote energy 
SMEs, the DoE hosts an “Energy Sector Activity Group” which includes a renewable energy (RE) sub-
sector to discuss issues of market opportunities. The DoE also hosts an ‘Energy Week’ as well as trade 
fairs to demonstrate energy technologies, where they join forces with other organisation such as WASAZA 
which promote the use of Biogas Digesters in Zambia. However it is clear, from discussions with SMEs 
including Muhanya and CLEF that the level of sector coordination for energy SMEs is very low, and in the 
case of solar energy, there is no representation.
Mulenga explained that the DoE sees its role in supporting SMEs as one of responding to the needs of 
business, and so they are waiting for businesses to do something, to approach them, stating that “…
we listen, assess what they have proposed and then try to get clarity on what it practical to implement, 
taking into account our capacities.” This is a fundamental point which serves to underline the lack of clarity 
regarding the leadership and coordination of energy SMEs in Zambia, since many of the entrepreneurs 
interviewed claimed that they are waiting for the government to take decisions that help support various 
energy markets, revealing a fundamental organisational capacity gap. 
Kenneth Chelemu is the Technical Director of International Development Enterprises (IDE) in Zambia, an 
NGO that works to build entrepreneurial capacities from the bottom up. Chelemu argued that it is important 
not to forget the demand-side capacity gaps, i.e., that Zambian consumers, especially in rural areas, must 
be trained in the management of energy technologies as a built-in aspect of all business activities, to ensure 
correct use and longevity. Chelemu summarised the relevant human and institutional capacity challenges, 
stating that“we employ Farm Business Advisors…their job is not only to identify business opportunities but 
also to advise farmers on basic skills on how to use and manage new technologies to help improve their 
livelihoods”. Related to this is the government’s Citizenship Economic Empowerment policy that pledges 
to provide support to indigenous businesses, though it is unclear what the exact, concrete mechanisms, 
are of this support.
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7.3.4 Research institutions and technological capacity
In Zambia a key player linking SMEs to research and development is the Technology Development Advisory 
Unity (TDAU) which is a semi-autonomous, non-profit, organisation within the University of Zambia, 
associated with the Engineering Department. Set up in 1975, the main function of TDAU is to conduct 
R&D across various programmes, including renewable energy, water, construction, food processing and 
agriculture. Mulambwa Imasiku, the director of TDAU, defined the organisation as a key “agent” in the 
technology transfer chain, whereby they package and register their technologies with patents, charging a 
fee to those using them.
With regard to SMEs, TDAU contacts relevant businesses to tell them about a new technology, but also 
responds to solicited advice and consultancy. Imasiku argues that intellectual property is not respected 
in Zambia and widespread copying exists, which limits the incentives for private sector innovation. Within 
the energy sector TDAU’s work has focused mainly on mini-hydro (a 2.5 kW system was developed and 
installed at the Mutanda Mission; however this became redundant when ZESCO connected the mission 
to the grid).
TDAU stated an interest in developing sawdust briquetting technology and have signed a technical support 
agreement with a Tanzanian organisation, to this end. Mr. Imasiku sees potential to deliver sawdust 
briquettes via SMEs and that all the necessary factors are in place in Zambia to promote this technology, 
with their aim to support the development and uptake of small-scale ‘pelleting’ technology. However, given 
the extent of knowledge and discussions held elsewhere with entrepreneurs including RASMA and Dread 
Works as well as the NTBC, it is unclear why this technology is not already in common use. On this point 
Imasiku argued that entrepreneurs in Zambia are not aware of energy issues, that they’d prefer to make 
money with other businesses, mainly retailing, and so “…it’s left to the intellectuals and fanatics to look at 
energy technologies”. Imasiku added that TDAU is not business-minded and the intellectuals that take an 
interest in energy issues are mostly unwilling to take entrepreneurial risks and so TDAU does not function 
as an incubator for energy entrepreneurs, per se. This dynamic reveals one of the dominant issues voiced 
by various energy SME stakeholders in Zambia, where there are poor linkages between the SMEs and 
technical support organisations. 
Mr. Phiri of RASMA Engineering is enthusiastic about the idea of producing sawdust briquettes as a 
substitute for charcoal. He plans to collaborate with TaTEDO in Tanzania on the technology for briquette 
making in 2013 and then conduct energy content tests. With a US$ 14,000 machine to compress the 
sawdust he claims he can supply half of Lusaka’s cooking-fuel needs, substituting for charcoal, and 
undercut the price of charcoal. He recognises that consumers are unlikely to take to the new fuel source 
right away and so he plans to conduct demonstrations at market places. Further, he claims that the 
sawmillers are happy to give their sawdust away given its environmental burden, though he will have to 
transport the material into Lusaka. Although the concept is plausible, and indeed is something that was 
mentioned by various stakeholders, there is a conspicuous lack of hard data on both the supply and 
demand side that would feed into a rigorous business plan, which appears to reflect a lack of research 
and/or systematic market testing and so the sawdust briquetting concept. This lack of basic data reflects a 
poor research capacity and/or organisational capacity in Zambia, to coordinate a study that would provide 
necessary basic data on the commercial viability of the technology.
Mukombo Tambatamba of the NTBC described his organisation as “…a vehicle through which technology 
R&D can be commercialised in Zambia”. The NTBC has a staff of about 27, divided into the technology and 
finance departments. Its business development work intends to function as an ‘incubator’ for SMEs. The 
NTBC also documents technologies in use in Zambia, conducts market assessments and has a specific 
Zambia
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programme for technology transfer.  The NTBC also operates a Technology Business Development Fund, 
which issues calls for proposal, currently an annual fund worth approximately US$ 160,000. The Finnish 
government is supporting technology innovation in Zambia through the NTBC, including in the energy 
sector. Therefore the NTBC holds, in theory, a key position in the Zambian institutional landscape for 
supporting specific energy SMEs and in otherwise influencing the process of public support available to 
SMEs with regard to technology commercialisation. The NTBC has access to a network of registered 
businesses through the chamber of commerce. Trade Fairs, the Agricultural Fair and the Business 
Executive Exhibition, are all concrete events in Zambia that put entrepreneurs in touch with business 
support agencies, such as NTBC.
In terms of its operational processes, the NTBC is mostly demand-led, i.e., they are involved with SMEs 
that approach them, though it sometimes contacts specific businesses and promotes its work at trade 
fairs.  Mr. Tambatamba referred to Zambian energy entrepreneur whom the NTBC sought to support; a 
company called Tapera Bio Industries that aimed to produce transport fuel from vegetable oil waste, sourced 
mainly from restaurants. The entrepreneur had some initial support from the US embassy who promised to 
purchase the fuel. However the business failed to expand due to lack of financing, despite having developed 
what appeared to be a commercially viable technology, with a clear, if initially limited, market. 
7.3.5 Social and cultural factors
The final set of issues which influence the outcomes of efforts to promote energy SMEs in Zambia can be 
referred to as ‘social and cultural factors’. These are, by their nature, mostly intangible aspects but ones 
that can have a powerful effect on the implementation of any given plan, policy or business activity. There 
are two important issues, with regard to energy SMEs in Zambia, that were referred to repeatedly by the 
stakeholders consulted for this research.
On the supply side the main issue is one of weak ‘entrepreneurialism’, i.e., the apparent lack of a strong, 
dynamic business culture where ideas and plans are effectively and efficiently converted into reality. When 
asked why he thought Zambia has a relatively poor record on entrepreneurship in the energy sector, Mr. 
Tambatamba, director of the NTBC, stated that: “…from our own experience we need them [entrepreneurs 
]...but we are very bad entrepreneurs, generally. I think it also relates to our culture, yes. So you need 
to constantly be mentoring them, teaching them, checking on them.” However ‘entrepreneurialism’ 
should not be confused with enthusiasm or passion, of which there is plenty among individuals working 
in Zambia’s energy technology development research. Rather, entrepreneurialism involves the ability to 
spot commercial opportunities and pursue them in a clear, structured manner, thus being something that 
incorporates human and organisational capacities. Although it was not the main focus of questioning, 
some interviewees volunteered to explain why they thought Zambia lacks a strong entrepreneurial spirit, 
the most common argument being the ‘hangover’ of decades of state-led and planned economy.
On the demand side, the main social or cultural issue raised by stakeholders was the need to convince 
household consumers and small businesses of the benefits of new energy technologies. This issue is most 
easily observed with the uptake of new, more efficient, cook stoves, especially with regard to the high 
capital cost vs. fuel savings, where there appears to be a non-saving culture, combined with a mentality 
that results in consumers accepting high discount rates on energy-related expenditure. Mr. Phiri of RASMA 
Engineering summed up the challenge by stating that “it is difficult to convince people that if they spend 
more money today on something, that it will benefit them in the future…”. While the prospect of distant 
payback periods is also a barrier faced by many RETs in developed countries, the challenge of convincing 
consumers to buy efficient stoves is strong in Zambia where an US$ 8 stove provides a payback time of 
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less than 3 months for a typical family of four. However there are other ‘cultural barriers’ that may be more 
universal to the uptake of new energy technologies, for example efforts to convince rural consumers of the 
benefits of a human waste biomass digester, which hasn’t been successful in Zambia.
When questioned on what had been, in his view, the most significant social or cultural change in energy 
use in the last 10 years, Mr. Tambatamba spoke of the “mushrooming” of efficient cook stove businesses, 
though recognised that these have had mixed successes and a limited market penetration due partly to 
weak demand and relatively low charcoal prices in Zambia. The NTBC has acquired sawdust briquetting 
technology from China however Mr. Tambatamba explained that education and awareness is needed to 
change perceptions of sawdust pellets and was unaware of any SMEs hoping to develop the technology 
in Zambia, as he  was unaware of TDAU or RASMA’s interest in the technology.
Asked whether he believes SMEs a viable means to the development and delivery of clean, modern energy 
products and services, Mr. Imasiku argued that “…yes, they are worthwhile but the barriers need to be 
overcome… more awareness to improve knowledge of energy SME opportunities, so need for greater 
information campaigns. There are also cultural barriers to entrepreneurialism and attitudes to community 
ownership which are equally important but harder to solve”. Similarly, Ngosa of CLEF Energy argued that 
education is the key to changing popular perceptions towards new and renewable energy technologies, 
and compared the challenge in Zambia with the education of school children towards recycling in the UK 
where he observed a powerful cultural shift over the space of a few years. Others referred to the need for 
modern marketing, using mass media, radio, TV etc., to change popular perceptions of energy use and to 
educate consumers on the benefits of energy efficiency and clean energy.
7.3.6 Summary of workshop discussion on barriers in Zambia
The issues listed in the table below are a summary of the main ideas and arguments expressed by the local 
stakeholders that attended the one-day workshop in Lusaka.
Demand-side	issues Supply-side	issues
1 Easy to set up a business in Zambia now, but knowledge of 
relevant processes is required i.e., there is little support for 
those that don’t know how to set up a business
Consumer knowledge is limited 
regarding benefits of investing in 
efficient cook stoves and other clean 
energy solutions
2 Government not proactively supporting entrepreneurs/
SMEs
Consumers very short-sighted: 
prioritise short term costs over 
longer-term gains, i.e., willingness to 
pay for higher fuels costs over capital 
cost of purchasing equipment.
3 Financial sector is largely foreign-owned with low levels of 
trust in lending to local businesses, especially SMEs
Difficulty for rural households 
to secure affordable loans for 
purchasing low/medium cost clean 
energy technologies, including cook 
stoves and SHSs. Microfinance is 
expensive.
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4 Lack of continuity in government policies and programmes 
to support SMEs
5 Possible hangover from past socialist policies/mentalities 
means lack of entrepreneurial spirit in Zambia. There are 
‘trade schools’ in Zambia that promote practical skills but 
mostly geared towards training future business employees
6 Lack of project monitoring and follow-up to ensure 
successful management by funding agencies, NGOs and 
government
7 Lack of coordination and information between market 
players
8 Missing link between research and entrepreneurs 
(examples: the Western province has lots of biomass (cow 
dung) lying around, rotting, when it could be used to fuel a 
biomass generator to supply a mini-grid or IPP connected 
to the grid. Also sawdust waste, e.g., in the Copperbelt 
Province, goes untapped
9 Challenge for energy SMEs to secure affordable loans to 
start or expand business
10 No government targets to drive the support or coordination 
needed to encourage banks to finance energy SMEs
11 Often little incentive to be a businessman in a country 
where ownership (especially in rural areas) is often viewed 
as communal in tribal culture
12 Lack of capacity/resources to identify and develop business 
opportunities
13 Government did have a scheme to provide soft loans to all/
any SMEs but that this was abused, i.e., people often failed 
to pay back
14 Policy is often good but implementation is poor
15 Prevalence of view that government or international aid-
based financing is ‘free money’
16 The government provides import tax breaks for solar PV 
and solar batteries and low-energy lighting. However 
these benefits are only for imported technologies and not 
for materials needed for local manufacturing, such as the 
efficient cook stoves
17 Legislative process is very slow in Zambia
18 Committee to discuss the FIT is slow and ineffective
19 Too much talking, not enough action!
20 Electricity tariff in Zambia is too low, and tariffs follow 
political priorities and not economic sense
21 Lack of capacity in banks and financial institutions to lend 
to energy SMEs. AREED invited banks to learn about the 
sector but their interest has been limited.
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7.3.7 Solutions
A wide-ranging debate over the relevant barriers and solutions was conducted at the Lusaka workshop 
(see annex 11.1.1 for a list of participants). Through open discussion on what actions could/would serve 
to benefit the Zambian energy SMEs sector, the following needs were agreed upon:
1. An energy task force to coordinate energy policy implementation
2. Formation of business associations to represent energy SMEs
3. SME business incubators and/or the institutionalisation of business support and capacity building 
for SMEs
4. Improved awareness at the community and individual levels to empower rural consumers to identify 
energy business opportunities. This should be responsibility of the energy task force and /or pro-
business NGOs like IDE
5. Improved communication, awareness and clarity on market incentives and energy prices in 
Zambia
6. To spread financial risks through sector-specific funds financed by various banks, organised through 
business associations. This would, in turn, lower interest rates and relax repayment terms.
7.4	 Conclusions
In Zambia the concept and practice of energy SMEs has not taken root to the extent that it has in 
other countries involved in the AREED project, with few examples of commercially viable energy SMEs 
in operation. This research has identified a few reasons that appear to explain this outcome, namely: 
the lack of a strong entrepreneurial culture in Zambia; an emphasis placed on supporting strong energy 
business ideas, including innovative technologies, as opposed to supporting strong entrepreneurs; poor 
communication and coordination between technology and business support agencies and individual 
entrepreneurs; and the lack of clear energy policies and targets and state-backed support for SMEs to 
supply the energy market. 
In addition to these factors, the Zambian economy is characterised by capital controls and high interest rates 
that inhibit lending to the SME sector in general, which serves to compound the lack of a demonstration 
effect hoped for by the AREED project to trigger commercial lending to energy SMEs. Nonetheless, 
there is no shortage of entrepreneurs willing to enter the Zambian energy sector, and numerous markets 
and technologies were identified by stakeholders consulted for this research. However, given the strong 
presence of donor-backed programmes offering grants and/or concessionary loans to small businesses in 
Zambia, there is evidence of a ‘dependency syndrome’ that appears to undermine the commercial basis 
for promoting energy SMEs as a concept, and in practice.
Zambia
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In this section we identify the main lessons that can be learned from more than a decade of initiatives to 
support energy SMEs in various countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular focus on the AREED 
project. Here, the overall aim is to analyse our answer to the question “what has changed?”
This research’s focus on the ‘contributing factors’ is a deliberately broader term that incorporates the 
internal ‘success factors’ for energy SMEs, about which much has already been written. Indeed, the 
research findings presented in this report reaffirm most of what has been concluded in previous studies, 
including Kolominskas (2003); Mehlwana (2003); Denton (2006) and Napier-Moore (2006). These studies 
identified the lack of access to affordable finance as the being the predominant, persistent, barrier to 
establishing and scaling up a commercially viable energy SME sector, emphasising the lack of strong 
policy support from governments, poor business skills capacity and the high cost of many RETs as related 
cause-and-effect barriers.
While these issues continue to characterise, to a greater or lesser extent, the energy SMEs sectors in the 
countries studied for this research, it is more relevant to revisit the main assumption behind AREED and 
other donor-backed programmes designed to promote energy SMEs. The assumption is that the solution 
to the aforementioned barriers would be overcome by a ‘demonstration effect’ whereby successful energy 
SMEs, supported by donor-backed programmes, influence the commercial financial sector to invest in 
energy SMEs, thus triggering a virtuous circle of growth and profitability. Experience drawn from a decade 
of AREED support across four of the project countries reveal both the presence (Ghana, Senegal) and 
absence, or weak presence, of this demonstration effect (Tanzania, Zambia). This is a central question, and 
one which was not the focus of previous research, presumably because the answer was not fully apparent 
prior to 2006 when the last substantial work was conducted.
Where there is an absence, or weak presence, of a demonstration effect a number of explanatory factors 
can be identified. These include, inter alia, the lack of an entrepreneurial culture; an SME ‘dependency 
syndrome’ perpetuated by grant-based support from governments and donor agencies; persistent 
shortcomings in business skills capacity; lack of clearly defined markets; demand-side barriers to purchase 
relatively high capital-intense energy products.
Where numerous energy SMEs are in operation and thus where a valid demonstration effect can be 
identified, there is a perceived paradox that serves to undermine commercial interest in investing in energy 
SMEs. The paradox is that the donor-supported businesses that were issued with concessional and/or 
flexible loans serve to demonstrate that these businesses depend upon such concessional terms, i.e., that 
they could not survive in ‘the real world’.  While this assumption is widely regarded as self-evident by private 
investors, there are in fact other, more concrete, factors that act to undermine the demonstration effect. 
These include, inter alia, relatively high transaction costs of investing in SMEs; the inherently complicated 
nature of energy sector SMEs with longer supply chains and slower pay-back periods for capital-intensive 
technologies such as solar PV; rigid rules regarding the need to secure collateral.
8. Overall conclusions and ‘lessons 
learned’
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These factors can be understood as structural issues that conspire to increase the financial risk of investing 
in energy SMEs and thus are not the product of ignorance on the behalf of the banking sector, which was 
assumed to be case (hence the need for a demonstration effect) by donor-backed programmes such as 
AREED. In the countries studied for this research, these factors are compounded by the high opportunity 
costs for banks where higher rates of return can be secured from investing in high-turnover businesses, 
for example those trading in high-volume, perishable goods. There is also a more general challenge faced 
by a range of SME entrepreneurs where such individuals and businesses are considered by banks to have 
an inherently higher risk profile, a factor which, to some extent, appears to be the product of ‘anti-SME’ 
discrimination, where investors favour larger corporate players operating under licence, often backed by 
strong branding, reputation and/or political connections.
To summarise: while ignorance of the energy sector doubtless continues to drive commercial apprehension 
in investing in energy SMEs, there are compelling structural reasons expressed by stakeholders that serve 
to perpetuate the development catch-22 that programmes such as AREED aimed to overcome. In the light 
of these analytical insights, it is useful to appraise N’Guessan’s (2009) review of AREED project summarised 
in section 2.1.1 which identified the need to “remove financial barriers to energy SMEs” and“focus on 
removing institutional barriers”. The review also recommended that countries set up a “National Steering 
Committee to ensure the follow-up and involvement of local parties (both private and public)”, targeting 
the energy SME sector, and the “need for further national capacity building”. While these issues reflect, 
on an abstract level, the reality of the challenge in promoting energy SMEs,a more concrete summary of 
the facts better serves to illustrate ‘what has changed’ (and what has not changed) in the decade since 
AREED was established.
Here, one major point concerns the role of government. There is a predominant view among stakeholders, 
across the countries studied, that governments are ineffective in designing and implementing tangible 
support for energy SMEs, despite politicians often providing strong rhetorical support. This point highlights 
an important status quo, and an issue that was itself one of the key rationales behind supporting energy 
SMEs in the first place, i.e., to by-pass government in efforts to supply sustainable energy technologies 
to low income consumers by supporting SMEs. However, early experience with the practical challenge of 
supporting energy SMEs led observers, including Denton (2006) and Napier-Moore (2006), to consider the 
role and importance of an ‘enabling framework’ necessary for energy SMEs to function and thrive. While 
this issue would appear to present itself as a chicken-and-egg dilemma, the research findings presented 
here from Senegal, and to a lesser extent with Ghana’s LPG market, do suggest that conducive economic 
and regulatory conditions are a prerequisite for scaling up the commercial success of energy SMEs. At the 
same time, one of the well-understood success factors for specific energy SMEs is the head start given 
to relatively mature technologies that are reliable, easy to understand and suitable for local distribution, 
thus presenting a ‘low-hanging fruit’ opportunity for SMEs. LPG and fuel efficient cook stoves are the 
obvious technologies that have proven to be most commercially viable, and indeed the failure to conduct 
in-depth market testing for energy products and services has been a major cause of commercial failure for 
otherwise well organised and motivated SMEs.
A major geographical outcome is that energy SMEs continue to mostly operate in, and supply, urban and 
peri-urban markets. As such, programmes (including AREED) that were originally intended to address 
the rural market, where traditional fuel use accounts for major social and environmental impacts, have 
largely failed. This is due to low levels of entrepreneurial capacity, higher transaction costs for supplying a 
dispersed rural market, and demand-side barriers for capital-intensive RETs. However this market focus 
is not unique to the energy sector and entrepreneurial talents and opportunities tend to dominate in urban 
areas, across all sectors. 
Overall conclusions and ‘lessons learned’
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Another key outcome, following at least a decade of targeted support to energy SMEs, is the predominant 
focus on an SME’s bottom line, promoted both by EDS programmes, donor and government policies 
which reveals a myopic emphasis on profit as the greatest force for good, as opposed to strategic, 
coordinated, investment in local human and manufacturing production capacity which could have more 
valuable development implications. The government’s and donor’s prioritisation of ‘private profitability at 
all costs’ would appear to miss an opportunity, especially in cases where local resources and skills are 
available for the manufacture of low-tech products that are otherwise imported. However, this observation 
comes up against the previously-identified dilemma regarding the evident difficulty that governments have 
in shaping the enabling framework for a specific sector or market, which is understood to be a key requisite 
for success.
When considering ‘what has changed’, it is necessary to reflect upon the context in which energy SMEs 
operate, i.e., to ask whether the SME model continues, in theory and in practice, to be an appropriate 
means of supplying modern, clean and sustainable energy. In the case of Ghana, a country with relatively 
high levels of grid electrification and rising incomes, it is apparent that the energy sector is changing. There 
is a greater need for larger MW-scale energy solutions and mini-grids, which in the foreseeable future is 
likely to render obsolete the kind of technologies typically supplied by SMEs, such as solar lanterns.
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It is useful to briefly reflect upon the methodology adopted for this research, both for the sake of assessing 
this report and for the benefit of future research. A qualitative approach, based on the ‘outcome harvesting’ 
methodology, was chosen because it enabled a detailed identification of the key contributing factors 
in the outcomes of specific energy SMEs documented in the country chapters. Here we understand 
‘contributions’ as feasible claims made by stakeholders in influencing, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
identified outcome.  As such, these are essentially stories told by individuals about ‘who did what’ and so 
cannot be measured, documented or understood by quantitative methods. 
However, in order to ensure that the outcome harvesting methodology is applied as scientifically as 
possible, it has to be conducted under similar conditions, and consistently. Here, practical and time 
constraints during the fieldwork undermined a full and honest application of the methodology. Specifically, 
it proved difficult in some of the workshops to secure full descriptions of individual businesses, and the 
main contributions to their operations,during the half a day that was available for this task and so, in some 
cases, partial primary data had to be substituted by secondary data collection. Furthermore, conducting 
an ‘Outcome Harvesting by Consensus’ proved more successful in the workshops where there was a 
diversity of participants,informed and able to discuss specific businesses (Zambia and Tanzania), and 
was less effective in the workshops where there were fewer participants and/or a less diverse mix of 
participants able to counter-balance individuals’ claims and stories (Ghana and Senegal).
In terms of future research, the findings presented in this report cover a broad range of issues, both with 
regard to the ‘success factors’ for the internal functioning of specific energy SMEs, and to the role and 
importance of the enabling framework within which they operate. However it is clear that the relationship 
between energy sector entrepreneurs and the financial sector remains of fundamental importance, as 
the lack of affordable finance is understood to be the principle barrier to energy SME sector expansion. 
Specifically, given the apparent lack of impact of the demonstration effects created by the numerous 
commercially viable energy SMEs operating in Ghana and Senegal (less so in Tanzania and Zambia), a more 
systematic investigation of what would motivate commercial banks to invest in energy SMEs is justified, 
expanding on the issues identified in this report. To a large extent this gap in the knowledge reflects the fact 
that too few interviews were conducted with representatives of the banking sector for this research. There 
could also be value in conducting a more focused study to document the ongoing performance of specific 
energy SMEs, with more than 5 years of experience, to assess changes over time. This could take the 
form of a survey-based study to provide quantitative data on market growth and performance that would 
complement the key contributing factors and market barriers identified in this report. 
9. Reflections on the methodology and 
future research
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11.1	 Workshop	participants
11.1.1  Zambia workshop, Lusaka, 11th September 2012
1 Lilian Zulu CEEEZ
2 Dominic Mbewe CEEEZ
3 Nancy Serenje CEEEZ
4 Kenneth Chelemu International Development Enterprises (IDE)
5 Noole Mass Zengo
6 Bright Chalwe National Technology Business Centre
7 John Mboozi National Technology Business Centre
8 Rashid Phiri Rasma Engineering
9 Bernard Lusale Micro Bankers Trust
10 Mary Chiluba Farmer entrepreneur (Kafue district)
11 Verelia Banda Farmer entrepreneur (Kafue district)
12 Lufunda Muzeya Ministry of Energy and Water Developmebt . Dept. of Energy
13 Lazarus Chewe Dread and Works Enterprise
14 Mulambwa Imasiku TDAU (Technology Development Advisory Unity - University of Zambia)
15 Chanda Banda Sylva Food Solutions
16  Satnam Virdy University of Zambia/Solartech
17  Leah Banda Rural Electrification Authority
18  Chilumba Ngosa CLEF Africa Energy Ltd.
19  Kaila Geoffrey Muhanya Solar Ltd.
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11.1.2  Tanzania workshop, Dar es Salaam, 18th September 2012
1 Mr. Imanuel Muro E+Co Energy through Enterprise
2 Joseph Ndunguru Twiga Bancorp Limited
3 Maimuna Itanisa Twiga Bancorp Limited
4 Debora Kiwale TUJIJENGE Tanzania
5 Anna Mulalo TUJIJENGE Tanzania
6 Gabriel Landa Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF)
7 Aluti Myenza IMED
8 Mr. S. J. Mwambije ENVOTEC Service Ltd.
9 Klaus Winkler Tanzania Renewable Energy Association  (TAREA)
10 Oscar Lema Alternative Energy Limited
11 Filbert Shoo - Manager Sustainable Energy Enterprise Company (SEECO)
12 Mr. Mzumbe Musa RESCO
13 Eng. Hamisi Mikate ENSOL Tanzania limited
14 E. N. Sawe TaTEDO
15 Lilian Njuu TaTEDO
16 Editruda Daulinge TaTEDO
17 Shima Sago TaTEDO
18 John Kirigiti CLAPHIJO Ltd.
19 Clara A. Ibihya CLAPHIJO Ltd.
 
11.1.3  Ghana workshop, 25th September 2012
1 Albert O. Boateng E+Co, Ghana
2 Mark Ofori Kwafo Ecobank Ghana Limited
3 Moses O Nyamekye Ghana Microfinance Institutions Network (GHAMFIN)
4 Omane Frimpong CEO, Wilkins Engineering
5 Mr. Seth Mahu Ministry of Energy
6 Kofi Asante CEO, ICR Engineering
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7 Frank Yeboah Dadzie ARB APEX Bank
8 Foster Adu-Dartey Impact Energies, Ghana
9 Ishmael Edjekumhene KITE
10 Charles Owusu Boateng  KITE
  
11.1.4  Senegal workshop, 2nd October 2012
1 Soda Ndongo Ministère de l’industrie de l’artisanat et des PME
2 Papa Macodou Sall Agence de Développement et d’Encadrement des Petites et Moyennes 
   Entreprises (ADEPME) 
3 Bamba Fall GVEP international
4 Adam Nodji Bob LA MAISON SOLAIRE
5 Lamine Ndour SIFFS
6 Daniel Vidal SAEB
7 Assane Dieng KAYER
8 Mamadou Sow Bourse Nationale de la sous traitance (BNSTP)
9 Mageye Ndiaye Bureau de mise à niveau (BMN)
10 El hadji Mbaye Diagne Comité National Changement Climatique (COMNAC)
11 Abdoulaye BA COSEER (Compagnie Sahélienne en Energie renouvelable)
12 Ndongo Guye Afric Building Services
13 Secou Sarr ENDA
14 Jean pascal corréa ENDA
15 Mamadou Cisse ENDA
11.2	 Interview	questions	for	country	stakeholder	experts/entrepreneurs
1. Is there really a need for or market for energy SMEs? To what extent are they the solution to providing 
access to modern energy technologies?
2. What kind of energy technologies or services are best delivered by SMEs?
3. Do you think there is more awareness, understanding and appreciation of energy SMEs in your 
country now then 12 years ago? 
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4. Do you think it’s easier for an entrepreneur to get a commercial loan for setting up or expanding an 
energy SMEs? 
5. How, and to what extent, have various energy SME programmes influenced national energy policies 
to incorporate support for SMEs?
6. What is the ‘enabling framework’ for energy SMEs in your country? Has this changed?
7. To what extent have the businesses supported by the programmes enabled a transfer and/or 
diffusion of sustainable energy technologies, either in a North-South direction, or South-South, 
including within and between African countries?
8. To what extent were the respective roles of the various social actors and ‘change agents’ involved 
in these programmes properly defined and understood by everyone involved?
9. To what extent did AREED and other programmes effectively engage with the local financial sector 
to promote increased awareness and understanding, aimed at eventual commercial loans for energy 
SMEs? If so, how?
10. Have small scale energy SMEs significantly influenced the national energy access policy in the target 
countries? Did/have international projects effectively engage with national governments in order to 
promote/scale up the concept of energy SMEs? If so, how?
11. How did/does AREED relate to similar activities operating in XXX, for example E+Co, GVEP, Shell 
Foundation? Did AREED cooperate or compete with these initiatives, or operate in isolation from 
them? Has there been any sharing of information between the programmes?
Questions	for	entrepreneurs
1. Did your business benefit for EED support?
2. Why did you approach AREED/GVEP for support when setting up?
3. What this EED support useful/relevant?
4. Did you try to secure commercial bank support first? If not, why not? If yes, what happened?
5. Do you still see a market for energy SMEs? What are the barriers/limitations?
6. Can you still make money from energy SMEs? If yes, what technologies or markets are best?
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11.3	 Interviews	conducted	for	this	research	(Sept-Oct	2012)
  Name Position Organisation Place Date
1 Mrs. Chiluba Farmer Farmer
Shimabala, 
Kafue District
12-09-2012
2 Mrs. Ngulube Farmer Farmer
Shimabala, 
Kafue District
12-09-2012
3 Rashid Phiri Entreprenuer Rasma Engineering Lusaka 12-09-2012
4 Mulambwa Imasiku Director
TDAU (Technology 
Development Advisory 
Unity - University of 
Zambia)
Lusaka 12-09-2012
5
Mukombo 
Tambatamba 
Director
National Technology 
Business Centre
Lusaka 13-09-2012
6 Hector Banda Chairman Sylva Catering Lusaka 13-09-2012
7 Bernard Lusale
Financial 
Services 
Programme 
Coordinator
Micro Bankers Trust Lusaka 13-09-2012
8 Chilumba Ngosa
Managing 
Director
CLEF Africa Energy Ltd. Lusaka 13-09-2012
9 Kaila Geoffrey
Managing 
Director
Muhanya Solar Ltd. Lusaka 13-09-2012
10 Charles Mulenga
Assistant 
Director
Department of Energy Lusaka 14-09-2012
11 Kenneth Chelemu
Technical 
Director
International 
Development Enterprises 
(IDE)
Lusaka 14-09-2012
12 Musa Mzumbe
Managing 
Director
RESCO Dar es Salaam 19-09-2012
13 S. J. Mwambije Director ENVOTEC Service Ltd. Dar es Salaam 19-09-2012
14
Lutengano 
Mwakahesya
Director General Rural Energy Agency Dar es Salaam 19-09-2012
15 Joseph Ndunguru
Head of 
Investment-
Banking
Twiga Bancorp Limited Dar es Salaam 20-09-2012
16 Gabriel Landa Funds Manager
Tanzania Private Sector 
Foundation (TPSF)
Dar es Salaam 20-09-2012
17 Filbert Shoo Manager
Sustainable Energy 
Enterprise Company 
(SEECO)
Dar es Salaam 20-09-2012
18 Oscar Lema
Managing 
Director
Alternative Energy 
Tanzania Ltd.
Kibaha 21-09-2012
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  Name Position Organisation Place Date
19 Aluti Myenza
Trainer/
Consultant
Institute of Management 
and Entrepreneurship 
Development
Dar es Salaam 21-09-2012
20 Albert Kwaw Eliason
Country 
Manager
International Finance 
Corporation/Lighting 
Africa 
Accra 24-09-2012
21 Boniface Taylor
Technical 
Director
Windfield Engineering Accra 26-09-2012
22 Omane Frimpong CEO Wilkins Engineering Accra 26-09-2012
23 Frank Atta-Owusu
Services 
Manager
Samsung Accra 27-09-2012
24 Kofi Duose
Operations 
Manager
Anasset LPG Accra 27-09-2012
25 Clara Koranteng Owner M38 LPG Accra 27-09-2012
26 William Aye-Addo 
Managing 
Director
Syscom Energy Ltd. Tema 27-09-2012
27 Moustapha Ndiaye
Head of admin 
and finance
Fondation Sen'Finances Dakar 03-10-2012
28 Issa Diop
Head of 
Investment
Banque Regionale du 
Solidarité
Dakar 03-10-2012
29 Mor Kassé
Deputy Director 
General
African Electric 
Manufactures
Dakar 03-10-2012
30 Luis Seck
Ex-Minister 
of Renewable 
Energy (2010-
12)
Ephata Global Energie 
et Environnement 
Consulting
Dakar 04-10-2012
31 Ousmane Fall Sarr
Head of Studies 
and Information 
System Unit
ASER Dakar 04-10-2012
32 Aliou Lo Director Lobbougas Dakar 04-10-2012
33 Mamadou Saliou Sow Director General
SPEC (Sustainable 
Power Electric Company)
Dakar 05-10-2012
34 Bamba Fall
ESME (Energy 
SMEs) West 
Africa Manager
GVEP International Dakar 05-10-2012
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11.4	 Small	and	Medium-sized	Enterprises	(SMEs)
Definitions of SMEs vary from country to country, according to the size of the economy, the structure of its 
corporate sector and any relevant policy frameworks. However, SMEs are most often defined by the total 
number of employees, total investment and sales turnover. In Europe, the European Commission defines a 
‘micro enterprise’ as one with less than 10 employees and either a turnover or a balance sheet total of up 
to €2 million. A ‘small enterprise’ has less than 50 employees and either a turnover or a balance sheet total 
of up to €10 million and a ‘medium-sized’ enterprise is defined as one with less than 250 employees and 
either a turnover of up to €50 million or a balance sheet total of up to €43 million (European Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361). 
Many academics refute the use of purely quantitative measures for the definition of an SME, instead 
choosing to emphasise a company’s organisation and behavioural characteristics, such as their degree of 
legal independence, small-scale decentralisation, generally flatter organisational hierarchy, higher degree of 
informality, smaller market power and lower level of technological sophistication (Biggs 2002; Senderovitz 
2009; Brytting 1991). Storey (1994) elaborates on these qualitative definitions of SMEs, identifying key 
economic characteristics such as owning a small share of the market, the inability to influence price levels, 
a limited customer base and the general lack of performance monitoring. Further, control of SMEs tends 
to be the responsibility of just one or two people and provide products and services that are marginally 
different than those of larger firms, and SMEs are less likely to undertake research and development than 
larger firms or undergo significant structural change.
According to the African Economic Outlook for 2005, a qualitative definition of SMEs based on the profile 
of the individual entrepreneurs and their strategy is more relevant and useful than purely quantitative 
criteria, when analysing African economies. Here, ‘micro enterprises’ are defined as family businesses that 
use simple technology and perform activities for the subsistence of the enterprise, i.e., the family. ‘Small 
enterprises’ are those whose owners possess some managerial and specific technical skills. They may rely 
on family members but they are usually registered, pay taxes and may even participate in a professional 
organisation. ‘Medium-sized enterprises’ involve substantial working capital, specific technology and 
therefore a medium to long-term vision on the part of the entrepreneurs. Such medium-sized firms are 
mostly formalised and pay regular taxes (AfDB and OECD 2005). Within the African context, the definition 
of an SME also greatly varies, with basic quantitative definitions varying significantly between countries.
Defining	organisation Definition
African Development Bank Max. 50 employees
Gov. of Ghana Max. 100 employees
Gov. of Tanzania Max. 20 employees
Gov. of Malawi Max. 50 employees
Source: Gibson, 2008
A study conducted by Calice et al. (2012) in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia found that 69% of 
banks in the surveyed countries defined SMEs solely in economic terms where size of loan and company 
turnover are the key criteria. Only 19% of banks in the sample considered number of employees when 
lending to SMEs. 
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11.4.1  Contribution of SMEs to economic growth
In many developing countries, SMEs constitute a significant portion of the national economy. Therefore, 
much effort has been focussed on SME development as a means to fostering economic growth that is 
more labour-intensive, entrepreneurial and com petitive (Ayyagari et al 2007). In the Republic of Congo, nearly 
80 percent of enterprises employ less than five people. In Kenya, SMEs collectively employ around 3.2 
million people and contributed about 18 per cent of total GDP in 2003. In Nigeria, SMEs account for 95 
percent of the enterprises in the organised manufacturing sector and around 70 percent of industrial 
employment. In Morocco, SMEs account for 93 percent of total enterprises, 38 percent of production, 33 
percent of investment, 30 percent of exports and 46 percent employment. Even in South Africa – a more 
developed economy – micro and very small enterprises accounted for over 55 percent of total employment 
and 22 percent of GDP in 2003 whereas small enterprises accounted for 16 percent of both employment 
and production and medium and large firms accounted for 26 percent of employment and 62 percent of 
production (AfDB and OECD 2005).
From a survey of 47,475 enterprises in 99 developing countries in the period between 2006-2010, Ayyagari 
et al. (2011) found SMEs to be the biggest contributors to employment, with firms of 5-250 employees 
employing a median of 66.38% of the total permanent, full-time employment. Enterprises that are younger 
than 2 years were found to represent only a mean of 6.75% of employment, while enterprises that were 
older than 10 years represented at least 48.12% of total employment in low income countries. It was found 
that SMEs with 5-99 employees and more than 10 years old have the largest proportional share of total 
employment compared to other size-age groupings. SMEs with less than 250 employees were also found 
to produce the most new jobs, with the median country generating 86.01% of new jobs over the studied 
period (Ayyagari et al 2011).
Tadesse (2009) maintains that the relatively low capital needs of SMEs foster an ‘efficient use’ of capital, 
which they highlight is a high-cost factor of production in most developing coun tries. They even make the 
case that SMEs are inherently more sustainable to the extent that they tend to make use of available local 
resources, i.e., local suppliers and customers, mi nimising transport needs (Tadesse 2009).
Some academics claim that SMEs have other advantages over their large-scale competitors in that they 
are able to adapt more easily to market conditions given their generally broadly skilled technologies and 
flexible organisation, meaning they can better withstand adverse economic conditions (Kayanula and 
Quartey, 2000). Since SMEs are generally more labour intensive than larger firms they therefore have lower 
capital costs associated with job creation (Anheier and Seibel, 1987; Liedholm and Mead, 1987; Schmitz, 
1995). By the same logic they are more likely to succeed in smaller urban centres and rural areas, where 
they can contribute to a more even distribution of economic activity in a region and can help to slow the 
flow of migration to large cities. Due to the regional dispersion of SMEs and their labour intensity it is 
argued that small-scale production units can promote a more equitable distribution of income than large 
firms, although this claim is made without empirical basis (Kayanula and Quartey, 2000; Abor and Quartey 
2010).
11.4.2 Financing SMEs in Africa
The lack of access to affordable finance is often cited as the most significant barrier to the establishment 
and expansion of SMEs in Africa, especially for businesses operating in new or relatively unknown sectors, 
including energy products and services (Denton, 2006; Mehlwana, 2003).
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Using data from the World Bank’s Enterprise Survey which covered 13,685 companies14 across 38 
sub-Saharan countries, Kuntchev et al. (2012) categorised enterprises into four categories: ‘fully credit 
constrained’, ‘partially credit constrained’, ‘maybe credit constrained’ and ‘not credit constrained’. 
According to this categorisation, Kuntchev et al. (2012) found that among small firms, 28.8% are fully credit 
constrained, 30.3% are partially constrained, 10.9% are maybe constrained and 30.5% are not credit 
constrained. Among medium firms, 15.4% are fully credit constrained, 27.3% are partially constrained, 
21.2% are maybe constrained and 36.1% are not credit constrained. Among large firms, 10.1% are fully 
credit constrained, 19.5% are partially constrained, 29.2% are maybe constrained and 41.2% are not 
credit constrained. 
Given the fundamental importance of finance in the setting up and running of SMEs, it is useful to distinguish 
the main sources of external finance. For the purchase of fixed assets (capital goods) there are two main 
types of finance: equity (where the investor buys a share of the company value) and debt financing. Debt 
financing can be divided up into 3 types: formal debt financing which includes banks and other financial 
institutions; trade finance which includes obtaining credit from suppliers or customers and; informal credit 
from family, friends and moneylenders.
Using the World Bank Enterprise Survey data, Kuntchev et al. (2012) found that of the small businesses 
in sub-Saharan Africa that obtained external financing, 6.3% took the form of equity, 48.5% was formal 
external debt, 17.4% semi-formal financing and 27.8% informal financing. As can be seen in table 3 
(below) the share of formal external borrowing increases as the size of the companies increase, with the 
levels of informal financing falling to 7.8% for large companies. As Kuntchev et al. (2012) point out SMEs 
in sub-Saharan Africa rely much more on trade credit and informal sources of financing than businesses in 
other regions. Kauffmann (2005) characterises this high reliance on informal borrowing as unpredictable, 
insecure and offers little scope for risk sharing due to a local, regional or sector-based focus for lending.
The reasons for the high level of informal financing are not necessarily clear or obvious and vary between 
countries and sectors, and hence this issue forms one of the lines of enquiry in this research. However, 
Kauffman (2005) highlights that formal financial institutions in sub-Saharan Africa are generally less willing 
to lend to SMEs due to the high risk of default, insufficient competition, poor guarantees and a lack of 
information about SME’s ability to repay loans (Kauffmann, 2005). Furthermore the financial sector in 
most African countries remains underdeveloped, shareholding is not commonly practiced and long-term 
commercial financing is virtually unheard of for SMEs. As such it is often left to non-banking intermediaries 
such as microcredit lending to ‘fill the gap’ in financing for African SMEs, however such intermediaries are 
limited in their ability to support customers when they expand (Kauffmann, 2005).
14 From this sample 8,612 companies were classified as ‘small’ with less than 20 employees, 3,682 were classified as ‘medium’ 
with 20 to 99 employees and 1,391 were classified as ‘large’ with more than 100 employees.
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11.4.2.1 Table 1: Percentage of firms by level of credit constraint
Region Firm	size NCC MCC PCC FCC
Sub-Saharan Africa All firms 32.2% 14.1% 29.1% 24.6% 
SME100 31.8% 13.2% 29.6% 25.4% 
SME250 31.9% 13.7% 29.4% 25.0% 
SME500 32.0% 14.0% 29.2% 24.8% 
East Asia and Pacific All firms 44.2% 19.0% 11.8% 24.9% 
SME100 44.4% 18.0% 12.2% 25.5% 
SME250 44.2% 18.8% 11.8% 25.2% 
SME500 44.1% 18.9% 11.8% 25.1% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia All firms 41.3% 31.0% 18.1% 9.5% 
SME100 42.1% 29.3% 18.6% 10.1% 
SME250 41.8% 30.2% 18.3% 9.7% 
SME500 41.5% 30.7% 18.2% 9.5% 
Latin America and Caribbean All firms 42.0% 26.7% 21.9% 9.4% 
SME100 42.3% 25.2% 22.5% 10.0% 
SME250 42.4% 25.8% 22.1% 9.7% 
SME500 42.3% 26.2% 22.0% 9.6% 
Middle East and North Africa All firms 41.6% 3.7% 20.9% 33.7% 
SME100 41.9% 3.5% 20.6% 34.0% 
SME250 41.7% 3.5% 21.0% 33.7% 
SME500 41.7% 3.5% 21.0% 33.8% 
South Asia All firms 43.0% 18.6% 16.2% 22.3% 
SME100 43.3% 17.8% 16.3% 22.6% 
SME250 43.0% 18.4% 16.3% 22.3% 
SME500 43.1% 18.5% 16.1% 22.3%
NCC: Not credit constrained; MCC: Maybe credit constrained; Partially credit constrained; Fully credit constrained 
Note: SME100 reference firms with fewer than 100 employees, SME250 reference firms with fewer than 250 employees, 
and SME500 references firms with fewer than 500 employees. Countries are group per region according to the World 
Bank classification.
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11.4.2.2  Table 2: Credit constrained status across firm sizes
Region Firm	size NCC MCC PCC FCC
Sub-Saharan Africa small(<20) 30.5% 10.9% 30.3% 28.3% 
medium(20-99) 36.1% 21.2% 27.3% 15.4% 
large(>=100) 41.2% 29.2% 19.5% 10.1% 
East Asia and Pacific small(<20) 46.5% 14.9% 11.0% 27.7% 
medium(20-99) 42.8% 23.9% 12.6% 20.7% 
large(>=100) 41.6% 41.3% 4.4% 12.7% 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia small(<20) 43.9% 24.7% 19.5% 11.9% 
medium(20-99) 38.4% 37.3% 17.8% 6.5% 
large(>=100) 34.5% 47.4% 14.5% 3.7% 
Latin America and Caribbean small(<20) 43.4% 22.1% 23.8% 10.7% 
medium(20-99) 40.0% 30.6% 21.5% 7.9% 
large(>=100) 42.2% 38.0% 14.9% 4.9% 
Middle East and North Africa small(<20) 41.4% 1.6% 21.0% 36.0% 
medium(20-99) 47.0% 22.9% 16.4% 13.7% 
large(>=100) 30.5% 16.9% 36.1% 16.6% 
South Asia small(<20) 43.1% 15.8% 16.6% 24.5% 
medium(20-99) 45.5% 25.6% 14.3% 14.6% 
large(>=100) 35.2% 33.6% 17.2% 14.0% 
Notes: Countries are group per region according to the World Bank classification. In the Middle East and North 
Africa only the Republic of Yemen is included due to lack of data. The size classification is as follows: small – 5 to 19 
employees; medium – 20 to 99 employees; large – 100 and above employees.
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11.4.2.3 Table 3: Sources of external financing for the purchase of fixed assets
Region Equity	external	
financing
Equity	
external	
financing
Formal	
external	
debt
Semi-
formal	
financing
Informal	
financing
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
small(<20) 6.3 48.5 17.4 27.8 
medium(20-99) 6.4 59.1 21.2 13.3 
large(>=100) 7.8 71.1 13.3 7.8 
East Asia and 
Pacific
small(<20) 18.7 53.1 9.6 18.5 
medium(20-99) 16.6 59.1 9.4 14.9 
large(>=100) 14.6 74.3 8.3 2.8 
Eastern Europe 
and Central Asia
small(<20) 68.4 N/A 31.6 N/A 
medium(20-99) 57.7 N/A 42.3 N/A 
large(>=100) 60.0 N/A 40.0 N/A 
Latin America 
and Caribbean
small(<20) 18.7 49.7 23.5 8.2 
medium(20-99) 11.6 60.6 21.9 5.9 
large(>=100) 9.4 74.4 13.8 2.5 
Middle East and 
North Africa
small(<20) 0.0 N/A 67.8 32.2 
medium(20-99) 28.6 N/A 66.9 4.6 
large(>=100) 5.3 N/A 94.7 0.0 
South Asia
small(<20) 27.5 69.9 1.8 0.8 
medium(20-99) 24.1 72.7 3.0 0.2 
large(>=100) 20.1 74.6 4.9 0.4 
(Kuntchev et al 2012)
11.4.3 Government support and ‘enabling frameworks’
While SMEs dominate economic activity in most sub-Saharan African countries, the explicit business 
policy and regulatory frameworks developed by governments tend to focus on supporting large corporate-
driven economic development. In many African countries the challenge is to diversify the economic and 
administrative support towards SMEs in addition to the large-scale industrial development pursued in the 
post-colonial decades (Späth, 1992). A review of existing literature on the topic suggests that a number of 
pre-existing conditions are necessary to support SME development, including:
• A stable macroeconomic environment, including rational interest rates, tight control over inflation 
and competitive exchange rates
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• A pro-business trade regime that minimises import restrictions (including tax waivers for targeted 
imports of strategic value to domestic business) and favours a gradual reduction in import tariffs 
• Incentives to save and direct savings into investments such as a lower tax rate on initial profits that 
allows firms to retain more earnings
• Reforms to simplify and minimise the cost of business registration and formalisation, including 
decentralised administration
• Targeted policies that facilitate business transactions such as infrastructure development
Beyond establishing the correct macroeconomic and industry-specific settings, effective government support 
for SMEs also requires public agencies to perform a facilitating and mediating role between the main interest 
groups in order to overcome the range of non-financial barriers that exist at the sector level. This can include 
awareness raising activities, information sharing and simple communication of ideas and opportunities of 
mutual interest to SMEs and their consumers. Such activities constitute the intangible assets of human 
capacity necessary to make markets work, beyond the more easily measured financial barriers.
Other functions that can and should be performed by governments to support SMEs and their markets 
concern regulations aimed at levelling the playing field between businesses, including product testing and 
certification to ensure quality control. In defining quality control and certification governments can also 
support local SMEs that would otherwise face stiff competition from low-cost and low-quality imported 
goods.
11.4.3.1  Government Financing
Some African Governments, such as in Kenya and Ghana, have attempted to remedy the lack of access 
to finance for SMEs by supporting the growth of smaller commercial banks and rural banks, so as to bring 
traditional banks and SMEs closer, both geographically and business-wise. In 2005 South Africa passed 
two laws to encourage the expansion of savings and loan institutions (so-called second-tier banks) and co-
operative banks (third-tier banks) as well as deregulating the banking sector to allow for more flexible terms 
on loans to SMEs. In many African countries commercial banks, mostly under pressure from governments, 
are also setting up their own micro-credit services, targeting at SMEs (Kauffmann 2005).
Governments can also intervene more directly in the financing of SMEs through the provision of subsidised 
credit facilities or guarantees that can either be managed by commercial banks to encourage the lending 
with more flexible (soft) repayment conditions and lower interest rates, or directly by a government agency 
responsible for supporting SMEs and/or a particular business sector. The need to steer available funding 
towards SMEs has been a perennial challenge, and one which requires clear and consistent support from 
governments (ECA, 2002).
11.4.4  Key Non-Financial Success Factors for African SMEs
In its study ‘Enhancing the Competitiveness of Small and Medium Enterprises in Africa’, the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) (2002) identified other key success factors – either internal or 
external to SMEs – that are most relevant to the African context. While these factors are generic and 
cross-sectoral, they are relevant and fundamental issues that provide a useful starting point for informing 
the analysis energy SMEs for this research:
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1. Technological capabilities and education
2. Marketing capabilities
3. Clusters, network and expansion
11.4.4.1  Technological Capabilities
The UN-ECA defines technological capabilities for SMEs as the “knowledge, skills and efforts required 
for firms to bring about an indigenous process of technological development” as a means to increase 
business productivity and innovation. In concrete terms, this refers to the implementation of quality controls, 
production scheduling, preventive maintenance and improving established technologies or creating new 
technologies (ECA, 2002). 
The ECA quotes research carried out in Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe that shows the most technologically 
advanced, productive and competitive SMEs are those run by well-educated entrepreneurs who, more often 
than not, inherited entrepreneurial knowledge and skills from their families or from employment experience 
and/or working abroad. Further, it was found that the entrepreneurs of well-performing companies in these 
three African countries paid higher salaries and spent more resources on training than the other companies 
(ECA 2002).
11.4.4.2   Marketing Capabilities
Marketing is an essential capability for all businesses, but one that is often lacking among otherwise 
well-managed SMEs in less developed countries. This includes the establishment of a marketing channel 
from production to the buyer, either through direct sales or retailers; organising relevant and economical 
logistics, i.e., transport of goods to market; branding and advertising and after sales services. The ECA 
(2002) argues that these issues have traditionally received less attention from policymakers and researchers 
alike, where the emphasis has been improving product design and manufacturing. The ECA report argues 
that the importance of product marketing is most acute for businesses aiming to export their products, 
however in an increasingly open global market place even SMEs aiming to supply only the local market 
need to improve their marketing capabilities given that they are often forced to compete with imported 
goods which often come highly packaged, advertised and connected to a local distribution network.
11.4.4.3   Clusters, networks and expansion
Business clustering, i.e., the sector-specific and/or spatial concentration of small enterprises, has been 
studied in various contexts and there is a consensus regarding their potential benefits. These include 
the creation of positive externalities, inter-firm cooperation and a focal point for targeted policy support. 
McCormick (1999) argues that clustering can be of particular value to less developed countries as they 
enable risk sharing between businesses and the pooling of limited capital and entrepreneurial skills within a 
defined space and infrastructure. However cases from around the world show that clusters tend to achieve 
significant growth only where trade networks are built up to connect production to markets, and where 
intangible assets such as high levels of trust are key to sustaining mutually beneficial relations between 
businesses operating in the same market (Brautigam, 1997; Knorringa, 1996).
In Africa business clusters have developed, but with mixed success. McCormick (1999) documents cases 
such as Ghana’s metalwork cluster in Suame and South Africa’s clothing cluster in Western Cape as having 
led to positive externalities for SMEs, namely access to markets, labour market pooling and technological 
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learning. Less successful cases include Nairobi’s garment cluster in Eastlands and the metalworking 
cluster in Kamukunji which developed weak linkages and few technological spillovers (ECA, 2002). Various 
explanations are put forward to account for these differing outcomes, including the observed tendency 
for clusters that are limited to supplying local markets to experience ‘involutionary’ and not evolutionary 
growth, and that clusters that have strong distribution networks or are well connected to distant markets 
by traders tend to achieve higher incomes (Pedersen, 1997).
Related to the role and importance of business clusters and networks is the size factor of SMEs in determining 
their success. Many SMEs in African countries are set up and operated by individuals that, according to 
Rogerson (2000), pursue low-return activities where the barriers to market entry are low. Numerous studies 
have found that one-person businesses are the least efficient and profitable and that those entrepreneurs 
who recruited workers were more likely to survive, leading to a virtuous circle of expansion.
11.5	 World	Bank	Enterprise	Surveys
“The Enterprise Surveys are an ongoing World Bank project in collecting both objective data based on 
firms’ experiences and enterprises’ perception of the environment in which they operate”. Survey covers 
113 countries
Fully credit constrained 
FCC firms have no external loans because loan applications were rejected or the firm did not even bother 
to apply even though they needed additional capital.
Partially credit constrained
Partially credit constrained companies include those that: 
a. Used external sources of finance for working capital and/or investments during the previous fiscal 
year and/or have a loan outstanding at the time of the survey, and either:
b. Did not apply for a loan during the previous fiscal year and the reason for not applying for a loan 
was other than having enough capital for the firm’s needs. Some  of these reasons may indicate 
that firms may self-select out of the credit market due to prevailing terms and conditions, thus some 
degree of rationing is assumed or; 
c. Applied for a loan but was rejected. 
However, firms in this group manage to find some other forms of external finance and, consequentially, 
they are only partially credit constrained.
Maybe credit constrained
Includes companies that:
a. Used external sources of finance for working capital and/or investments during the previous fiscal 
year and/or have a loan outstanding at the time of the survey; 
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b. Applied for a loan during the previous fiscal year 
Not credit constrained
Includes companies that:
a. Did not apply for a loan during the previous fiscal year; 
b. The reason for not applying for a loan was having enough capital for the firm’s needs. 
As firms in this group have had access to external finance and there is evidence of them having bank 
finance, they are classified under the possibility of maybe being credit constrained as it is impossible to 
ascertain whether they were partially rationed on the terms and conditions of their external finance.
Source: World Bank
11.6	 Enabling	frameworks	for	technology	transfer
Enabling	
environment	
elements
Relevant	government	policies	
(examples	of	areas	of	influence)
Barriers	addressed	(examples)	
National 
macroeconomic 
conditions 
-Trade policies and laws
-Tax , subsidies, and tariff regime policies
-Regulation of financial sector institutions 
-Public investment policies 
-Commercial law and practices 
-lack of adequate financing options e.g., 
high cost of capital and interest rate 
-High inflation rate and high price 
fluctuations
-Balance of payment problems
-High import duties  
-Unstable currency and uncertain 
exchange rates
Human, 
organisational, 
and institutional 
capacity 
-Capability building programs of 
governmental agencies and institutions
-Initiatives to efficiency in government 
procedures and processes 
-Promotion of industry associations, 
networks, organisations, and alliances
- Lack of functioning legal institutions
-Lack of coordination between 
governmental agencies
-Lack of stakeholder/community 
participation in technology choices 
-Lack of specialised governmental 
agencies 
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Enabling	
environment	
elements
Relevant	government	policies	
(examples	of	areas	of	influence)
Barriers	addressed	(examples)	
Research and 
technological 
capacity
-Technical standards, certification, and 
codes
-Public funded research and development 
and training programmes 
-Support for testing and demonstration 
facilities (including training programs)
-Monitoring capacity enhancement 
programs
-Property rights regimes policies
-Lack of technology nurturing sites 
-Limited capacity to install, implement, 
operate, and maintain technology 
-Insufficient specialised expertise in 
technology, practice, or organisational 
system 
-Lack of institutions or initiatives to set 
standards
Social and 
cultural 
-Information dissemination, outreach, and 
awareness raising campaigns
-Targeted assistance to promote early 
adopters and technology front runners 
-Promotion of public-private partnerships  
-Education policies 
-Limited awareness,  trust, or 
acceptance in the suitability/reliability of 
the technology
-Aesthetical considerations of users 
technology (e.g., products lack appeal)
-Community resistance to technology or 
practice 
-Tradition, social esteem, pride, laziness 
and religious belief discouraging 
technology adoption 
Source: Boldt, J., Nygaard, J., Hansen, U.E., Trærup, S. (2012) Overcoming Barriers to the Transfer and Diffusion of 
Climate Technologies. UNEP Risø Centre, Denmark
11.7	 Solar	dryers	in	Zambia
Zambia, along with many other sub-Saharan African countries, has experienced a rapid diffusion of 
solar drying technology in recent years. Solar dryer are essentially a table whose main feature is a plastic 
sheet covering the fruit or vegetables which, combined with air flow, reduces their drying time to one 
third, compared to conventional drying (simply lying products in the sun) and minimises the risk of food 
contamination from dust and bird droppings etc. Food drying greatly reduces post-harvest losses as dried 
vegetables can be stored for months, into the next season. All vitamins and minerals are preserved through 
drying and dried vegetables are mainly boiled when prepared for meals.
Mrs. Chiluba is a farmer in Shimabala, Kafue District, approximately 45 km outside of Lusaka. She owns 
7 hectares of land, slightly less than the average for small-holder farms in the region, and practices 
conservation farming. She acquired a solar dryer in July 2012, for which she took out a loan with the 
Micro Bankers Trust (MBT), which in turn received credit guarantees from the AREED II facility. The solar 
dryer was manufactured by Sylva Foods and was sold for 3.5 million Kwacha (approx US$ 700). Sylva 
Foods promote solar dryers mainly for quality control and sanitation reasons and provide a guaranteed 
market for the dried vegetables produced using the solar dryers, paying an average of 8-10,000 Kwacha 
per kilo of dried vegetables which they then package and sell to supermarkets. MBT provided the loan at 
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a 30% annualised interest rate, which has to be paid back in 1 year at 350,000 Kwacha(US$ 70) monthly 
repayments.
It takes an average of 3 hours to dry vegetables under direct sun, using the solar dryer. The estimated 
maximum capacity of the solar dryer is 2 kilos of dried vegetables, per drying. Assuming there are 9 
hours of direct sunshine per day then the farmer would be able to produce a maximum of 6 kilos of dried 
vegetables per day, with a maximum value of 60,000 Kwacha (US$ 13). Assuming 25 days of direct 
sunshine per month then this equates to 1.5 million Kwacha (US$ 300), which would appear to make the 
solar dryer a worthwhile investment, though the figures are based on optimistic assumptions of almost 
constant drying throughout the month.
Solar drier built and sold by Sylva Foods, Shimabala, Kafue District, September 2012
At the time this research was carried out, Mrs. Chiluba had yet to produce and sell any products to Sylva 
Catering, but plans to dry lemons, okra, eggplant (aubergine), sweet potato, spinach, pumpkin leaves, 
paw-paw and mango, among other fruits and vegetables. Mrs. Chiluba learned about the solar dryer 
technology through one of IDE’s Farm Business Advisors or ‘go-to’ men, who told them about a workshop 
where the technology was being demonstrated. No literature was provided to explain the technology, 
just verbal explanations. Mrs. Chiluba understands that the best product to dry and sell is ‘chibwabwa’ 
(pumpkin leaves), and although she claimed that the drying process itself is simple, the produce must be 
soaked first in hot, then cold water before they can be dried, which takes time and energy. Although she 
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has access to electricity in her home Mrs. Chiluba mostly uses charcoal under a traditional (non-efficient) 
stove to boil water, for which she pays 30,000 kwacha (US$ 6) per 25 kg bag.
Mrs. Ngulube is a neighbour of Mrs. Chiluba in Shimabala and was similarly informed about the technology 
and the business opportunities it could provide her, and also took a loan through the MBT to purchase 
the drier, on the same terms. Mrs. Ngulube has 7 daughters and 28 grandchildren living with her on 
just 3 hectares of land. They have to rent land from neighbours to be able to grow enough food and 
raise animals, both for subsistence and sale to local markets. Mrs. Ngulube also practices conservation 
farming and claims to have increased her annual maize yield from 25 x 50kg bags to 230 x 50kg bags. 
Mrs. Ngulube explained that demand for dried vegetables has increased in Zambia due to health campaigns 
in the light of increased blood pressure and diabetes. 
11.8	 Energy	SMEs	that	were	awarded	loans	under	AREED	in	Ghana
No.
Name	of	
Organization/
Firm
Project
Year	of	
Sub.	
Pro.
Year	
Approved/
Disbursed
Amount	
Requested/	
Approved
Training	
Programme
Status	
1
AB 
Management
Energy 
Efficiency; 
Power Factor 
Correction, 
Industrial
2001 2003
US$ 
120,000/ 
US$122,400
Participated 
in AREED 
entrepreneurs 
training 
programme 
from 14th to 
16th February, 
2001 in Accra
Successful
2
Anasset
LPG Retail 
and Marketing 
Company
2002 2002 US$ 38,000 One on 
one training 
sessions with 
KITE Officials
Successful
Anasset II 2007 2007 US$ 225,000
3 Fee-Hi Ventures LPG retail 2004 2004
US$ 27,000/ 
US$ 33,500
One on 
one training 
sessions with 
KITE Officials
Successful
4
Gladymanuel I
CFLs
2002 2002
US$ 200,000  
/US$70,000
Participated 
in AREED 
entrepreneurs 
training 
programmes
Successful
Gladymanuel II 2004 2004
US$ 150,00/ 
US$50,000
5
Lambark Gas I
LPG 
Distribution
2004 2004
US$ 70,000/  
US$109,746
Participated 
in AREED 
entrepreneurs 
training 
programmes
Successful
Lambark Gas II 2006 2007 US$ 250,000
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No.
Name	of	
Organization/
Firm
Project
Year	of	
Sub.	
Pro.
Year	
Approved/
Disbursed
Amount	
Requested/	
Approved
Training	
Programme
Status	
6
M-38
LPG 
Distribution
2004 2004 US$ 59,000 Participated 
in the AREED 
entrepreneurs 
training 
programme
Successful
M-38 II 2007 2007 US$ 50,000
7 RKA LPG Stoves 2005 2005
US$ 
173,469/      
US$104,080
Participated 
in the AREED 
entrepreneurs 
training 
programme
Successful
8
Trans-Legacy 
Ventures
LPG Stoves 2002 2002 US$ 20,000
Participated 
in the AREED 
entrepreneurs 
training 
programme
Successful
9 ABARA Gas
LPG 
Distribution
2005 2006
US$ 211,00/    
US$ 102,990
Participated 
in the AREED 
entrepreneurs 
training 
programme
Successful
10
Bansim Binara 
(BBE)
LPG 
Distribution
2005 2006
US$ 86,451/ 
US$ 46,000
One on 
one training 
sessions with 
KITE officials
Successful
11
Power World I
Energy 
Efficiency
2006 2006 US$  77,912 One on 
one training 
sessions with 
KITE officials
Successful
Power World II 2006 2006 US$ 70,000
12 Toyola
Biomass 
Cookstoves
2006 2006 US$ 70,000
One on 
one training 
sessions with 
KITE officials
Successful
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No.
Name	of	
Organization/
Firm
Project
Year	of	
Sub.	
Pro.
Year	
Approved/
Disbursed
Amount	
Requested/	
Approved
Training	
Programme
Status	
13 WilkinSolar
PV Solar 
Home Syster 
& Solar Water 
Heaters
2005 2006 US$ 127,000
One on 
one training 
sessions with 
KITE officials
Successful
14 Best Solar
PV Solar 
Home Syster 
& Solar Water 
Heaters
2007 2007 US$ 45,000
Participated in 
KITE training 
programmes
Successful
15 NorthLite
Solar Lighting 
Products
2011 2012/2012
US$120,000/ 
US$50,000
Enterprise 
Development 
Support to 
entrepreneur
The 
approved 
amount 
is yet to 
disbursed
11.9	 Electricity	tariffs	2010	in	Zambia,	Tanzania,	Ghana	and	Senegal
Electricity	tariffs	(2010)(cents	US/kWh)
    Zambia Tanzania Ghana Senegal
Social tariff (E=100kWh/month) 1kW 1,13 6,46 8,07 17,58
         
Single phase domestic usage 2kW 2,04 8,88 7,8 17,74
(E=200kWh/month) 4kW 2,04 8,88 7,8 20,47
         
Triphase domestic usage 6kW 2,18 8,4 10,32 17,74
(E=600kWh/month) 10kW 2,18 8,4 10,32 19,56
         
Commercial usage 12kW 4,13 10,61 14,61 23,52
(E=1 800kWh/month) 15kW 4,13 11,84 14,61 24,91
         
Semi-Industrial & motive power 20kW 4,52 10 13,22 24,63
(E=2 500kWh/month) 25kW 4,92 11,48 13,22 25,31
         
Medium voltage 250kW 4,72 9,91 14,06 20,09
(E=35 000kWh/month)          
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OECD	average	household	tariff	=	14,5	cents	UD/kWh	(WEO,	2012)
Source: www.updea-africa.org/updea/DocWord/TarifAng2010.pdf
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